COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Smith, A. (1937) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, New York: Random House.

• Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an exclusive company, of whom the colonies were obliged to by all such European goods as they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to sell the whole of their own surplus produce. It was the interest of the company, therefore, not only to sell the former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap as possible, but to buy no more of the latter, even at this low price, than what they could dispose of for a very high price in Europe. It was their interest, not only to degrade in all cases the value of the surplus produce of the colony, but in many cases to discourage and keep down the natural increase of its quantity. Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt that natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual. 542
• Other nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother country, from whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either in a fleet and at a particular season, or, in single, in consequence of a particular license, which is most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the trade of the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they traded from the proper port, at the proper season, and in the proper vessels. But as all the different merchants, who joined their stock in order to fit out those licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the trade which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted very nearly upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company. The profit of those merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and oppressive. The colonies would be ill supplied, and would be obliged both to buy very dear, and to sell very cheap. 542-3
• The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management in the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is perhaps either a member of the colony assemble, or an elector of such a member, he dare not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave. 553
• The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consists, first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and secondly, in the augmentation of its industry. 557
• Through the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system proposes to enrich every country, yet with regard to some particular commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan to discourage exportation and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those of other nations in all foreign markets: and by restraining, in this manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes an occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others. It encourages the importation of the materials of manufacture, in order that our own people may be enabled to work them up more cheaply, and thereby prevent a greater and more valuable importation of the manufactured commodities. 607
• It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been carefully attended to; and among this latter class are merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principle architects. 626

Hoselitz, B. (1957) “Economic Growth and Development: Non-economic Factors in Economic Development,” American Economic Review, 47, 28-41, pp. 183-192.

• The need for capital on a relatively large scale requires the availability of institutions through which savings can be collected and channeled into projects of employing productive capital. Hence a banking system or its equivalent in the form of a state agency collecting revenue and spending it on developmental projects is required. What is also required in a society in which investment decisions are made by private individuals is a legal institution, such as the corporation, which allows the combination of capitals of various individuals in order to support enterprises which, for technological reasons, can be undertaken economically only on a large scale. In Britain all these institutions were in existence at the time its industrial revolution began. 184
• These [skilled labor of various kinds, chiefly entrepreneurial services and the services of skilled administrators, engineers, scientists, and managerial personnel] rather than manual skills are the types of labor normally in short supply in nonindustrialized countries, and it is the overcoming of bottlenecks in the supply of these kinds of services that a major developmental effort usually needs to be made. 186
• By the onset of the industrial revolution, technological research was widespread and had spilled over from being practiced in the laboratories of “experimental philosophers” to be carried on also in workshops, mines, and manufactories. 187
• Entrepreneurship is a more evasive thing. It is not so much a particular set of institutions through which it is brought to bear, but its presence or absence, its vigor or debility depends rather upon a whole series of environmental conditions and appropriate personal motivations. It has been shown—in my opinion successfully—that entrepreneurship is associated with a personality pattern in which achievement motivation is strong. But the presence of strong achievement motivation in a group of individuals does not necessarily produce an abundance of entrepreneurs unless certain other general conditions of social structure and culture strongly favor achievement-oriented individuals to enter economic pursuits. 188
• It is not too difficult to show that in a society in which the acquisition of wealth is regarded as a good thing in itself, persons with the appropriate motivational disposition will tend to enter an entrepreneurial career. 188
• Economic growth is a process which affects not only purely economic relations but the entire social, political, and cultural fabric of a society. The predominant problem of economic growth in our day is the overcoming of economic stagnation, which normally takes place through a process of industrialization. In most record cases in which industrialization took place and led to a level of self-sustaining growth, this phase of economic development was initiated by a rapidly “explosive” period which, in concordance with Rostow, we may call the take-off. The rapid structural and organizational changes affecting the productivity of a society which take place during the take-off phase are made possible because in a previous phase social institutions were created which allow the successful overcoming of supply bottlenecks, chiefly in the field of capital formation and the availability of a number of highly skilled and specialized services. The creation of these social institutions in turn, especially the “institutionalization” of entrepreneurship, i.e., an innovating uncertainty-bearing activity, requires the establishment of a social framework within which these new institutions can exist and expand. 189
• …a deviant always engages in behavior which constitutes a breach of the existing order and which is neither contrary to, or at least not positively weighted in, the hierarchy of existing social values. 190
• deviant behavior is often exercised by persons who, in some sense, are marginal to society. 190
• Once a form of deviant behavior can find the shelter of an institution, it becomes routinized, it ceases to be deviant, and it tends to become an accepted mode of social action. 191
• …one of the most important determinants of the relative success of deviants will be the system of sanctions which exist in a society. 191
• …rather than developing entirely new institutions, new meaning may be given to existing old ones; and whereas in the former process of industrialization will be preceded normally by a substantial alteration in relations between social classes, this will not take place, or only to a smaller extent, in the second case. 192
• Since the development of new institutions by means of deviance has usually been outside the control and often even in opposition to the aims of the elite, it has been designated as an autonomous process. 192
• This seems to indicate that ultimately a theoretical system may have to be evolved in which the interrelations between the various processes determining institutions embodying social change are elucidated. 192

Rostow, W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• in terms of human motivation, many of the most profound economic changes are viewed as the consequence of the non-economic human motives and aspiration. 2
• The idea spreads that not merely economic progress is possible, but that economic progress is a necessary condition for some other purpose, judged to be good: be it national dignity, private profit, the general welfare, or a better life for the children. 6
• The revolutionary changes in agricultural productivity are an essential condition for successful take-off; for modernization of a society increases radically its bill for agricultural products. 8

Schumpeter, J.A. (1961) The Theory of Economic Development, New York: Oxford University Press.

• The mere knowledge of the changed state of affairs is not attained in most cases with desirable promptness. To draw conclusions from the knowledge is again a big step, which meets many obstacles in unpreparedness, the lack of means and so on. 33
• This stability is indispensable for the economic conduct of individuals. 40
• There is one kind of economic conduct which, under given conditions, establishes the equilibrium between means on hand and wants to be satisfied in the best way possible. 40
• For the economic state of a people does not emerge simply from the preceding economic conditions, but only from the preceding total situation. 58
• Every concrete process of development finally rests upon preceding development. 64
• Development in our sense is a distinct phenomena, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium. It is a spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing. 64
• To produce means to combine materials and forces within our reach. To produce other things, or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials and forces differently. 65 Development in our sense is then defined by the carrying out of new combinations. 66
• command over means of production is necessary to the carrying out of new combinations. 68
• Here the success of everything depends upon intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the moment, and of grasping the essential fact, discarding the unessential, even though one can give no account of the principles by which this is done. 85

Bendix, R. (1964) Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order, Berkely, CA: University of California Press, pp. 362-434.

• These changes in the eighteenth century initiated a transformation of human societies which is comparable in magnitude only to the transformation of nomadic peoples into settled agriculturalists some 10,000 years earlier. Until 1750 the proportion of the world’s active population engaged in agriculture was probably above 80 per cent. Two centuries later it was about 60 per cent, and in the industrialized countries of the world it had fallen below 50 per cent, reaching low figures like 10 to 20 per cent in countries that have a relatively long history of industrialization. In Great Britain, the country which pioneered in this respect, the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture reached a low 5 per cent in 1950. 361-2
• Trading as well as the ownership and care of property undermine an individual’s integrity, because his every act and thought turns on considerations of money and economic expediency. 368
• “He must cultivate some individual talent, in order to be useful, and it is well understood that in his existence there can be no harmony, because in order to render one talent useful, he must abandon the exercise of every other.” Thus, to Goethe’s hero, the aristocrat has high social standing but a cold heart, the Burger may gain distinction by his attainments, but only the artist is in a position to pursue the harmonious cultivation of his nature. (Goethe, J. (1867) Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, London: Bell and Doldy.) 368
• Proudhon also believes that specialization has a destructive effect on the individual. 371
• This ability to maintain his family by his own efforts makes the peasant into the ideal anarchist. By contrast Proudhon emphasizes that certain industries “require the combined employment of a large number of workers” involving subordination and mutual dependence. “The producer is no longer, as in the fields, a sovereign and free father of a family; it is a collectivity. Thus, for Proudhon, industry is a locus of an enforced collectivism, mutual dependence, and subordination., whereas agriculture enhances freedom and individualism. (Proudhon, P.J. (1923) General Idea of the Revolution in the 19^th Century, London: Freedom Press). 372
• The industrial revolution in England and the contemporary political revolution in France had a profound cultural impact, frequently leading men of letters to formulate pervasive and invidious contrasts between the old and the new social order. As a result “tradition” and “modernity” came to be conceived in mutually exclusive terms, not only as a conceptual aid but also as a generalized, descriptive statement about the two, contrasting types of society. 404.
• …modernization, once it has occurred anywhere, alters the conditions of all subsequent efforts at modernization so that “the late arrivals cannot repeat the earlier sequences of industrial development.”
• …the internal, historically developed structure of a country and the emulation induced by economic and political developments abroad affect each country’s process of modernization. 411
• The simplified contrast between tradition and modernity shows us that medieval society was ruled by a landowning aristocracy and capitalist society by a bourgeoisie owning the means of production. If one conceives of the transition from tradition to modernity as the decline of one set of attributes and the rise of another, one gets the simple picture of a declining aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie. 420
• The continuity between tradition and modernity remains a characteristic of social change throughout, for even the increasing differentiation between office and family in Western Civilization reveals a variety of historically conditioned patterns. 424.
• The division of history into epochs, like the distinction between tradition and modernity, is a construct of definite, but limited unity. 432
• If we want to explain this historical breakthrough in Europe, our emphasis will be on the continuity of intra-societal changes. If we wish to include in our account the worldwide repercussions of this breakthrough and hence the differential process of modernization, our emphasis will be on the confluence of intrinsic and extrinsic changes of social structures. Both emphases are relevant for the comparative study of stratification. 433

Smelser, N. (1964) “Toward a Theory of Modernization,” in Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.) Social Change, Sources, Patterns and Consequences, New York: Basic Books, pp. 258-274.

• Economic development generally refers to the “growth of output per head of population.” (Lewis, W.A. (1955) The Theory of Economic Growth, London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 1.)
• For purposes of analyzing the relationships between economic growth and the social structure, it is possible to isolate the effects of several interrelated technical, economic, and ecological processes frequently accompanying development: (1) In the real of technology, the change from simple and traditional techniques toward the application of scientific knowledge. (2) In agriculture, the evolution from subsistence farming toward commercial production of agricultural goods. This means specialization is cash crops, purchase of nonagricultural products in the market, and frequently agricultural wage-labor. (3) In industry, the transition from the use of human and animal power toward industrialization proper or “men aggregated at power-driven machines working for monetary return with the products of the manufacturing process, entering into a market based on a network of exchange relations.” (Nash, N. (1954) “Some Notes on Village Industrialization in South and East Asia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, No. 3, p. 271.) (4) In ecological arrangements, the movement from the farm and village toward urban centers. 259
• As the economy develops, several kinds of economic activity are removed from this family-community complex. In agriculture, the introduction of money crops marks a differentiation between the social contexts of production and consumption. Agricultural wage-labor sometimes undermines the family production unit. 262
• “Cottage industry,” …frequently involves a differentiation between consumption and community, since production is “for the market , for an unknown consumer, sold to a wholesaler who accumulates a stock,” (Boeke, J.H. (1942) The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy, New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations). 262
• One implication of the removal of economic activities from the kinship nexus is that the family loses some of its previous functions and thereby itself becomes a more specialized agency. The family ceases to be an economic unit of production; one or more members now leave the household to seek employment in the labor market. The family’s activities become more concentrated on emotional gratification and socialization. While many halfway houses such as family hiring and migratory systems persist, the tendency is toward the segregation of family functions and economic functions. 263
• Capitalism had, by virtue of its conquest of Western society, solidly established an institutional base and a secular value-system of its own—“economic rationality,” These secular economic values no longer needed the “ultimate” justification required in the newer , unsteadier days of economic revolution. 265
• Differentiation alone, therefore, is not sufficient for modernization. Development proceeds as a contrapuntal interplay between differentiation (which is divisive of established society) and integration (which unites differentiated structures on a new basis). Paradoxically, however, the process of integration itself produces more differentiated structures—e.g., trade unions, associations, political parties, and a mushrooming state apparatus. 267
• Urbanization, however, frequently creates more anonymity. As a result, one finds frequently in expanding cities a growth of voluntary associations—churches and chapels, unions, schools, halls, athletic clubs, bars, shops, mutual aid groups, etc. In some cases this growth of integrative groupings may be retarded because of the back-and-forth movement of migratory workers, who “come to the city for their differentiation” and “return to the village for their integration.” In cities themselves the original criterion for association may be common tribe, caste, or village; this criterion may persist or give way gradually to more “functional” groupings based on economic or political interests. 268
• (1) Differentiation demands the creation of new activities, norms, rewards and sanctions—money, political position, prestige based on occupation, and so on. These often conflict with old modes of social action, which are frequently dominated by traditional religious, tribal, and kinship systems. These traditional standards are among the most intransigent of obstacles to modernization, and where they are threatened, serious dissatisfaction and apposition arise. (2) Structural change is, above all, uneven in periods of modernization. In colonial societies, for instance, the European powers frequently revolutionized the economic, political, and educational frameworks, but simultaneously encouraged or imposed a conservatism in traditional religious, class, and family systems. 270
• Thus unevenness creates anomie in the classical sense, for it generates disharmony between life experiences and the normative framework by which these experiences are regulated. 270
• (1) Undifferentiated institutional structures frequently constitute the primary social barriers to modernization. Individuals refuse to work for wages because of traditional kinship, village, tribal, and other ties. Invariably a certain amount of political pressure is required to pry individuals loose from these ties. The need for such pressure increases, of course, with the rate of modernization desired. (2) The process of differentiation itself creates those conditions which demand a larger, more formal type of political administration. A further argument for the importance of government in periods of rapid and uneven modernization lies, then, in the need to accommodate the growing cultural, economic, and social heterogeneity, and to control the political repercussions from the constantly shifting distribution of power which accompanies extensive social reorganization. (3) The apparent propensity for periods of early modernization to erupt into explosive outbursts creates delicate political problems for the leaders of developing nations. We might conclude this essay of the major social forces of modernization by suggesting what kinds of government are likely in be most effective in such troubles areas. First, political leaders will increase their effectiveness by open and vigorous commitment to utopian and xenophobic nationalism. The commitment serves as a powerful instrument for attaining three of their most important ends: (a) the enhancement of their own claim to legitimacy by endowing themselves with the mission for creating the nation-state; (b) the procurement of otherwise impossible sacrifices from a populace which may be committed to modernization in the abstract but which resists the concrete breaks with traditional ways; (c) the use of their claim to legitimacy to hold down protests and to prevent generalized symbols such as communism from spreading to all sorts of particular grievances. 273
• Differentiation may arise from sources other than economic development; the requirement of integration may arise from conditions other than differentiation; and the sources of social disturbance are not exhausted by the discontinuities between differentiation and integration. 274

Tocqueville, A. (1966) Democracy in America, J.P. Mayer (ed.), Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

• Understanding its own interests, the people would appreciate that in order to enjoy the benefits of society one must should its obligations. Free associations of the citizens could then take the place of the individual authority of the nobles, and the state would be protected both from tyranny and from license. 14
• The emigrants who colonized America at the beginning of the seventeenth century in some way separated the principle of democracy from all other principles against which they contended when living in the heart of old European societies, and transplanted that principle only on the shores of the New World. It could there grow in freedom and, progressing in conformity with mores, develop peacefully within the law. 18
• It is not political opinions only, but all the views of men which are influences by freedom of the press. 180
• The effective force of any power is increased in proportion to the centralization of its control. 184
• ...with their resources restricted, the power of the American press is still immense. It makes political life circulate in every corner of that vast land. Its eyes are never shut, and it lays bare the secret shifts of politics, forcing public figures in turn to appear before the tribunal of opinion. The press rallies interests around certain doctrines and gives shape to party slogans; through the press the parties, without actually meeting, listen and argue with one another. When many organs of the press to come to take the same line, their influence in the long run is almost irresistible, and public opinion, continually struck in the same spot, ends by giving way under the blows. Each individual American newspaper has little power, but after the people, the press is nonetheless the first of powers. 186
• Opinions established in America under the influence of its free press are often more firmly rooted than those formed elsewhere under censorship. 186
• A great man has said that ignorance lies at both ends of knowledge. Perhaps it would have been truer to say that deep convictions lie at the two ends, with doubt at the middle. 187
• It has been noted that in ages of religious fervor men sometimes changed their beliefs, whereas in skeptical centuries each man held obstinately to his own faith. 187
• The most natural right of man, after that of acting on his own, is that of combining his efforts with those of his fellows and acting together. Therefore the right of association seems to me by nature almost as inalienable as individual liberty. 193
• It is our inexperience of liberty in action which still leads us to regard freedom of association as no more than a right to make war on the government. The first idea which comes into a party’s mind, as into of an individual, when it gains some strength is that of violence; the thought of persuasion only comes later, for it is born of experience. 194
• …perhaps universal suffrage is the most powerful of all the elements tending to moderate the violence of political associations in the United States. In a country with universal suffrage the majority is never in doubt, because no party can reasonably claim to represent those who have not voted at all. 194
• In democratic eyes government is not a blessing but a necessary evil. Officials must be given certain powers, for without them how could they be of any use? But the external pomps of power are by no means essential to the conduct of business; the sight of them would offend the public uselessly. 203
• …the art of administration is certainly a science, and all sciences, to make progress, need to link the discoveries of succeeding generations. One man in the short space of life notices a fact and another conceives an idea; one man finds a means and another discovers a formula; as life goes on, humanity collects various fruits of individual experience and build up knowledge. It is very difficult for American administrators to learn anything from each other. Thus the lights that guide them in the direction of society are those to be found widespread throughout that society, and not any particular administrative techniques. So democracy, pressed to its ultimate limits, harms the progress of the art of government. In this respect it is better adapted to a people whose administrative education is already finished than to a nation which is a novice in the experience of public affairs. 208
• In aristocratic governments those who get to the head of affairs are rich men desiring power only. The statesmen in democracies are poor, with their fortunes to make. As a result, the rulers in aristocratic states are little open to corruption and have only a very moderate taste for money, whereas the opposite occurs in democracies. 220
• So while rulers of aristocracies sometimes seek to corrupt, those of democracies prove corruptible. The first directly attack the morality of the people, whereas the others exercise on the public conscience an indirect effect which is even more to be feared. 220
• Nothing in the world is so fixed in its views as an aristocracy. The mass of the people may be seduced by its ignorance or its passions; a king may be taken off his guard and induced to vacillate in his plans; and moreover, a king is not immortal. But an aristocratic body is too numerous to be caught, and yet so small that it does not easily yield to the intoxication of thoughtless passions. An aristocratic body is a firm and enlightened man who never dies. 230
• The political constitution of the United States seems to me to be one of the forms that democracy can give to its government, but I do not think that American institutions are the only ones, or the best, that a democratic nation might adopt. So in pointing out the blessings which the Americans derive from democratic government, I am far from claiming or from thinking that such advantages can only be attained by the same laws. 231
• I have come to the conclusion that all the causes tending to maintain a democratic republic in the United States fall into three categories: The first is the peculiar and accidental situation in which providence has placed the Americans. Their laws are the second. Their habits and mores are the third. 277
• Among the lucky circumstances that favored the establishment and assured the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States, the most important was the choice of the land itself in which the Americans live. Their fathers gave them a love of equality and liberty, but it was God who, by handing a limitless continent over to them, gave them the means of long remaining equal and free. General prosperity favors stability in all governments, but particularly in a democratic one, for it depends on the moods of the greatest number, and especially on the moods of those most exposed to want. When the people rule, they must be happy, if they are not to overthrow the state. 279-80
• One cannot clear the wilderness without either capital or credit, and before a man ventures into the forest his body must be accustomed to the rigors of a new climate. It is therefore Americans who are continually leaving their birthplace and going forth to win vast far-off domains. 281
• Millions of men are all marching together to the same point on the horizon; their languages, religions, and mores are different, but they have one common aim. They have been told that fortune is to be found somewhere toward the west, and they hasten to seek it. 282
• Other nations in America have the same opportunities for prosperity as the Anglo-Americans, but not their law or mores, and these nations are wretched. So the laws and mores of the Anglo-Americans are the particular and predominant causes, which I have been seeking, of their greatness. I am far from claiming that there is absolute excellence in the American type of laws: I do not believe that they are applicable to all democratic peoples, and there are several of them that strike me as dangerous even in the United States. 307
• When towns and provinces form so many different nations within the common motherland, each of them has a particularist spirit opposed to the general spirit of servitude. But now that all parts of a single empire have lost their franchises, usages, prejudices, and even their memories and names and have grown accustomed to obey the same laws, it is no longer more difficult to oppress them altogether than do to this to each separately. 313
• It is hard to make the people take a share in government; it is even harder to provide them with the experience and inspire them with the feelings they need to govern well. 315
• But I do think that if we do not succeed in gradually introducing democratic institutions among us, and if we despair of impairing to all citizens those ideas and sentiments which first prepare them for freedom and then allow them to enjoy it, there will be no independence left for anybody, neither for the middle classes nor for the nobility, neither for the poor nor for the rich, but only an equal tyranny for all; and I foresee that if the peaceful dominion of the majority is not established among us in good time, we shall sooner or alter fall under the unlimited authority of a single man. 315
• General ideas have this excellent quality, that they permit human minds to pass judgment quickly on a great number of things; but the conceptions they convey are always incomplete, and what is gained in extent is always lost in exactitude. 437
• In ages of equality all men are independent of each other, isolated and weak. One finds no man whose will permanently directs the actions of the crowd. 439
• I have shown before how equal standards induce each man to look for truth himself. It is easy to see how such a method insensibly directs the human spirit towards generalizations. 439
• The main business of religions is to purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which men acquire in times of equality, but I think it would be a mistake for them to attempt to conquer it entirely and abolish it. They will never succeed in preventing men from loving wealth, but they may be able to induce them to use only honest means to enrich themselves. 448
• The more people are assimilated to one another and brought to an equality, the more important it becomes that religions, while remaining studiously aloof from the daily turmoil of worldly business, should not needlessly run counter to prevailing ideas or the permanent interests of the mass of the people. 448
• …by respecting all democratic instincts which are not against it and making use of many favorable ones, religion succeeds in struggling successfully with that spirit of individual independence which is most dangerously enemy. 449
• Freedom is found at different times and different forms; it is not exclusively dependent on one social state, and one finds it elsewhere than in democracies. It cannot therefore be taken as the distinctive characteristic of democratic ages. The particular and predominating fact peculiar to those ages is equality of conditions, and the chief passion which stirs men at such times is the love of this same equality. 504
• I think democratic peoples have a natural taste for liberty; left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and be sad if it is taken from them. But their passion for equality is ardent, insatiable, eternal, and invincible. They want equality in freedom, and if they cannot have that, they still want equality in slavery. They will put up with poverty, servitude, and barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy. 506
• Egoism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to all. Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself. Egoism springs from a blind instinct; individualism is based on misguided judgment rather than depraved feeling. It is due more to inadequate understanding than to perversity of heart. Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at first only dams the spring of public virtues, but in the long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally merges in egoism. Egoism is a vice as old as the world. It is not peculiar to one form of society more than another. Individualism is of democratic origin and threatens to grow as conditions get more equal. 506-7
• Despotism, by its very nature suspicious, sees the isolation of men as the best guarantee of its own permanence. So it usually does all it can to isolate them. Of all the vices of the human heart egoism is that which suits it best. A despot will lightly forgive his subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love one another. 509
• He [a despot] calls those who try to unite their efforts to create a general prosperity “turbulent and restless spirits”, and twisting the natural meaning of words, he calls those “good citizens” who care for none but themselves. 509
• Americans of all ages, all stations of life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. They are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types—religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and limited, immensely large and very minute. 513
• …the most democratic country in the world now is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires and have applied this new technique to the greatest number of purposes. 514
• The more government takes the place of associations, the more will individuals lose the idea of forming associations and need the government to come to their help. 515
• Among laws controlling human societies there is one more precise and clearer, it seems to me, than all the others. If men are to remain civilized, the art of association must develop and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spreads. 517
• When no firm and lasting ties any longer unite men, it is impossible to obtain the cooperation of any great number of them unless you can persuade every man whose help is required that he serves his private interests by voluntarily uniting his efforts to those of all others. That cannot be done habitually and conveniently without the help of a newspaper. Only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before a thousand readers. 517
• As equality spreads and men individually become less strong, they ever increasingly let themselves glide with the stream of the crowd and find it hard to maintain alone an opinion abandoned by the rest. The newspaper represents the association; one might say that it speaks to each of its readers in the name of all the rest, and the feebler they are individually, the easier it is to sweep them along. The power of newspapers must therefore grow as equality spreads. 520
• One must understand that unlimited political freedom of association is of all forms of liberty the last which a people can sustain. If it does not topple them over into anarchy, it brings them continually to the brink thereof. 524
• One hears it said that such and such a nation could not maintain internal peace, inspire respect for its laws, or establish a stable government if it did not set strict limits to the right of association. These are undoubtedly great benefits, and one can understand why, to gain or keep them, a nation may agree for a time to impose galling restrictions on itself; but still a nation should know what price it pays for these blessings. To save a man’s life, I can understand cutting off his arm. But I don’t want anyone to tell me that he will be as dexterous without it. 524
• American moralists do not pretend that one must sacrifice himself for his fellows because it is a fine thing to do so. But they boldly assert that such sacrifice is as necessary for the man who makes it as for the beneficiaries. 525
• Love of comfort has become the dominant national taste. The main current of human passions running in that direction sweeps everything along with it. 532
• It might be supposed, from what has been said, that the love of physical pleasures would continually lead the Americans into moral irregularities, disturb the peace of families, and finally threaten the stability of society itself. But it does not happen like that. The passions for physical pleasures produces in democracies effects very different from those it occasions in aristocratic societies. 532
• But love of physical pleasures never leads democratic peoples to such excesses. Among them love of comfort appears as a tenacious, exclusive, and universal passion, but always a restrained one. There is no question of building vast palaces, of conquering or excelling nature, or sucking the world dry to satisfy one man’s greed. It is more a question of adding a few acres to one’s fields, planting an orchard, enlarging a house, making life ever easier and more comfortable, keeping irritations away, and satisfying one’s slightest needs without trouble and almost without expense. 533
• Where physical pleasures are concerned, the opulent citizens of a democracy do not display tastes very different from those of the people, either because, themselves originating from the people, they really do share them or because they think they ought to accept their standards. 533
• The nations of our day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading in their midst. But it depends upon themselves whether equality is to lead to servitude or freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness. 705

Myrdal, G. (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.

• The bests interests of the United States, for instance, dictate the establishment and growth in the underdeveloped countries of what many people there themselves strive for: a stable and, where possible, democratic regime in a consolidated nation capable of economic development. 13
• Economic theorists, more than other social scientists, have long been disposed to arrive at general propositions and then postulate them as valid for every time, place, and culture. 16
• Economists operate to a great extent within a framework that developed early in close relationship with the Western philosophies of natural law and utilitarianism and the rationalistic psychology of hedonism. Only with time has this tradition been adapted to changing conditions, and then without much feeling of need for radical modifications. 17
• When we economists, working within this tenacious but variegated but flexible tradition of preconceptions that admittedly are not too badly fitted to our own conditions, suddenly turn our attention to countries with radically different conditions, the risk of fundamental error is exceedingly great. 17
• The lack of mobility and the imperfection of markets in underdeveloped countries rob the analytical method of aggregation of magnitudes - employment, savings, investment, and output - of much of its meaning. This conceptual difficulty is in addition to the statistical one already pointed out: that the data aggregated are frail and imperfect, partly because their categories are unrealistic. 19
• while in the Western world an analysis in "economic" terms - markets and prices, employment and unemployment, consumption and savings, investment and output - that abstracts from modes and levels of living and from attitudes, institutions and cultures may make sense and lead to valid inferences, an analogous procedure plainly does not in underdeveloped countries. 19-20
• …the tendency to use the familiar theories and concepts that have been used successfully in the analysis of Western countries exerts influences in the same direction. 23
• The strict logic a non-theoretical approach is scientific work is impossible; and every theory contains the seed of a priori thought. 24
• Theory, therefore, must not only be subjected to immanent criticism for logical consistency but must be constantly measured against reality and adjusted accordingly. 24
• Theory is thus no more than a correlated set of questions to the social reality under study. 25
• Inherent in all honest research is a self-correcting, purifying force that in the end will affirm itself. 25
• …we need not only establish the mechanisms that can explain the unique properties of these economies but also to build an analytical structure fitted in the dynamic problems of development and planning for development. 27
• [Objective research] The student should have no ulterior motives. He should confine himself to the search for truth and be as free as possible from both he pressures of tradition and of society around him and his own desires. More particularly, he should in his research have no intention in influencing the political attitudes of his readers, either inside or outside the countries whose conditions he is studying. His task is to provide factual information that will help them all reach greater rationality in following out their own interests and ideals, whatever those are. In his scientific work he should have no loyalties to any particular country or group of countries or any particular political ideology, whatever his own preferences. Indeed, he should have no loyalties at all except to the professional standards of truth-seeking. 31
• The only way in which we can strive for objectivity in theoretical analysis is to lift up the valuations into the full light, make them conscious and explicit, and permit them to determine the viewpoints, the approaches, and the concepts used. In the practical phases of a study the stated value premises should then, together with the data - established by theoretical analysis with the utilization of those same value premises - form the premises for all policy conclusions. 33

Frank, A. (1969) Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution--Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy, New York: Monthly Review Press.

• We cannot hope to formulate adequate development theory and policy for the majority of the world's population who suffer from underdevelopment without first learning how their past economic and social history gave rise to their present underdevelopment. 3
• …historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. 4
• …the economic, political, social and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the product of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly more modern or capitalist features of the metropoles of these underdeveloped countries. 5
• …a whole chain of constellations of metropoles and satellites relates all parts of the whole system from its metropolitan center in Europe or the United States to the farthest outpost in the Latin America countryside. 6
• …tendencies...which lead to the development of the metropolis and the underdevelopment of the satellite.  7
• …underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself. 9
• Though science and truth know no national boundaries, it is probably new generations of scientists from the underdeveloped countries themselves who most need to, and best can, devote the necessary attention to these problems and clarify the process of underdevelopment and development. It is their people who in the last analysis face the task of changing this no longer acceptable process and eliminating this miserable reality. 15
• They [people from underdeveloped countries] will not be able to accomplish these goals by importing sterile stereotypes from the metroplis which do not correspond to their satellite economic reality and do not respond to their liberating political needs. 16

Prebisch, R. (1970) Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task, Washington, DC: The Inter-American Development Bank.

• There is a direct link between the increase of marginality and the incapacity of urban activities to absorb the population increment in productive employment. 2
• considerable capital formation effort [is] required in order to give the economy the additional dynamism it needs. It is not conceivable - much less desirable - that this should be done mainly with foreign capital. A great internal effort will be an imperative and inescapable necessity. 14
• In reality, socialism has been a method of development rather than a method of transforming an advanced economy. 15
• Any system which fails to imbue the economy with the required degree of dynamism, and to promote more equitable income distribution, will have irrevocably forfeited the right to survive. 16

Tilly, C. (1970) “The Changing Place of Collective Violence,” in Melvin Richter (ed.) Essays in Theory and History, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 139-164.

• Collective violence is especially likely to occur when and where new groups are acquiring membership in the political community or old groups are losing it. The idea rests on an interest-group conception of political life. The main elements of that conception are: 1) Every polity consists of a limited number of identifiable groups with known but shifting relations to one another. Collectively they control the principal organized means of coercion within a society. 2) Those groups—the “members” of the polity—do not include all identifiable groups within a society and need include all persons within the society. 3) Every polity establishes tests of membership. All polities include among such tests the ability to mobilize or coerce significant numbers of people. 4) Within the polity, members constantly test one another in partial ways; repeated failures of partial tests lead to fuller tests and/or to exclusion from the polity. 5) Membership in the polity gives important advantages to a group; exclusion is costly. 6) Members of the polity resist the entry of new members and use their control over the organized means of coercion to do so. 7) Groups acquiring the means of membership in the polity define their demands or aspirations as rights which ought to be recognized or extended to them. 8) Groups losing the means of membership in the polity define their demands or aspirations as rights or privileges which they should retain. 9) The entry of a new group into the polity tends to produce collective violence because: a) the existing members resist with the coercive means under their control; b) the aspiring members make or reinforce their claims to membership by use of violence; c) each one defines the action of the other as illegitimate and as thus requiring and justifying extraordinary means of coercion. 10) The departure of a member from the polity also tends to produce collective violence because: a) among the fuller tests applied by other existing members are applications of violent coercion; b) the departing member state their claims to continued membership by the use of violence; c) again, each party defines the action of the other as illegitimate and as thus requiring and justifying extraordinary means of coercion. 11) Peaks of collective violence therefore occur when multiple entries into the polity and exits from it go on simultaneously. 12) The incorporation of smaller polities into some larger unit and the disintegration of a polity into smaller units both produce effects similar to the simultaneous entries and exits from several groups into the same polity, because they both shift the loci of important political identities. … 13) Each entry into a polity and each exit from it redefines the criteria of membership in a sense favorable to the characteristics of the new set of members. 14) The structural conditions favoring multiple entries or exits therefore vary from society to society and period to period. In general, however, they include rapid changes in the means of political communication, in the groups defined by economic activity and in the society’s coercive apparatus. 15) Every society also produces a significant amount of nonpolitical violence, which can for the short run of any particular society be treated as constant. However, long changes and international variations in the “culture of violence”—in the ways in which aggression is acted out and violence institutionalized—to produce important differences among societies in the level of collective violence. Furthermore, this nonpolitical culture of violence affects the form taken by political violence. 16) The mutual testing on the part of members also produces violence continuously, even when no exist or entries are occurring. Still, “testing violence” grows especially frequent around the entries and exist of members of the polity. 142-4
• …the distinctive pattern of behavior we know as the Western European food riot seems to have taken shape during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It remained the most frequent form of collective violence in some parts of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. More exactly, it took two shapes—one urban and one rural. 147
• …the predominant forms of collective violence during the first half of the century embodied, to an important degree, angry reactions to the growth of centralized nation-state organized around free markets, factory production, and capitalist property. The men who made the collective protest came largely from established classes being squeezed out by the big change. 155
• …their very classes created by the growth of centralized, capitalistic industrial nation-state were acquiring political identity by means of collective violence, if not by that means alone. Like their basic conditions of existence, their forms of violence were shaped by their willy-nilly implication in such a nation-state. Hence the fundamental traits of the new forms of collective violence: complexity and durability of organization, growth and formal associations, crystallization around explicit programs and articulated ideologies. 163
• The expectation-achievement line catches some important features of what we have met as the modern forms of violence in France: their emergence from newly developing aspirations, their frequent ideological character, their recruitment of groups just acquiring political identities. 163
• Obviously, urbanization and industrialization transform the basic divisions within societies and change the means different groups have of acquiring or maintaining political identities. Less obviously, but not less surely, urbanization, industrialization, and the emergence of a powerful state transform the very character—the form itself—of collective violence.

Schumacher, E. (1973) Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, London: Abacus.

• Small-scale operations, no matter how numerous, are always less likely to be harmful to the natural environment than large-scale ones, simply because their individual force is small in relation to the recuperative forces of nature. 29
• [Dorothy Sayers] "War is a judgment that overtakes societies when they have been living upon ideas that conflict too violently with the laws governing the universe ... Never think that wars are irrational catastrophes: they happen when wrong ways of thinking and living bring about intolerable situations." Creed or Chaos, Methuen and Co, London, 1947. 30
• An entirely new system of thought is needed, a system based on attention to people, and not primarily attention to goods. It could be summed up in the phrase - 'production by the masses, rather than mass production'. 61
• …that the key factor of all economic development comes out of the mind of men. 64
• Marx does not say that some parts of history are made up of class struggles; no, 'scientific materialism', not very scientifically, extends this partial observation to nothing less than the whole of 'the history of all hitherto existing society'. 73
• Every country, no matter how devastated, which had a high level of education, organization, and discipline, produced an 'economic miracle'. 140
• Education does not 'jump'; it is a gradual process of great subtlety. Organization does not 'jump'; it must gradually evolve to fit changing circumstances. And much the same goes for discipline. All three must evolve step by step, and the foremost task of this development policy is to speed this evolution. 140-1
• If new economic activities are introduced which depend on special education, and special organization, and special discipline, such as are in no way inherent to the recipient society, the activity will not promote healthy development but will more likely to hinder it. 141
• The task, then, is to bring into existence millions of new work-places in the rural areas and small towns. ... The real task may be formulated in four propositions. First, that workplaces have to be created in the areas where people are living now, and not primarily on metropolitan areas into which they tend to migrate. Second, that these workplaces must be, on average, cheap enough so that they can be created in large numbers without this calling for an unattainable level of capital formation and imports. Third, that the production methods employed must be relatively simple, so that the demands for high skills are minimized, not only in the production process itself but also in matters of organization, raw material supply, financing, marketing, and so forth. Fourth, that production should be mainly from local materials and mainly for local use. These four requirements can be met only if there is a 'regional' approach to development and, second, if there is a conscious effort to develop and apply what might be called an 'intermediate technology'. 146-147
• Economic development is something much wider and deeper than economics, let alone econometrics. Its roots lie outside the economic sphere, in education, organization, discipline and beyond that, in political independence and national consciousness of self-reliance. 171
• Economic development is primarily a question of getting more work done. For this, there are four essential conditions. First, there must be motivation; second, there must be some know-how; third, there must be some capital; and fourth, there must be an outlet: additional output requires additional markets. 172
• Planners...proceed on the assumption that the future is not 'already here', that they are dealing with a predetermined - and therefore predictable - system, that they can determine things by there own free will, and that there pans will make the future different from what it would have been had there been no plan. 188
• The best formulation of the necessary interplay of theory and practice, that I know of, comes from Mao Tse-tung: Go to the practical people, he says, and learn from them: then synthesize their experience into principles and theories; and then return to the practical people and call upon them to put these principles and methods into practice so as to solve their problems and achieve freedom and happiness. Selected Works by MTT, V.III.

Tilton, T. (June 1974) “The Social Origins of Liberal Democracy: The Swedish Case,” APSR, Vol. 68, pp. 561-571.

• Democratic development, at least for cases analogous to Germany, requires that economic development produce a broad, independent, assertive class of entrepreneurs capable of formulating a liberal program and imposing it upon the pre-industrial ruling classes. 562
• For democracy to triumph, the monopoly of power by a small clique of arbitrary rulers must be broke. 562
• This model [a radical liberal model of democratic development] postulates, and Swedish experience confirms, the existence of a distinctive set of conditions and tactics for democratic development--the availability of another "path to the modern world." It incorporates Dahrendorf's emphasis upon the avoidance of an industrialization fueled by vast military outlays and promoted by a soldier- aristocracy, but it rejects the notion that a liberal laissez-faire society constitutes an essential prerequisite for democratic development. The model also employs three of Moor's preconditions: the preservation of a balance between monarchy and aristocracy in the early stages of development; the subsequent weakening of the landed aristocracy in the early stages of development; the subsequent weakening of the landed aristocracy and the permeation of its thinking by bourgeois values; and the prevention of a reactionary alliance of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie against the peasants an workers. Sweden's development demonstrates, however, that massive emigration may substitute (in large measure, if not wholly) for the growth of commercial agriculture as a means of eliminating a financially unstable and politically dangerous peasantry. The Swedish case further demonstrates that…a radical reform can substitute for revolutionary violence. The radical liberal model thus specifies tactics as well as conditions for relatively non-violent democratic modernization. 569
• …the radical liberal model does not imply the political modernization--in America as elsewhere--must proceed by either practice of violent revolution or by "institution building" and purely parliamentary tactics("working through the system"). The Swedish case points to a path between timid liberalism and revolutionary violence. 569
• When the popular movement is able to persuade its governors that they face a choice between radical reform and revolution, when the insurgents are able (as the Social Democratic leader Branting was in 1918) to keep their revolutionary wing relatively small, and when the diehard conservatives perceive the futility of repression, the radical liberal path to democratic development opens. 569

Girvan, N. (1975) Conference on an Appraisal of the Relationship Between Agricultural Development and Industrialization in Africa and Asia, Dakar: United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning.

• …for industrial growth to begin, and to proceed smoothly in a closed economic system, agricultural workers must feed not only themselves but also the growing proportion of the total labor force employed in industry; thus technical conditions must be such as to bring about a rise in labor productivity in agriculture while institutional conditions ensure that the agricultural workers do not directly consume their increased food production per person and the agricultural food surplus is transferred to industry. 2
• …many of the techniques used in raising agricultural productivity themselves require manufactured inputs, such as more and better agricultural implements, machinery, fertilizer and building materials. 3

Tilly, C., Tilly, L. and Tilly, R. (1975) The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 2-86.

• “Participation—a vague word, but one with power—expressed the hope for a communitarian life which our hierarchical and segmented society, with its juxtaposition of different sorts of privilege, only offers the French in fleeting moments of lyrical illusion” (Raymond Aron, 1968: 167). 2
• There is plausible—although not entirely convincing—evidence that the people most “readily drawn into such movements are those suffering most severely under the displacements created by structural change… Other theoretical and empirical data suggest that social movements appeal most to those who have been dislodged from old social ties by differentiation without also being integrated into the new social order” (Smelser, 1966: 44). 5-6
• In this view [solidarity theory] the conditions that lead to violent protest are essentially the same as those that lead to other kinds of collective action in pursuit of common interests. Violence grows out of the struggle for power among well-defined groups. In the baldest, vulgar-Marxist version of the theory, changes in a society’s organization of production realign the fundamental class divisions within the society, define new interests for each class, and (through an awakening awareness of those interests promoted by interaction with both class allies and class enemies) eventually produce new, expanding forms of class conflict. 7
• …every event is an anticipation or preparation of events that have not yet occurred, all actions are judged according to the standards of a later era than the one in which they happened, and Historic Tendencies are always being blocked or advanced. 11
• If the measure of class consciousness is, let us say, the adoption of a mass revolutionary movement instead of small-scale attempts to change working conditions, then the circularity of the argument linking political advance to class consciousness is complete. 11
• …an explanation of protest, rebellion, or collective violence that cannot account for its absence is no explanation at all; an explanation based only on cases where something happened is quite likely to attribute importance to conditions which are actually quite common in cases where nothing happened. That is the characteristic defect of the many theories being bandied about today which treat rebellion as a consequence of frustrated rising expectations without specifying how often (or under what conditions) rising expectations are frustrated without rebellion. 12
• Group violence ordinarily grows out of collective actions which are not intrinsically violent—festivals, meetings, strikes, demonstrations, and so on. Without them the collective violence could hardly occur. People who do not take part in them can hardly get involved in the violence. The groups engaging in collective action with any regularity usually consist of populations perceiving and pursuing a common set of interests. And collective action on any considerable scale requires coordination, communication, and solidarity extending beyond the moment of action itself. The urbanization and industrialization and political rearrangement of France from the revolution onward utterly transformed the composition of the groups capable of collective action, the nature of their opponents, and the quality of collective action itself. The transformation of collective action transformed violence. 46
• …the greater the repression, the les the collective violence. 82
• Years in which the governmental budget is large tend to be years of collective violence at least as measured by participants and arrests. This is also true of election years, although the number of cabinet changes in a year shows no relation to the extent of collective violence. Finally, the number of union members (in years in which we have a good estimate) turns out to be a fairly good predictor of the number of violent incidents and of participants, if not of the number of arrests. 82
• Rather than inciting protests through breakdown and hardship, “modernization” changed the prevailing forms of collective action. That in turn altered the character of collective violence. Second, in the short run rapid urbanization and industrialization alike generally depressed the level of conflict. They destroyed various contenders’ means and bases of collective action faster than they created new ones. Peasants who moved to cities, for example, ordinarily left settings in which they were sufficiently organized and sufficiently aware of common interests to throw up repeated resistance to taxers, drafters, and grain-buyers. In the industrial city it generally took them and their children a full generation to form the new organization, and the new consciousness, essential to renewed collective action. Third, urbanization and industrialization nevertheless directly stimulated political conflict when they diverted resources and control over resources from established groups which retained their internal organization… Fourth, the emergence of industrial capitalism, the development of a class structure organized around relations to a national market and the means of industrial production, the rise of bureaucracies and other formal organizations as the principle means of accomplishing collective ends combined to transform the identities and the interests of the major contenders for power, as well as the form of their concerted action. 84-5
• In general, justice—and conflicting conceptions of justice, at that—lies at the heart of violent conflict. Violent conflict remains close to politics, in origin as well as in impact. 85

Lewis, W. A. (1977) The Evolution of the International Economic Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• …the dependence of an industrial revolution on a prior or simultaneous agricultural revolution. 9
• In a closed economy, the size of the industrial sector is a function of agricultural productivity. 9
• The distinguishing feature of the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century is that it began in the country with the highest agricultural productivity - Great Britain - which therefore already had a large industrial sector. 10

Bendix, R. (1978) Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 176-214.

• Though royal supremacy and aristocratic dependence was the norm, the centralization and decentralization of authority varied in practice. If it was true of kings that they delegated authority but wished to control its exercise, it was true of aristocrats that they accepted such authority but sought to make it autonomous. This tension between central authority and local government but be continually managed but is never resolved. 4

Bernstein, H. (ed.) (1978) Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today, New York: Penguin.

"The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America," T. Dos Santos, pp. 57-80

• A change from development towards the 'outside' to development towards the 'interior' would relieve underdeveloped countries of their dependence of foreign trade and give to a locally controlled economy. These changes were described as a 'transfer of centers of decision-making towards the interior' of underdeveloped economies, and as replacing a development 'induced' by uncontrollable foreign trade situations by national development as conceived by those in power within the country. 64
• D.S. Dependence is not the 'external factor' which it is often believed to be. "The international situation in which this movement occurs is taken as a general condition but not as a demiurge of the national process because it is the elements within a nation which determine the effect of international situations upon the national reality." 72
• …dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. 76
• The concept of dependence itself cannot be understood without reference to the articulation of dominant interests in the hegemonic centers and in the dependent societies. 78
• For if dependence defines the internal situation and is structurally linked to it, a country cannot break out of it simply by isolating herself from external influences; such action would simply provoke chaos in a society which is of itself dependent. The only solution therefore would be to change its internal structure - a course which necessarily leads to confrontation with the existing international structure. 79

"Planning Economic Development," O. Lange, pp. 207-215

• The strategic factor is investment, or more precisely productive investment. Consequently the problem of development planing is one of assuring that there be sufficient productive investment, and then of directing that productive investment into such channels as will provide for the most rapid growth of the productive power of national economy.

Delacroix, J. and Ragin, C. (1978) “Modernizing Institutions, Mobilization, and Third World Development: A Cross National Study, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 123-150.

• [Inkles, A., and Smith, D. (1974) Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p 4.] "…There is more to national development than a high GNP per capita. Some of the new nations have become aware of the critical importance of institution building as a concomitant of, indeed, as a prerequisite for sustained national development." 125
• …modernization is in fact "Westernization" and that it retards economic progress in three distinct ways. (1) Competent individuals with modern attitudes are more likely to emigrate than others, thereby depriving their countries of their skills. (2) Modernized individuals must be consumption rather than savings oriented. This orientation undermines capital accumulation. (3) The individual secularism inherent in a modern outlook diverts energies from the mobilizing ideologies used by successful elites to induce the population to greater effort. 126-7
• The cinema clearly illustrates one of the outstanding features of modernizing institutions considered from a policy viewpoint: they are very "politically available." Their political availability is manifested in two distinct ways. (1) their expansion is only moderately limited by structural or economic factors, and (2) the content of the influences disseminated by them can be manipulated toward particular objectives. 130
• Education can be a destroyer of tradition, or it can be used as a bulwark of tradition. 130
• …modernizing institutions cans be used to reformulate modern values so that they are more compatible or consistent with indigenous cultures. 130
• A regime lacking a mobilizing orientation…may fail to utilize the positive potential of modernizing institutions. A nonmobilizing regime may fail as well to bar the entry of Western values… 131
• According to mainstream modernization theory, the psychological modernity of the populations of poor countries is an important factor in these countries' economic progress. It is argued that individuals can be modernized by being exposed to modernizing institutions. 131
• …the greater the exposure of the populations of poor countries to the school and the cinema, the greater should be these countries' economic progress in a subsequent period. 132
• Regimes that are oriented toward social mobilization may develop or expand modernizing institutions more than nonmobilizing regimes in order to facilitate overall mobilization efforts. 136
• State-sponsored social mobilization in most likely to occur in systems that are oriented toward participation and authoritarianism. 136
• To argue that modernizing institutions are used deliberately to further economic development is absurd if, in fact, their expansion requires that poor countries first become rich. 137
• Education furthers the economic progress of poor countries. However, we cannot say whether the positive effect of the school operates through the individual-level mechanisms. 145
• What we do know is that education is an institution relatively free from the usual constraints of underdevelopment and therefore should be eminently responsive to voluntaristic intervention. In most underdeveloped countries, the state appears as the most likely agent of such intervention. Thus, whatever attitudes and skills the schools may instill, it is a secular institution that may be used to mobilize individuals for political and economic action. The magnified influence of education on economic development under mobilizing regimes (but not under others) suggests that this may be precisely how the school is used. 145
• We argue that the cinema, according to the logic of modernization theory, is a modernizing institution of prime importance as far as underdeveloped countries are concerned. Yet simple exposure to its institution (attendance per capita) seems to have no effect on economic growth. 145
• Western films appears to impede economic growth to a considerable extent. This is contrary to the expectations of mainstream modernization theory since (1) Western films should have the greatest modernizing impact because of their "modern" content and (2) the modernization of individuals is expected to contribute to economic progress. This finding, however, is fully consistent with Porte's speculation that some of what passes for modernization (actually Westernization) is what underdeveloped countries need least. He argues in particular that the modernization of individuals contributes to the emigration of skilled persons and stimulates prematurely high levels of personal consumption. 146
• …there have been few escapes from underdevelopment since the end of the 19th century that have been unaided by the nonmaterial incentives offered by mobilizing ideologies. 147
• …the principle obstacle to self-generated development is not the traditionalist orientation of either masses or elites, as mainstream modernization seems to imply. Instead the main obstacle is the inadequacy of modern attitudes as means to modernist ends, among which economic development looms large. Accordingly, the advancement of the culturally diverse countries of the Third World does not require the uniform establishment of modernizing institutions aimed at the eradication of traditional mentalities. 147

Bollen, K. (August 1979) “Political Democracy and the Timing of Development,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 44, pp. 572-587.

• The time in world history when a country begins to develop will affect its social, economic and political systems. Britain, the first to "take off" into rapid economic growth, altered the path to development for all the countries that were to follow it. It established a model of economic development that influenced France, Belgium, America and numerous other countries. As the number of successful economies grew, the pool of potential models for the industrial development of other countries grew. At the same time the relevance of traditional development models became questionable. Part of the reason for the irrelevance is that the first developers were largely from a similar western cultural heritage. In contrast, the later developers represent a more heterogenous set of sociocultural systems, some of which are not easily malleable to the transformations required to begin and maintain economic development. It is an open question whether democratic forms of government are consistent with the diverse sociocultural systems of these countries. 573
• In addition the birth control policies, economic and social changes that are considered essential to development are viewed as nearly impossible to achieve within a democratic framework. Instead, an authoritarian government with a concentrated distribution of political power is seen as a likely and necessary response to the tensions of late development. The earlier developers did not have to cope with the same strains that are faced by the latecomers. They could afford to develop with a more diffused distribution of political power. 574
• [Taylor, C. and Hudson, M. (1972) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators II, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.] "The consolidation [of modernizing leadership] is marked by three characteristics: (1) the assertion of the determination to modernize; (2) an effective and decisive break with the institutions of an agrarian way of life; and (3) the creation of a national state with an effective government and a reasonably stable consensus on political means and ends by the inhabitants." 577
• Like many complex and abstract concepts in the social sciences, there are a number of possible definitions of political democracy. Common to many of these definitions are two dimensions: (1) popular sovereignty, and (2) political liberties. The first dimension, popular sovereignty, implies that the elites of a country must be accountable to the nonelites. The most common institution through which the nonelites exercise their control is through elections. In order for elections to represent popular sovereignty, there must be as wide a franchise as possible, equal weighting of votes and fair electoral processes. The second dimension, political liberties, is also essential to political democracy. Political liberties include the rights of free speech, a free press, and the right to organize against any officeholders or their policies. 578
• A measure of the percentage of the population eligible to vote (the franchise) is a much better indicator of political democracy but an accurate measure of it is even more difficult to find than accurate participation statistics. These and other arguments suggest that using voting participation as an indicator of political democracy raises a number of difficulties. Political democracy should also be distinguished from social democracy. A strong socialist or labor party in power may be crucial to reducing the inequalities in the distribution of social and economic goods, but such indicators of social democracy are analytically distinct from indicators of political democracy. 580
• …three indicators of popular sovereignty and three of political liberties. The three measures of popular sovereignty are: (1) fairness of elections, (2) effective executive selection, and (3) legislative selection. The indicators of political liberties are: (4) freedom of the press, (5) freedom of group opposition, and (6) government sanctions. 580

Coughlin, R. (1979) "Social Policy and Ideology: Public Opinion in Eight Rich Nations," Comparative Social Research, Vol. 2, pp. 3-40.

• …social policy originates in government intervention in social and economic affairs in order to mitigate the effects of the "free market" on individuals and families. The actual forms that this intervention can take are varied--as are, of course, the possible consequences--but underlying the diversity of particular strategies are some characteristics which, take together, constitute the essence of modern social policy. Briefly, these are: (1) the guarantee of minimum standards of living (employment, income, health, housing, etc.) for all citizens and political rights; (2) the assumption of collective responsibility for attaining or maintaining these standards; and (3) the implementation of this collective responsibility through government action, involving obligatory participation of all (or most) individuals. The full expression of these principles in public policy coincides with what is generally identified as the "welfare state." 8
• Active government involvement in providing for the well-being of individuals and families is everywhere a matter of majority public acceptance; in most nations, the data suggest, it is strongly preferred over laissez faire alternatives. 10
• In sum: Americans are not alone in their sanctification of individualist values. Similar tendencies can be detected in Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, and other "welfare leaders" of Western Europe. Conversely, support for the collectivist principles of social policy is not restricted to nations with strong social democratic traditions. Americans--and Canadians too--pay their respects to the values of security, social protection, and collective risk-sharing. 12
• …the structural props of mass ideologies are complex, and that explanations based solely on crude self-/or class interest are not very useful in sorting out the relationship between ideology and social structure. 13
• Successive increments of legislation during the past seventy years or so have established the welfare state as a permanent fixture of modern society. 15
• The ideological debate recurs, but it does so increasingly in terms of the equity of social programs and the implications of high levels of taxation for economic health, and political stability. 16
• Indeed, probably more than any other single type of governmental activity, the old-age pension aspect of Social Security has achieved almost unanimous public regard as an American "birthright." 17
• Numerous surveys have documented the negative components of American public attitudes toward "welfare." Included here is the pervasive belief that "relief rolls are loaded with chiselers (66 percent agreement), that public assistance programs serve as work disincentives (60 percent agreement), and that eligibility rules for "welfare" programs need to be tightened (about 75 percent agreement, depending on the wording of the question. 24-5
• …this research has identified some communalities of modern societies having to do with prevailing attitudes and opinions, but they are neither themselves immutable nor independent of powerful forces at work in each nation. 32
• …where cross-national differences in the content, structure, and distribution of social policy attitudes are found, the search for the sources of these variations must go beyond the study of social welfare institutions themselves, to the exploration of the historical, political, and economic factors that have mediated the formation and development of public opinion. 32
• The strong support among American blacks for collectivist social and economic policy seems clearly linked to the subordinate position that they have occupied in American society dating back to the time of slavery. Other American minorities who have suffered discrimination also appear more receptive to government-guaranteed minimum standards. 33
• We have some evidence that where social mobility ideology has been strong (e.g., in the United States and Canada), public support for collectivist social guarantees is lower and undercut by the "success ideology" to a greater degree than where social class boundaries have historically been more rigid. 33
• The United States will undoubtedly institute some form of national health insurance, and all nations may move further toward a system of universal minimum income maintenance. It remains to be seen whether this increased structural convergence will be paralleled by a growing similarity of mass ideologies, or whether existing differences will persist. 34

Wallerstein, I. (1979) The Capitalist World Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press.

• “[We] turn to history and only to history if what we are seeking are the actual causes, sources, and conditions of overt changes of patterns and structures in society. Conventional wisdom to the contrary in modern social theory, we shall not find the explanation of change in those studies which are abstracted from history: whether these be studies of small groups in the social laboratory, group dynamics generally, staged experiments in social interaction, or mathematical analyses of so-called social systems. Nor will we find the sources of change in contemporary revivals of the comparative method with its ascending staircase of cultural similarities and differences plucked from all space and time.” (Nisbet, R. (1969) Social Change and History, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 302-3.) 2
• “Marxism is a whole collection of models…I shall protest…more or less, not against the model, but rather against the use to which people have thought themselves entitled to put it. The genius of Marx, the secret of his enduring power, lies in his having been the first to construct true social models, starting out from the long term (la longue duree). These models have been fixed permanently in their simplicity; they have been given the force of law and they have been treated as read-made, automatic explanations, applicable to all paces to all societies…In this way has the creative power of the most powerful social analysis of last century been shackled. It will be able to regain its strength and vitality only in the long term.” (Braudel, B? (1972) “History and the Social Sciences,” in Peter Burke’s (ed.) Economy and ? in Early Modern Europe, London: Routledge and Paul Kagan, pp. 38-9.) 3
• Revolution is not an event but a process. 12
• “Capitalism, emerging in the 16^th century, became a world economic system only in the 19^th century. It took the bourgeois revolutions 300 years to put an end to the power of the feudal elite. It took socialism 30 or 40 years to generate the forces for a new world system.” (Sdobnikov, Y. (1971) Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects (Moscow: Progress Publications, p. 20). 13
• The meaning of ethnic consciousness in a core area is considerably different from that of ethnic consciousness in a peripheral area precisely because of the different class position such ethnic groups have in the world economy. 25
• …industrial production required access to raw materials of a nature and in a quantity such that the needs could not be supplied within the former boundaries. At first, however, the search for new markets was not a primary consideration in the geographic expansion since the new markets were more readily available within the old boundaries… 27
• Russia entered in semi-peripheral status, the consequence of the strength of its state machinery (including army) and the degree of industrialization already achieved in the eighteenth century. The independences in the Latin American countries did nothing to change their peripheral status. 27
• Asia and Africa were absorbed into the periphery in the nineteenth century, although Japan, because of the combination of the strength of its state machinery, the poverty of its resource base (which led to a certain disinterest on the part of the world capitalist forces), and it geographic remoteness from the core areas, was able to quickly graduate to semi-peripheral status. 27-8
• The absorption of Africa as part of the periphery meant the end of slavery world-wide for two reasons: First of all, the manpower that was used as slaves was now needed for cash-crop production in Africa itself, whereas in the eighteenth century Europeans has sought to discourage just such cash-crop production. In the second place, once Africa was part of the periphery, and not the external arena, slavery was no longer economic. 28
• Slaves receiving the lowest conceivable reward for their labor are the least productive form of labor and have the shortest life span, both because of undernourishment and maltreatment and because of lowered psychic resistance to death. Furthermore, if recruitment from areas surrounding their workplace the escape rate is too high. Hence, there must be a high transport cost for a product of low productivity. 28
• Once...Africa was part of the periphery, then the real cost of a slave in terms of a production of surplus in the world-economy went up to such a point that it became far more economical to use wage labor, even on sugar or cotton plantations, which is precisely what transpired in the nineteenth-century Caribbean and other slave labor regions. 29
• The Russian Revolution was essentially that of a semiperipheral country whose internal balance of forces had been such that as of the late nineteenth century it began on a decline towards a peripheral status. This was the result of the marked penetration of foreign capital into the industrial sector which was on its way to eliminating all indigenous capitalist forces, the resistance to the mechanization of the agricultural sector, the decline of relative military power (as evidenced by the defeat by the Japanese in 1905). 30-1
• …the decline of Britain which dates from 1873 was confirmed and its hegemonic role was assumed by the United States. 31
• Chinese Revolution meant that this region, which had been destined for much exploitative activity, was also cut off. Three alternative areas were available and each was pursued with assiduity. First, western Europe had to be rapidly ‘reconstructed’, and it was the Marshall plan which thus allowed this area to play a primary role in the expansion of world productivity. Secondly, Latin America became the reserve of US investment from which now Britain and Germany were completely cut off. Thirdly, southern Asia, the Middle East and Africa had to be decolonized. 32
• Colonial rule…had been an inferior mode of relationship of core and periphery, one occasioned by the strenuous late-nineteenth century conflict among industrial states but one no longer desirable from the point of view of the new hegemonic power. 32
• …whenever the tenants of privilege seek to coopt an oppositional movement by including them in a minor share of the privilege, they may no doubt eliminate opponents in the short run; but they also up the ante for the next oppositional movement created in the next crisis of the world-economy. Thus the cost of ‘cooption’ rises ever higher and the advantages of cooption seem ever less worthwhile. There are today no socialist systems in the world-economy and more than there are feudal systems because there is only one-world-system. It is a world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form. Socialism involves the creation of a new kind of world-system, neither a redistributive world empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world government. I don’t see this projection being the least utopian but I also don’t feel its institution is imminent. It will be the outcome of a world struggle in forms that may be familiar and perhaps in very few forms, that will take place in all the areas of the world economy (Mao’s continual ‘class struggle’). 35
• To be very concrete, it is not possible theoretically for all states to ‘develop’ simultaneously. The so called ‘widening gap’ is not an anomaly but a continuing basic mechanism of the operation of the world economy. 73
• There is an alternative system that can be constructed, that of a socialist world government in which the principles governing the economy would not be the market but rather the optimum utilization and distribution of resources in the light of a collectively arrived at notion of substantive rationality. 73
• Even if every nation in the world were to permit only state ownership of the means of production, the world system would still be a capitalist system. 74
• I am not suggesting that it does not matter if a country adopts collective ownership as a political requirement of production. The moves in this direction are the result of a series of progressive historical developments of the capitalist world-economy and represent themselves a major motive force for further change. Nor am I in any way suggesting the immutability of the capitalist system. I am merely suggesting that ideological intent is not synonymous with structural change, that the only system in the modern world that can be said to have a mode of production is the world-system, and that this system currently (not eternally) is capitalist in mode. 74
• “[technological dependence] leads, on the one hand, to the emergence of a monopolistic structure because the scales of output that must be adopted to introduce modern methods are large relative to the extent of the initial market; and on the other hand, these markets will be only practically expanded through some income generated by investment, since a large portion of capital goods must be imported. In addition, the monopolistic structure itself will restrict the volume of investment…So that the two effects reinforce each other. (Merhav, M. (1969) Technological Dependence, Monopoly and Growth, Oxford: Pergamon Press. pp. 59-60.) 77-8
• State ownership is not socialism. Self-reliance is not socialism. Those policies may represent intelligent political decisions for governments to take. They may be decisions that socialist movements should endorse. But a socialist government when it comes will not look anything like the USSR, or China, or Chile, or Tanzania of today. Production for use and not for profit, and rational decision on the cost benefits (in the widest sense of the term) of alternative uses is a different mode of production, one that can only be established within the single division of labor that is the world-economy and one that will require a single government. 91

Organski, A. (1980) The War Ledger, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

• It has long been believed that the outbreak of major hostilities is connected to changes in the power structure of the international order. 13
• There can be little doubt that some of the incendiary factors essential to the outbreak of wars are lodged in the culture of elites, their belief systems, their skill in negotiation, there ability to decipher signals from other leaders, as well as in the constraints and opportunities imposed on and provided for all elites by the institutions in which they must operate. 14
• The balance-of-power model suggests that power is more or less equally distributed among great powers or members of major alliances peace will ensue. 14
• …the trinity of beliefs that constitute the balance-of-power model: equality of power is conducive to peace, the imbalance of power leads to war, the stronger party is the likely aggressor. 15
• We lack, in short, the kind of universal behavior that would have to prevail for the first law of the balance-of-power system to be, as it is held, immutable. 17
• …collective security required that all members of the system move against the aggressor. 17
• If a peaceful nation failed to do its duty because of uninterest in the immediate quarrel or in the fate of the victim, or if an aggressor were able to win over potential defenders of the victim by playing on their fears or on their greed for booty, the chances of war would grow with each such defection. 17-18
• A lopsided distribution of power (with defenders much stronger than the aggressor) will support peace; an equal or approximately equal distribution of power will mean war, but the aggressor will be weaker than the coalition. 18
• According to the power-transition model, …it is not a desire to maximize power or a single minded urge to guarantee security in the narrow sense that leads nations to start major wars, though the later is often the excuse furnished. In this model, it is a general dissatisfaction with its position in the system, and a desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work, that move a country to begin a major war. 23
• …balance-of-power predicts that the stronger will attack, collective-security posits that the aggressor will be weaker than the coalition, while power-transition argues that the attacker will be the weaker party. 27
• Two factors predominate in bringing about any conflict where dominant nations and challengers contend for first place: the power position of the two nations relative to each other, and the speed with which the challenger is passing the dominant nation. The interaction of these two factors accounts for 57 percent of the proportion to be explained. 55
• Our probes point firmly to the fact that the basic propositions in the balance-of-power model miss most if not all of the critical behaviors our data show to be responsible for moving a whole system of nations toward major war. It is not only details in the model that are in error. The conception of the system that underpins this model seems to be wrong. It is the model based on the concept of the power transition that specifies correctly the behaviors, and the connections between behaviors, that our data show to be the necessary conditions for major wars to break out. 61
• The fundamental problem that sets the whole system sliding almost irretrievably toward war is the differences in rates of growth among the great powers and, of particular importance, the differences in rates between the dominant nation and the challenger that permit the latter to overtake the former in power. It is this leapfrogging that destabilizes the system. 61

McConnell, S. (1981) Theories for Planning, London: Heinemann.

• Planning theory needs to be prescriptive as well as explanatory. Explanatory theory by itself is insufficient to guide the action inherent in the activity of planning. Prescriptive theory is insufficient if it is divorced from related explanatory theory which explains the phenomenon the future of which is being planned. Thus planning theory needs both explanatory and prescriptive components. xiii-xiv
• Because planning practice is dependent on the sanction of those with political power at each level of government with a responsibility for planning, planning theory must be related to political theory if it is to relate to practice. Xiv
• Because planners and politicians are concerned with a kind of decision-making which affects the well-being of others - it is an activity with ethical aspects, and for this reason planning theorizing should be moderated by ethical reasoning. Xiv
• It is believed that theoretical statements for planning should be 'tested' for: falsifiability, responsiveness, justice, and potential effectiveness. Xiv
• …more interested in the contexts and the processes of planning and decision-making than with the plans. 2
• …planning is a political activity which changes its nature under different political systems and in accordance with different ideologies. 7
• Social theorists, not least those with Marxian leanings, are very critical of approaches to theory which do not include consideration of who decides, who benefits, and who loses as a result of action based on different theories. 13
• Leonardo da Vinci warned that those who practice before they have learned the theory resemble sailors who go to sea without a rudder. 13
• …ethical and political theories are held to have a direct relationship with theories for planning. 2
• It will be claimed by man that revolutionary praxis is for politicians and not for planners: that planners have neither the power nor the authority to prescribe fundamental changes in society, except in their private, away from work, existence. 25
• Positivism has been explained as an attempt to systematize human life upon the basis of such knowledge as is available, and is thus said to be based on positive and certain knowledge as opposed to imaginary knowledge. 26
• Auguste Comte (1789-1857) related the workings of human society to animal life and to chemistry, emphasizing the systemic connectivity between phenomena. Comte rejected the economics of his day as unscientific because it abstracted 'wealth' from its social context and therefore the nature of economic activity was stripped of its political and social contexts and connections. 26
• Pragmatism, like the word 'practical', derives from the Greek word pragma which means action. 27
• …"genuine democracy cannot be achieved in America without some greater economic, social and political equality and that this requires initially a concerted attack on poverty and segregation." (Gans) 31
• …"planning is inside the political system, and, hence, a growing political force in itself. I would wish it to use its growing power toward assuring that the goods, services and facilities supplied are sufficiently diverse to satisfy even the smallest minority's wants." (Webber) 32
• …the Marxian approach is concerned with the influence of productive agencies in the historical evolution of society and with class conflict. 32
• In Aristotle's usage 'dialectic' referred to the mental activity related to examination of the presuppositions lying at the back of sciences. 32
• In the Hegelian sense, which influenced Marx, the word 'dialectic' has been said to refer to the intellectual process whereby the inadequacy of popular conceptions is exposed. 32
• In dialectical logic, contradictions have been explained 'as fruitful collisions of ideas from which a higher truth may be reached by way of synthesis.' 32 (BIB)
• The principle meaning of dialectic is that thought develops in a way characterized by the 'dialectical triad': thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The idea is that each thesis has its weaker aspects. This an antithesis is developed to this thesis and to related theses, or to the social actions based on these theses. In the end the desire for recognition by exponents of each thesis and each antithesis will result in the creation of a new idea, a synthesis, which retains some of the virtues of these theses and antitheses, without their weaknesses or limitations. However each synthesis has, in turn, the characteristics of a thesis to which people will develop antitheses. Thus proceeds the evolution of ideas and the social actions related to these ideas. 33
• [Marx] the mode pf production in material life determines the character of the social and political processes of life; and sooner or later the material forces of production come into conflict with the existing relations of production. 34
• …'the materialistic conception of history starts with the proposition that the production of the means to support human life, and next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure.' 34 (Engel)
• 'And if freedom is lost, everything is lost, including "planning". For why should plans for the welfare of people be carried out if the people have no power to enforce them? ... If we plan too much, if we give too much power to the state, then freedom will be lost, and that will be the end of planning." (Popper) 42
• 'The traditional view of scientific method had the following stages in the following order each giving rise to the next: 1, observation and experiment; 2, inductive generalization; 3, hypothesis; 4, attempted verification of hypothesis; 5, proof or disproof; 6, knowledge. (Magee)
• Land-use planning is based on the normative theory that the future development of land uses and their associated activities should be in accordance with a plan which has regard to environmental, physical, social, and economic considerations. 71
• 'Fundamentally, the land use plan as a part of an overall plan embodies a proposal as to how land should be used as expansion and renewal proceed in the future.' (Chapin) 73
• Political theory is a systematic thinking about the purposes of government and power relationships. 104
• Because the elected representatives of the people in fact cannot represent equally the interests of all groups, especially the minority groups, in a large and heterogenous area, it is now accepted that it is in the interest of the people most effected by urban planning if they can share in the whole planning process from the early stage of identification of problems to the stage of choice of solutions and the means of implementation. 113
• Public participatory theories arising from the model of populist democracy give people the right to participate in decision-making relating to planning matters in so far as they may be directly or indirectly affected by such decisions. 113
• …pluralism is a grand term for the age-old game in which powerful groups in a society maneuver to get what they want through a bargaining or trade-off process. But in the end, as with representative democracy, it is the groups with the most power which succeed. 114
• 'Rousseau claims that the general will in action is sovereignty and since the general will emanates from the community as a whole, so sovereignty must reside in the community as a whole. He argues that sovereignty cannot be surrendered, or delegated to any one person or group of people. It cannot be exercised at all through elected representatives.' (Thomson) 115
• Each decade brings change in attitudes. It can be argued that before the mid-1960s planners in the USA tended to believe in consensus more than they did after the student and race upheavals of the later 1960s. Participation was then perceived as a way to resolve conflict. However participation as a way of arriving at decisions in any community can only replace decision-making by those in power in those in power permit it, or have to permit it as a condition of remaining in power. 117
• In the Marxian approach the class conflicts in capitalists societies are stressed and are seen as the condition or fuel for social change, finally evolving in a harmonious form of society. Such a view has elements of Idealism and Utopianism. 118
• …'the problem is in convincing enough people, both those in power and ordinary citizens, that peaceful relations with others provide the most satisfying and beneficial ways of life and are worth striving for, even when immediate, personal sacrifices are necessary (e.g. relinquishing power, reducing material gains, or admitting and attempting to correct unjustified actions). Also, these persons must realize that these kinds of relations can be achieved'. (Nye) 118
• …if the norm of participation is not widespread for one reason or another, the fostering of participation will not in itself create a participatory democracy. 121
• The ideology of public participation as it is being developed in theory and practice is then becoming the ideology of opposition to the status quo, and this is inevitably leading to more and more reluctance to accede to claim for public participation. ... Public participation...will exist only on terms acceptable to the governing elite, i.e. that its function is to aid and assist the operation and management of government and not to challenge or 'disrupt' it.' 124 (McAuslan)
• 'The State is differentiated from other associations by its universal jurisdiction, its negative function, and the spacial character of law in being backed by force and having special authority. ...we may therefore define the State as an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries, by mean of law backed by force and recognized as having sovereign authority. 126 (Raphael)
• Has every person in the locality to be planned been given a reasonable opportunity: (a) at the initial stage of the planning process to identify their needs and aspirations, and thus their perception of the problems? (b) to generate their proposals or conjectural solutions? (their tentative theories)? (c ) to register their perception of the errors or problems in the first et of alternative proposals which have been developed by the planners after stage (b)? (d) to record their choice as between the preferred alternatives? (e) to offer their views as to the means and the program of implementation. 131
• Has every person, wherever he or she lives in the region, but who visits the area regularly, and who will be directly affected by the proposals , been given a reasonable opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process. 132
• …we cannot expect to find in our society a simple set of moral concepts, a share interpretation of the vocabulary. Conceptual conflict is endemic. ... Each of us therefore has to choose both with whom we wish to be morally bound and by what ends, rules and virtues we wish to be guided. ... In choosing to regarding this end or that highly I make certain moral relationships with some other people, and other moral relationships with others impossible. ... I must choose between alternative forms of social and moral practice... (MacIntyre) 146
• The primary aim of planning for justice is that planning decisions should be biased towards the greatest benefit of the least advantaged: there should be positive discrimination in favor of the most disadvantaged. A second aim is that any inequality in the distribution or allocation of resources should only be allowed when it is t the benefit of the least advantaged. There are two conditions in such an aim. First, that any one person's liberty be restricted only in the interest of ensuring the freedom for others to enjoy their well-being or to have their opportunities for a 'better' life and environment protected; and, secondly, that any scarce resource be safeguarded for future generations.
• Justice in this context is defined as fairness in the distribution or the allocation of whatever spatial resources and other welfare benefits are at the 'command' of the planning system. It is argued that in the event of there being a conflict between the objectives of responsiveness and the objectives of justice in decision-making, the latter should prevail. 155
• 'Justice, it is often said, is an idea and an ideal. Like law and morality, it rests on the tension and contradiction between what is and what at least some men think ought to be. It represents or presupposes a criticism of an existing reality or state of affairs allegedly in the light of principles or an idea-end state; it is in that sense said to be both transcendent and a guide to action and evaluation.' (Kamenka) 156
• From the 'Left Wing' viewpoint such savings are seen as capitalist accumulation which distinguish people and classes from each other, and which are especially divisive when inherited from one generation to another. 158
• [United Nations Organization Article No. 29] Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. In the exercise in his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 163
• The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in 1966 and 1970 listed nine basic components of social well-being: nutrition; shelter; health; education; leisure; security of person and human rights; stability in economic and social senses; physical environment with ecological and aesthetic care of resources; surplus income, i.e. additional to satisfaction of basic need. 166 (Coates)
• …'in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets as to those born into the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality.' 170 (Rawls)
• There is a need for a socialism that would increase domestic ownership, and that would attack inequality and alienation by giving to every household, as far as scarcity and environmental prudence allow, the fullest control of the resources it can use.
• First Principle Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second principle Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged...to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle.' (Rawls) 175
• Rawls's idea of 'just saving' is that there is a duty on one generation to uphold institutions and resources generally for future generations, including each nation's heritage. 178
• 'Since the market is not suited to meet the claims of needs, these should be met by a separate arrangement. Whether the principles of justice are satisfied, then, turns on whether the total income of the least advantaged (wages plus transfers) is such s to maximize their long-run expectations (consistent with the constraints of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity).' 185 (Rawls)
• Policy-making within and between levels of government is fragmented in every country of the world. 188

MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, p.268
Gans, H., People and Plans, Basic Books, 1968, and Penguin Books, 1972, p.266
Webber, M., 'Planning in an environment of change', in Problems of an Urban society, vol.3, Planning for change, ed. J.B. Cullingworth, Allen & Unwin, 1973, p.5
Bullock, Alan & Stallybrass, O., eds, The fontana Dictionary of Modern thought, Fontana/Collins, 1977, p.170
Engels, F., 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', in Karl Marx and F. Engels, op.cit. p.411
Popper, K.R., The open society and its enemies, vol. II, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945, 130
Magee, B., Popper, Fontana/Collins, 1973, p.56
Chapin, S., Urban land use planning, p. vi, 1963
Thomson, D., Political Ideas, Penguin, 1966, p.98
Nye, R., Conflict Among Humans, Springer, 1973, p.184
McAuslan, P., The Ideologies of Planning Law, Pergamon, 1980, pp.296
Raphael, D., Problems of Political Philosophy, Macmillan, 1976, p.53
Kamenka, E., 'What is Justice', in Justice, eds. E. Kamenka & Alice Tay, Arnold, 1979
Verzijil, J.H.W., (ed) Human Rights, Haarlem, 1958
Coates, B.E., Johnston, R.J. & Knox, P.L., Geography and Inequality, Oxford University Press, 1977
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971, p 100-101, 302-303, 277

Bollen, K. (August 1983) “World System Position, Dependency, and Democracy: The Cross-National Evidence,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, pp. 468-479.

• The greater the political inequality, the lower is the political democracy of a nation. 468
• Increases in education lead to greater participation in the mass media. Widespread access to newspapers, magazines and radios heightens awareness of national political processes. This increased awareness may then lead to greater demands for political power by groups formerly outside the central power circles. 469
• [Chirot, D. (1977) Social Change in the Twentieth Century, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, p. 13] "Core societies: economically diversified…rich, powerful societies that are relatively independent of outside controls. Peripheral societies: economically overspecialized, relatively poor and weak societies that are subject to manipulation or direct control by the core powers. Semi-peripheral societies: societies midway between the core and periphery that are trying to industrialize and diversify their economies." 249
• Generally, economic dependency is greatest in the periphery and semiperiphery and least in the core. Of course in certain sectors where non-core societies have organized the export of primary goods (e.g., OPEC) the core may be very dependent. 470
• The world capitalist system, driven by the core, expands to the semiperipheral and peripheral countries in search of cheaper raw materials, cheaper labor, and less regulated investment environment. The penetration of the core into the noncore countries cannot be accomplished without the cooperation of at least some segments of the noncore. A common interest emerges between landowners, merchants, and other traditional elites and the core elites. 470
• [Chirot 1977:22] "…outside the core, democracy is a rarity."
• The present analysis reveals that both peripheral and semiperipheral countries are less democratic than core nations. 477
• Another significant finding is the persistence of the positive relationship between economic development and political democracy. 477

Coughlin, R. and Armour, P. (1983) “Sectoral Differentiation in Social Security Depending in the OECD Nations,” Comparative Social Research, Vol. 6, pp. 175-199.

• There are a number of ways to conceptualize the sectoral components of social security. The most frequent distinctions are based on: (1) the historical timing of major program innovations, (2) current legislation and administrative arrangements governing various types of benefits, (3) the nature and coverage of a range of “risks” across all or part of the population, or (4) some combination of the above. 178
• The crisis of rising structural unemployment may have only tangential effects on insurance schemes for the jobless, but it poses important problems for policymakers who must create effective industrial redevelopment and retraining schemes while also managing the burden of pension and health care spending. 195
• …our analysis reveals that public assistance—historically the most politically volatile of social security programs—is paradoxically the least cause for concern. 195-6
• …the welfare state is not a featureless monolith, nor is it an edifice constructed out of interchangeable program building blocks. Sectoral analysis helps to delve beneath the surface of aggregate social security development, revealing a deeper structure that is both richer and more difficult to understand. 196

Kelly, W., Poston, D. and Cutright, P. (1983) “Determinants of Fertility Levels and Change Among Developed Countries: 1958-1978,” Social Science Research, 12, pp. 87-108.

• Recent cross-nationals studies of fertility decline have established the importance of socioeconomic development and family planning programs as major determinants, but their focus has been exclusively on less developed countries. 87
• Below replacement level total fertility rates and even negative rates of population growth have stimulated some governments of developed countries to consider and initiate policies to increase birth rates. 88
• …change in fertility from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s is directly and closely related to the nature of population policy and the availability of family planning services. 88-9
• Generally, the “low” rates of the early 1970s remained stable or declined as the decade passed into history. …one and then another European country moved to a negative rate of natural increase… 90
• …explanation of the decline emphasizing changes in age at marriage, and at the reluctance of the young to marry and start family building at an early age. Others focused on trial marriage (or cohabitation) as a response to changing economic conditions that depressed employment and income opportunities of younger workers. Declining stigma on childbearing outside wedlock, increasing prevalence of non-marital sex and rising illegitimacy in some countries have been interpreted as a change that reduces general fertility because today’s unwed mother is less likely than yesterday’s mother-wife to have a second, third, or higher order birth. Further, some have suggested that among ever-married women, increasing rates of separation and declining rates of remarriage should depress completed fertility of women in broken families, in contrast to wives in stable unions. Because divorce rates have been rising in many developed nations and marriage rates have been declining, the proportion of women aged 15-44 in marital unions has declined.

Some scholars suggest that the post-1960 declines in fertility in developed countries are not simply an adjustment to continuing change in institutional arrangements related to development, such as rising rates of labor force activity by women and pressures for equalitarian sex roles that increase opportunity costs to women. In addition to these factors, the causes of the recent declines in fertility may well also include changes in population policy, the availability of new and more effective methods of temporary and permanent contraception, and legalization of abortion in many developed countries.

The new methods to control contraception have tended to replace traditional and less effective, contraceptive methods, thus reducing rates of unplanned and unwanted pregnancies. Also, in the case of unwanted pregnancy, many women in developed countries now have a choice between carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term or terminating the pregnancy, a decided change from the situation in the early 1960s, excepting the Soviet Union and Japan. 90-1

• Socioeconomic development is conceptualized as a multidimensional process involving the following dimensions: education, health, communications, economic conditions, and urbanization. 93
• Earlier we argued that socioeconomic development should not have direct effects on fertility. Rather its effect should be mediated by more proximate determinants of fertility. We found that, in fact, the effect of development on fertility was totally mediated by contraceptive use and a nation’s population/family planning policy. These results suggest that although past research (primarily among LDCs) has established a direct link between socioeconomic development and fertility, further thought should be given to the specification and estimation of direct effects of development through the more proximate determinants of fertility. 100-1
• Remedies to the population problems faced by low fertility nations range from child allowance programs, liberal maternal leaves from the workplace, low interest marriage loans, and restrictions on access to legal abortion. At best these policies have minor impacts on fertility. Restrictions on legal abortions are generally ineffective. They increase fertility in the short run but couples quickly adjust to such changes by practicing more efficient contraception and seeking illegal abortion. And several acknowledge that child allowances and maternity leaves have only temporary effects and primarily influence the timing rather than the quantity of fertility. 101
• …fertility experts conclude that pronatalist population policies alone are ineffective. 102
• Most experts agree that a major source of recent fertility declines in developed nations is the increased participation of women in the labor force. It would seem then that countries wishing to encourage larger families should start by making the role of the wife/mother more compatible with alternative roles of women. However, if the past is any indication, such policies may be ineffective in increasing fertility. 102
• “The most appropriate policy response and the most effective…is likely to be one which focuses on the adjustment of social institutions to the implications of low fertility rather than one which attempts to modify the behavior of individuals.” (O’Neill, C.J. (1981) Populations Policy Considerations and Low Fertility in Western and Northern Europe, paper presented at the IPC, Manila: December 9-16.) 102

Wallerstein, I. (1983) Historical Capitalism and Capitalist Civilization, London: Verso, pp. 13-137.

• Historical capitalism is…that concrete, time bounded, space-bounded integrated locus of productive activities within which the endless accumulation of capital has been the endless accumulation of capital has been the economic objective or ‘law’ that has governed or prevailed in fundamental economic activity. It is that social system in which those who have operated by such rules have had such great impact on the whole as to create conditions wherin the others have been forced to conform to the patterns or to suffer the consequences. It is that social system in which the scope of these rules (the rule of value) has grown ever wider, the enforcers of these rules ever more intransigent, the penetration of these rules into the social fabric ever greater, even while social opposition to these rules has grown ever louder and more organized. 18-9
• …when national statistics began to be compiled, itself a product of a capitalist system, all breadwinners were considered members of the economically active labor-force, but no housewives were. Thus was sexism institutionalized. The legal and paralegal apparatus of gender distinction and discrimination followed quite logically in the wake of this differential valuation of labor. 25
• …in addition to fostering the gender/age division of labor, they [employers of wage labor] they also encouraged, in their employment patterns and through their influence in the political arenas, recognition of defined ethnic groups, seeking to link them to specific allocated roles in the labor-force, with different levels of real remuneration for their work. Ethnicity created a cultural crust which consolidated the patterns of semi-proletarian household structures. That the emergence of such ethnicity also played a politically divisive role for the working classes has been a political bonus for the employers but not, I think, the prime mover in this process. 28
• One way…to affect the rules about what may or may not cross frontiers, and under what terms, was to change the actual frontiers—through total incorporation by one state of another (unification, Anschluss, colonization) through seizure of some territory, through secession or colonization. 50-1
• The states controlled the relations of production. They first legalized, later outlawed, the particular forms of coerced labor (slavery, public labor obligations, indentures, etc.). They created rules governing wage-labor contracts, including guarantees of the contract, and minimum and maximum reciprocal obligations. They decreed the limits of the geographical mobility of the labor force, not only across their frontiers but within them. All these state decisions were taken with direct reference to the economic implications for the accumulation of capital. 52
• Taxation was by no means an invention of historical capitalism; previous political structures also used taxation as a source of revenue for the state-machineries. But historical capitalism transformed taxation in two ways. Taxation became the main (indeed overwhelming) regular source of state revenue, as opposed to state revenue deriving from irregular requisition by force from persons inside or outside the formal jurisdiction of the state (including requisition from other states). Secondly, taxation has been a steadily expanding phenomenon over the historical development of the capitalist world-economy as a percentage of total value created or accumulated. This has meant that the states have been important in terms of the resources they controlled, because the resources not only permitted them to further the accumulation of capital but were also themselves distributed and thereby entered directly into the further accumulation of capital. 53
• …the power to tax was one of the most immediate ways in which the state directly assisted the process of the accumulation of capital in favor of some groups rather than others. 53
• …redistribution has in fact been far more widely used as a mechanism to polarize distribution than to make real incomes converge. 54
• …they [official subsidies] have also taken the less direct form of the state bearing the costs of product development which could presumably be amortized by later profitable sales, only to turn over the economic activity to non-governmental entrepreneurs at nominal cost at precisely the point of completion of the costly developmental phase. 54
• …governments have redistributed to the wealthy by utilizing the principle of the individualization of profit but the socialization of risk. Over the whole history of the capitalist system, the larger the risk—and the losses—the more likely it has been for governments to step in and prevent bankruptcies and even to restitute losses if only because of the financial turmoil they wished to avoid. 54-5
• Sovereignty however was never really intended to mean total autonomy. The concept was rather meant to indicate that there existed limits on the legitimacy of interference by one state-machinery in the operations of another. 57
• Progress is not inevitable. We are struggling for it. And the form the struggle is taking is not that of socialism versus capitalism, but that of a transition to a relatively classless society versus a transition to some new class-based mode of production (different from historical capitalism but not necessarily better). 107
• Socialism…is a realizable historical system which may one day be instituted in the world. There is no interest in a ‘socialism’ that claims to be a ‘temporary’ moment of transition towards Utopia. There is interest only in a concretely historical socialism, one that meets the minimum defining characteristics of a historical system that maximize equality and equity, one that increases humanity’s control over its own life (democracy), and liberates the imagination. 110
• Over the past 5,000 years, humanity has developed an array of religions, all of which have shared at least one basic feature. They have attempted to give some response to, some solace for, the perceived material miseries of the world. 117
• In a sense, one could argue that ‘civil war’ is an invention of the capitalist world-economy. It is a product of the complex relationship between the construct “people’ and the construct ‘state’ in a system whereby there is an extremely high degree of admixture and propinquity in urban zones of groups defined socially as different ‘peoples’. This is not accidental, but is derived from the intrinsic structuring of the capitalist world-economy. 121
• In capitalist civilization, the number of persons who have shared in the surplus-value has been much larger. This is the group referred to as the middle class. They are a significant stratum. But it would be quite in error to exaggerate their size. This group worldwide, has probably never exceeded one-seventh of the world’s population. To be sure, many of these ‘middle strata’ are concentrated in certain geographical zones, and thus, in the core countries of the capitalist world-economy, they may be a majority of the citizenry. 123
• Perhaps as much as 85 per cent of the people who live within the structures of the capitalist world-economy are clearly not living at standards higher than the world’s working populations of 500 to 1,000 years ago. Indeed, it can be argued that many, even most, of them are materially worse off. 124
• In no previous historical system did there exist the concept that people, even wealthy and powerful people, would spend a part of their lifetime exempt from income-producing work in order to travel, observe, and enjoy pleasures that were not part of their ordinary ongoing life pattern. 125
• At the very most, 5 to 10 per cent of the world’s population can engage even one in a tourist expedition. 125
• What has preserved the system thus far has been the hope of incremental reformism, the eventual bridging of the gap. The debate has itself fed this hope doubly. The assertion of the virtues has served to persuade many of the long-term benefits of the system. And the discussion of the vices has made many feel that they could thereby organize effectively to bring about political transformation. Capitalist civilization has not only been a successful civilization. It has above all been a seductive one. It has seduced even its victims and its opponents. 137
• Capitalist civilization...has been built around a geocultural theme which has never previously been dominant: the centrality of the individual as the so-called subject of history. Individualism presents a dilemma, because it has double-edged sword. One the one hand, by placing the emphasis on individual initiative, capitalist civilization has harnessed self-interest both to the flourishing and the maintenance of the system. 151
• …individualism encourages the race of all against all in a particular virulent form, since it legitimizes this race not just for a small elite alone but for the entirety of mankind. 152
• The problem for capitalist civilization, from the outset, has been how to reconcile the positive and negative consequences of having established the individual as the subject of history. 152
• What is the praxis of universalism? It involves theoretically the moral homogenization of mankind. It is not only the assertion that all persons are endowed with the same human rights but also the assertion that there are universals of human behavior we can ascertain and analyze. 153
• The praxis of racism and sexism is exactly the opposite. It is the assertion that all persons are not endowed with the same human rights, but are rather arrayed in a biologically and culturally definitive hierarchy. This hierarchy determines their rights and privileges, and their place in the collective work process. It is explained and justified by the fact that some groups inherently perform differently from (and better than) others. 153
• The most extraordinary fact of capitalist civilization over the past 500 years is that the intensity of belief in these two themes, and the degree to which they have been implemented in social practice, has grown side by side, in tandem. 153
• On the one hand, universalism leads to the conclusion that the contradiction is not real, since the limitless struggle is in fact the spur to initiative, and therefore any privilege that emerges is justified as the consequence of superior performance in a situation where all have equal opportunity to try. 154
• On the other hand, racism-sexism becomes the explanation of why those on the bottom have gotten there. They have shown less initiative, even when the possibility has been offered them. They have lost out in the limitless struggle of all against all because they are inherently (in not biologically, then at least culturally) incapable of doing better. 154
• Capitalist civilization will be over; its particular historical system will be no more. The most we can say beyond that is to outline a few alternative possible historical trajectories—outline them, that is, in broad brush strokes without the institutional detail that is entirely unforeseeable. Three types of social formulae seem plausible in the light of the history of the world-system. One is a sort of neo-feudalism that would reproduce in a far more equilibrated form the development of the time of troubles—a world of parcellized sovereignties, of considerably more autarkic regions, of local hierarchies. This might be made compatible with maintaining (but probably not furthering) the current relatively high level of technology. Endless accumulation of capital could no longer function as the mainspring of such a system, but it would certainly be an inegalitarian system. What would legitimate it? Perhaps a return to belief in natural hierarchies. A second formulae might be a sort of democratic fascism. Such a formula would involve a caste-like division of the world into two strata, the top one incorporating perhaps a fifth of the world’s population. Within this stratum, there can be a high degree of egalitarian distribution. On the basis of such a community of interests within such a large group, they might have the strength to keep the other 80 per cent in the position of totally disarmed working proletariat. Hitler’s new world order had such a vision in mind, but then it defined itself in terms of too narrow a top stratum. A third formula might be a still more radical worldwide highly decentralized, highly egalitarian world order. This seems the most utopian of the three but it is scarcely to be ruled out. This kind of world order has been foreshadowed in much intellectual musings of the past centuries. The increased political sophistication and technological expertise we now have makes it doable, but not at all certain. It would require accepting certain real limitations in consumption expenditures. But it does not mean merely a socialization of poverty, for then it would be politically impossible to realize. 162-3
• By the year 3000, we may remember it as a fascinating exercise in human history—either an exceptional and aberrant period, but just possibly a historically important moment of very long transition to an egalitarian world; or inherently unstable form of human exploitation after which the world returned to more table forms. 163

Chilcote, R. (1984) Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

• "The permanent revolution, in the sense which Marx attached to this concept, means a revolution which makes no compromise with any single form of class rule, which does not stop at the democratic stage, which goes over to socialist measures and to war against reaction from without; that is, a revolution whose every successive stage is rooted in the proceeding one and which can only in complete liquidation of class society." p.62 in Leon Trotsky, "The theory of permanent revolution", --62-65 in Isaac Deutscher, The age of permanent revolution: A Trotsky Anthology, NY, Dell Publishing. 19
• "By dependence I mean relations between centers and the periphery whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centers, not only in economic matters, but also in matters of politics and strategy for domestic and foreign policies. The consequence is that due to exterior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should do or cease doing. The structural changes bring about an awareness of this phenomena, and this awareness, this desire for autonomy, is one of the integral elements in a critical understanding of the system." Raul Prebisch, "The Dynamics of peripheral capitalism", pp21-27 in Louis and Liisa L. North (eds.), Democracy and Development in Latin America, No 1 Toronto: Studies on the political economy, society and culture of Latin America and the Caribbean, p.25. 27
• The Prebisch approach clearly moves toward an autonomous capitalist solution. The state must assume a dominant role, but rather than socialize the means of production, it must work to coordinate private and public enterprise in order to overcome the obstacles and contradictions between center and periphery. 27
• "What we are seeing is the assertion of the national interest of our countries in their international economic relations. The aim is greater autonomy, in order to achieve development without "dependencia" and without marginalization. To achieve this goal, the asymmetrical nature of the present system of international economic relations must first undergo a thorough reform." 531 Sunkel, Osvaldo, "Big Business and Dependencia", Foreign Affairs, 50, (April), 517-531. 30
• "By dependence we mean a situation by which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development". P.231 Theotonio Dos Santos, "The structure of dependence", American economic review, 60, May, 231-231. 60
• Such inequalities produces limits within the dependent countries on the capacity of the internal market as well as negative consequences for the people. 61
• "Underdevelopment is not original or traditional....The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped". A.G.F., 17-18 "The Development of Underdevelopment", Monthly Review, 18, Sept., 17-31. 86
• "Underdevelopment as we know it today, and economic development as well, are the simultaneous and related products of the development...of a single integrated economic system: capitalism". A.G.F., p.43, On Capitalist Underdevelopment, Bombay: Oxford University Press. 87
• The definition of development - "At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being". Walter Rodney, p.9, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications; Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. 95
• "Whereas at the center, growth is development - that is, it has an integrating effect - in the periphery growth is not development, for its effect is to disarticulate. Strictly speaking, growth in the periphery, based on integration on the world market, is development of underdevelopment." Samir Amin, 1:18-19, Accumulation on a world scale: A critique of the theory of underdevelopment, 2 vols. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Skocpol, T. (1984) Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 356-403.

• Some historical sociologists apply a single theoretical model to one or more of many possible instances covered by the model. Other historical sociologists want to discover casual regularities that account for specifically defined historical processes or outcomes, and explore alternative hypotheses to achieve that end. Still other historical sociologists, who tend to be skeptical of the value of general models or causal hypotheses, use concepts to develop what might best be called meaningful historical interpretations. 363
• The three major strategies are not hermetically sealed from one another… 362
• Interpretive historical sociologists—the label I want to give practitioners of this second strategy—are skeptical of the usefulness of either applying theoretical models to history or using a hypothesis testing approach to establish causal generalizations about large-scale structures and patterns of change. Instead, these scholars seek meaningful interpretations of history, in two intertwined senses of the world meaningful. First, careful attention is paid to the culturally embedded intentions of individual or group actors in the given historical settings under investigation. Second, both the topic chosen for historical study and the kinds of arguments developed about it should be culturally or politically “significant” in the present; that is, significant to the audiences, always larger than specialized academic audiences, addressed by the published works of interpretive historical sociologists. 368
• Indeed, whenever interpretive historical sociologists do comparative historical studies, rather than simply conceptually structured presentations of single histories, they use comparisons for the specific purpose of highlighting the particular features of each individual case. 369
• Good comparative historical sociologists nevertheless must resist the temptation to disappear forever into the primary evidence about each case. 383
• Analytic historical sociology, I believe, can effectively combine the concern to address significant historically embedded problems—a concern that most of its practitioners share with interpretive historical sociologists—with ongoing efforts to build better general social theories, a concern shared with those who have applied general models to history. 384

Tilly, C. (1984) Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

• In the world of education, we still behave as though the effective way to prepare young intellects for the fight ahead were to divide all youngsters of a certain age into groups of twenty or thirty, place each group in a closed room with a somewhat older person, seat the youngsters in rows of small desks, arrange for the older person to talk to them for hours each day, have them write various sorts of exercises for the older person to evaluate, and require them to speak periodically in class about the exercises they have written, about material they have read, about general issues the older person has raised. (Young people who survive a dozen years or so of that treatment often move on to the even stranger system of the lecture; there the older person gets to talk at them without interruption for fifty minutes at a time. Very nineteenth century!) 1-2
• What, then, was disorder? At the small scale, popular violence, crime, immorality, madness. If urbanization, industrialization, and other differentiating changes occurred without a corresponding reinforcement of the sense of likeness, shared belief, and so on, these evils would beset individuals and families. At the large scale, popular rebellion, insubordination, class conflict. Increasing education, the expansion of markets, occupational specialization, and other forms of differentiation would cause these dangers as well, unless respect for authority, fear of moral deviation, and related forms of integration developed simultaneously--or at least survived. At either scale, a victory of differentiation over integration produced a threat to bourgeois security. 4
• [Alexis de Tocqueville's in 150-51] The industrial revolution which in thirty years had made Paris the chief manufacturing city of France and had brought within its walls a whole new mass of workers to whom work on fortifications had added another mass of unemployed agricultural workers. 6
• [Alexis de Tocqueville's in 150-51] The love of material satisfactions which, with encouragement from the government, agitated that multitude more and more, and fomented in it the democratic illness of envy. 6
• [Editor of the proceedings of a 1978 conclave in New Delhi] …capitalist penetration appears to shape the process of urbanization in the Third World in several distinct ways. It leads to the eventual disintegration of the rural subsistence sector and increasing reliance on the urban informal economy; to increasing internal differentiation within cities, including differentiation within caste or ethnic groups; to increasing demands on the state for public services and infrastructure, while the autonomy of the state is simultaneously weakened by foreign intervention; and to the possibility of increased collective action and protest focused on the state by the urban poor who have continually been denied access to adequate housing, jobs, education and other necessities. This process has developed much further in Latin America, which has experienced a longer history of capitalist penetration than Africa or Asia, where in many areas it is just beginning. 19 (Safa, 1982: 13)
• Real social movements actually consist of sustained interactions among authorities and challengers. Within real social movements, various challengers attempt to create a coherent actor, or at least its appearance. Furthermore, real social movements always involve a symbolically constrained conversation among multiple actors, in which the ability to deploy symbols and idioms significantly affects the outcome of the interaction. Existing theories and models do not provide useful accounts of that interaction. 31
• Over repeated interactions, even entirely egoistic actors tend to gain from strategies combining initial cooperation with a sharp discrimination of subsequent responses depending on whether the other party cooperates or serves himself. 31
• The advantage of an initially cooperative strategy increases with (1) the likelihood of subsequent encounters, (2) the sharp discrimination of responses, and (3) the certain identification of the other party, his actions, and their consequences. 31
• Revolutionary action becomes likely when, in the presence of vulnerable powerholders, potential opponents to those powerholders communicate with each other sufficiently to recognize that they have the collective capacity to overturn the existing structure. 32
• All societies fell on the same continuum from simple to complex, differentiation drove societies toward greater and greater complexity, and complexity created strength, wealth, and suppleness. The fittest--the most differentiated--survived. 43
• Daniel Lerner, one of the architects of modernization theory, defined modernization as "the social process of which development is the economic component." …"…there is a single process of modernization which operates in all developing societies--regardless of their color, creed or climate and regardless of their history, geography, or culture. This is the process of economic development, and since development cannot be sustained without modernization, we consider it appropriate to stress this common mechanism underlying the various faces of modernization" (Lerner 1968: 82). 46
• …essential to economic growth: a shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services, urbanization, educational expansion. 46
• …it became a progressive process: In general and in the long run, increasing differentiation meant social advance. 46
• In the abstract sense, no process in fundamental. In a given era, specific historical processes dominate the changes occurring in a given population or region. Over the last few hundred years, the growth of national states and the development of capitalism in property and production have dominated the changes occurring in increasing parts of the world. More generally, alterations in the organization of production and of coercion have set the great historical rhythms. In other eras, the creation or decline of empires and the establishment or destruction of command economies have dominated all other changes. 49-50
• Differentiation can take the form of industrialization, urbanization, immigration of people from alien cultures, and any number of other changes. In essence, any change that increases the variety of social forms having durable connections to each other qualifies as differentiation. Integration (alias social control, hegemony, and solidarity in different versions of the theory) can occur throughout repression, socialization, mutual obligation, or consensus. Disorder sometimes appears in this formulation as crime, as war, as emotional disturbance, as rebellion, as alienation, as family instability, as violence. 50
• Thus differentiation exceeds integration, disorder results. 50
• "The very fact that modernization entails continual changes of all spheres of a society means of necessity that it involves processes of disorganization and dislocation, with the continual development of social problems, cleavages and conflicts between various groups, and movements of protest, resistance to change. Disorganization and dislocation thus constitute a basic part of modernization and every modern and modernizing society has to cope with them" (Eisenstadt 1966:20]
• We must hold on to the nineteenth century problems, but let go of the nineteenth century intellectual apparatus. 59

Walton, J. (1984) Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 141-171.

• …a revolutionary situation is identified by the condition of multiple sovereignty—a government that has become the object of competing claims to rightful power by two or more political groupings. 141
• “The revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and from an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to be the government…and those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body.” (Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 192.) 141-142
• …incipient to full blown revolutionary situations existed at the inception of the national revolts. 143
• Incidents of protest and violence, however serious, are not inherently revolutionary apart from the context of the context reaction: “revolt” and “revolution” are socially constructed categories whose interpretation cannot be conceptually divorced from the political struggle. 144
• Theories of revolution that ignore political consciousness on the assumption that the potential for rebellion is “structurally given” or that the “rational peasant” bases political action exclusively on some economic calculus seriously underestimate the cultural basis of political organization. 156
• Revolutionary movements are successfully organized in proportion to the strength and relative unity of their cultural bases. 156
• What became crucial…was the manner in which cultural nationalism and political consciousness became mobilized immediately prior to the revolts. 156
• Revolution is less a blind leap into the hands of violence than a miscalculated use of violence within the political process. 159
• Uneven development is generated in the first place instance by the penetration of global capitalism into precapitalist societies that vary widely in their resources and forms of social organization. The immediate impact of this penetration is affected by a number of considerations , including what the peripheral society has to offer (e.g., mineral and agricultural resources, commercial or military bases), the motives of the colonizer (e.g., for domains plunder, trade, investment), the timing of incorporation (e.g., during periods of empire building or commercial competition), and the potential for internal resistance. In combination these conditions produce a multiplicity of initial effects ranging from relatively benign annexation (as in the very early contact between European explorers and the people of East Africa and the Philippines) to wholesale destruction of indigenous groups (as in much of Latin America). Nevertheless, with the passage of time and the closer integration of the periphery as a zone of the world economy, characteristic features of underdevelopment appear. The peripheral society is “developed” not for its own sake but as a complement to the economic and military needs of the core power: systematic inequalities between the two are created and perpetuated, constituting the first sense of uneven development. Typically this entails fostering export agriculture and an internal market for the consumption of imports from the core. These, in turn, often require land alienation, coerced wage labor, and an export-oriented commercial sector. Similarly, it is necessary to generate (unequally) national income in this process to ensure purchasing power for imports. Accordingly, the peripheral economy is unevenly developed in a second sense of internal class and sectoral disparities. All this produces a massive transformation of the indigenous economy that entices or forces the population into new forms of wage labor and services to the international system or leaves it behind to starve as traditional forms of subsistence are eliminated or rendered unprofitable. 161-2
• With superior military and economic weaponry colonial society resists accommodation save through occasional ameliorative changes in response to massive unrest. 162
• …linking organization may be facilitated by state and institutional mechanisms for labor regulation, migration control, absentee ownership, or segregation of the rural (in reserves or tenant zones) and urban (in slums or native quarters) population. The coalition for popular rebellion is fostered to the extent that rural and urban grievances are merged in the routine operation of the economy (e.g., in the circle of traders or the urban and return migration from impoverished rural areas to the conditions of unemployment if the urban slums). 163
• Moving from the context of uneven development to the conditions of protest mobilization (the second summary process), a vital development is the organizational articulation of political consciousness. 164
• Material achievements, however equally distributed, helped promote the recognition that poverty could be eliminated, therefore fostering the sense of noninevitability. 165
• It was the dominant society that provided the opening, the opportunity to participate in seemingly sanctioned ways, that coalesced the popular movement. The new legal norms designed to promote innocuous participation of popular classes in the elite plan for modernization failed to mystify as they provided a platform and vehicle for subversion. 165
• Conceptually, national revolts rival their celebrated revolutionary cousins in gravity and scope. 169
• …successful social revolutions probably emerge from different macro-structural and historical contexts than do either failed social revolutions or political transformations that are not accompanied by transformations of class relations. 170
• …revolution is not the singular accomplishment of the peasantry or urban prolitariat. Theories that counterpose these class ensembles are belied by a great deal of evidence and reason spuriously by virtue of their failure to recognize the common origins and differential political expressions and rural and urban dislocations following from incorporation. 171

Reitsma, H.A., and Kleinpenning, J. (1985) The Third World Perspective, The Netherlands: Rowman and Allanheld.

• (1) Development is a never-ending process of change which has progressed further in some parts of the world than in other. The result is a continuum ranging from comparatively advanced countries, often referred to as 'core' countries, via a wide variety of moderately developed countries, which may be labeled 'semi-peripheral' countries, to comparatively backward or 'peripheral' countries. (2) The development stage (high, moderate or low) in which a country finds itself, represents a multidimensional situation in which important needs (food, shelter, clothing, health, education, recreation, social security, personal freedom, religion, culture, etc.) are satisfied to a larger or smaller degree. (3) Since development is a continuing process, the meaning of developed varies with place and time. (4) Fully developed societies do not exist. All we can say is that a particular society may be moving toward a higher level of developedness or a higher degree of needs satisfaction for more people. 24
• …underdevelopment may be viewed as a growing discrepancy between raised expectations and the existing level of needs satisfaction, irrespective of how this level of needs satisfaction may be. By the same token, if the income gap between two classes in the same society widens, resulting in greater inequality, the disadvantaged class can be expected to become dissatisfied and restless even though its standard of living may be experiencing uninterrupted absolution improvement. 24
• Since developedness and underdevelopedness are relative concepts, the Third World is considered underdeveloped simply because the First World is considered developed. This statement does not mean that the Third World's underdevelopedness has been caused by the First World. Although it is unquestionably true that past and present processes of development in the First World were/are causally related to past and present processes of underdevelopment in the Third World, it would be incorrect to state…that the poverty in the Third World is entirely and exclusively the result of colonial and neo-colonial activities of the capitalist First World. 25
• …we conclude that it is possible to recognize two types of underdevelopedness: one involving awareness and the other which does not. 25
• It is highly unlikely that this planet can support Western standards of living for all humanity. For that reason, less ambitious development goals would seem much more realistic. 29
• Poverty is the inability to satisfy one's needs. In the voluminous literature on underdevelopment far more attention is paid to material needs than to non-material needs, such as religious and political freedom and the protection of human rights. Indicative of this bias is that basic needs are usually, although not invariably, defined in terms of such material needs as shelter, food, clothing, clean drinking water and fuel. Quite apart from the low level of material well-being, human rights are seriously violated in virtually all Third World countries…. 30
• The demographic 'explosion' - with annual growth rates of 2 percent or more, as compared to less than one percent in the developed countries - heavily taxes the natural environment and puts an enormous burden on the economy. 33
• The basic characteristics of underdevelopment…are not isolated phenomena, but together form a large and complex system of cause-and-effect relationships. 35
• Even if we assume that poverty refers to the inadequate satisfaction of perceived needs, we are still faced with the problem of how to determine whether or not a particular needs is adequately satisfied. No less troublesome is the qualification 'perceived.' Should a transistor radio or bicycle be considered a need when 30 or 60 percent of the people perceive it as such. In other words, what makes something a need? What should be the quality and size of a house or hut before it meets the local demands for shelter? Should it have windows, a fireplace or some other heating system, a bathroom with running water and a separate kitchen? And what happens to the meaning of poverty when, perhaps as a consequence of an increase in income or exposure to Western housing standards, expectations are raised? When that happens, people become more demanding, so that a dwelling which used to be acceptable may become perceived as unfit for proving adequate shelter. 37
• This dilemma underlines our earlier conclusion that development and underdevelopment are time-relative and culture-relative concepts. 37
• Already man years ago economists 'solved' the problem of measuring development by using per capita GNP as an indicator. This measure makes sense because the combined value of total domestic and foreign output claimed by the residents of a given country not only is a reasonable accurate measure of that country's overall economic development, but also tells us a great deal about average earnings, purchaidng power and thus about the general level of prosperity. Using per capita GNP as a yardstick, however, also has its disadvantages. It may be that one extremely lucrative sector of the economy, e.g., oil production, is far more developed than other sectors, thereby raising the value of total output so much that it can no longer serve as a reliable indicator of overall development. Equally problematic is that per capita GNP, like every other average value, tell us nothing about the distribution of wealth. 38-9
• When trying to decide which countries should be considered underdeveloped and thus belong to the Third World, we soon discover classifying most of them presents no problem. No matter which criterion is used, Ethiopia always qualifies, whereas Sweden never does. Most problematic are the high-income oil exporters and such borderline cases as Uruguay, South Africa, Portugal, Albania and Singapore. In addition, there are countries for which it is hard to obtain qualitative data, such as Cuba, Mongolia and North Korea. Finally, there are a few special cases like Taiwan and Puerto Rico which are not members of the World Bank or the United Nations because they are not considered independent sovereign states. 42
• Using our definition of underdevelopment for determining whether a given country belongs to the Third World, it must be characterized by (1) a weak economic structure, (2) widespread poverty, (3) a growing awareness among the people that they are poverty-stricken, and (4) rapid population growth. 42
• …we conclude that regardless of how underdevelopment is defined, there will always be a number of countries which straddle, so to speak, that definition. 42
• Although revolutionary changes may lay the foundation for a period of economic growth and a more equitable distribution of wealth for society at large, they are just as likely to set the stage for more revolution, instigated by those individuals or segments of society which suffered most from the previous revolution. The long-term result may well be a more or less permanent climate of turmoil and instability. 212
• Contrary to what is often believed, Marx considered capitalism as the most advanced socioeconomic system ever achieved and held that its expansion into the pre-capitalist (backward) areas of the world was desirable and progressive - not regressive. He looked upon capitalism as a superior mode of production and saw the rise of capitalism as the greatest progress in human history. Understandably, then, he welcomed its extension to non-European societies by means of direct colonialism. Since Marx regarded colonialism as the historical process of capitalist expansion, he recognized the progressive role of British colonialism in India and other overseas areas. 216
• "…we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it all of grandeur and historical energies…. We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence, evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unfounded forces of destruction, and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindostan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be of sovereign circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman the monkey and Sabbala the cow" (Marx, K. (June 25, 1853) New York Daily Tribune). 217
• "Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which rests the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power" (Marx, K. (Augist 8, 1853), New York Daily Tribune). 217
• For similar reasons, Marx favorably viewed the annexation of Mexican territories by the U.S., while Engels welcomed the French conquest of Algeria as an important event in the progress of civilization. 217
• Underdevelopment…must be seen as a product of an array of…continuously changing interactions between past and present, between natural and human forces, and between internal conditions and external relations. The multitude of obstacles to development and the many retrogressive forces causing underdevelopment vary with place and time. 222
• During the 1960s, the results of import substitution industrialization proved to be disappointing and it became apparent that it contained a number of obvious disadvantages. These disadvantages have already been discussed, but will be summarized briefly here. (1) Industrial expansion remained rather limited, mainly as a consequence as a small home market, the impossibility being able to export on a large scale, and the limited successes in the field of international cooperation or collective self-reliance. In the smaller countries, in particular, it was not economically feasible to establish capital goods industries. Insufficient domestic purchasing power meant that many factories could not be operated at full capacity. The result was that they produced at too high a cost. Faced with widespread industrial inefficiency, governments decided to subsidize numerous enterprises. Apart from the negative effect this had on the national budget, it also tended to encourage more inefficiency. (2) Another problem was that the adoption of modern production processes caused the expansion of much-desired employment opportunities to be quite small. Consequently, the rural exodus which had been encouraged by the establishment of industries led to an increase in unemployment in the cities. (3) Imports of capital goods needed for the process of industrialization imposed a heavy burden on the balance of payments. Many countries were soon confronted with a shortage of foreign exchange and/or a growing foreign debt. (4) Owing to inefficiency and high costs of production, industrial goods generally were unable to compete with foreign-made products, so that the hoped for increase in manufactured exports normally failed to materialize. Meantime, exports o mineral resources and agricultural commodities often suffered from deteriorating terms of trade, thus putting extra pressure on the balance of trade. (5) In order to achieve rapid industrialization, which supposed to reduce dependence on imports, Latin American countries became ever more dependent on foreign capital and foreign technology. The result was that foreign capitalists obtained increasing control over Latin American economies. While they established monopolies in the more profitable sectors, the less attractive sectors suffered from a serious lack of investment capital. There also began a considerable outflow of capital in the form of royalties and profits. To add insult to injury, already existing domestically owned industries were exposed to growing competition from subsidiaries on increasingly influential multinational concerns. (6) In other fields, developments were also disappointing. For example, the traditional oligarchy retained its influence and was thus able to prevent much-needed changes in the countryside - there were virtually no large-scale redistributions of agricultural land and hardly any radical agrarian reforms. In general, the level of prosperity did not rise appreciably; poverty and other social problems persisted undiminished. 244-5
• The following individuals may be listed as belonging as the major forerunners and pioneered dependency theory: (1) The Argentine economist R. Prebisch, who introduced the double concept of 'center-periphery' in 1949, pointing out that the economies of peripheral countries were merely geared towards primary production and benefited much less from international specialization and technological progress than did the central countries. Owing to deteriorating terms of trade, the peripheral countries found themselves in an increasingly vulnerable position and remained structurally subservient to the central or core countries. The situation would in all likelihood continue, if not grow worse, because the core countries could be expected to maintain, and possibly strengthen, their exploitation-oriented dominance over the periphery. (2) Experts for the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA). After the failure of the inward looking development strategy, originally propagated by ECLA, many of them took a critical look of this development-through import-substitution-industrialization policy; (3) The Swedish economic G. Mydal, who noted that economic, social and political dependency relations existed between regions, not only at the national level, but also at the international level. More often than not, such relations have favorable backwash effects (e.g., outflow of surplus production, brain drain and destruction of domestic craft industries because of external competition), rather than the positive spread effects, on the weaker, less developed regions. Like Prebisch, he regarded underdevelopment not as an early stage of a universal development process through which all countries had to pass (as Rostow maintained), but as a phenomenon directly related to development elsewhere. 246
• It is above all the American economist A.G. Frank, who is credited for having integrated the various points of view into a single theoretical framework. Although it is debatable whether he should be considered as the founder of dependency theory, fact is that his books and articles - mostly written in English - have enjoyed great popularity outside Latin America. 246
• Dependency theory holds that Latin America's underdevelopment is the result of external domination which began immediately after 1492. As a consequence, Latin America has not been able to determine its own development. 247
• …dependency theory does not make clear why certain countries are underdeveloped while others are not. "The failure to enumerate and analyze the essential characteristics of dependency leads to confusion when it comes to [formulating] policy (O'Brien 1974, p. 39). According to critics, dependency's vagueness is due to the fact that not enough empirical work has been carried out for the explicit purpose of testing and adjusting the theory. Authors have fallen back on repetition, ultimately leading to a fair amount of rigidity in dependency thinking. 255
• Dependency theorists have by no means always made clear which circumstances lead to underdevelopment, or, conversely, what attitudes the representatives of the capitalist system need to posses in order to be able to promote development. 258
• "…if we accept that the basic determinant of dependency is the use of power in exchange relations, it follows that dependence may occur in the relations between socialist states, too. In such societies, power is redistributed and concentrated in the hands of a small number of people, but it is not absent" (Galjart 1974, p. 15). 260
• The present weakness of agriculture in many Third World countries is often attributed to the failure of colonial powers to encourage native agriculture as much as they stimulated the production of export crops. 261
• Quite another obstacle on the path to development can be the very small size of a country; the smaller it is, the greater the chance that it lacks essential natural resources and has a far too small domestic market. Other countries are faced with the problem of having excessive internal divisiveness resulting from differences in ethnicity, religion, language and lifestyle, and often leading to long-lasting 'tribal' jealousies, suspicions and outright animosities. Then there are Third World countries whose development is held back by their unfavorable location. In this respect, special mention may be made of the more than twenty land-locked countries which lack their own outlet to the sea and are handicapped by the fact that they do not have a seaport. Considering that they cannot compete effectively with countries which do posses these locational advantages, it is not surprising that they are among the least developed countries in the world. 261
• A final consequence of the negative role attributed to the capitalist penetration is that the Marxist inspired dependency and imperialism theorists have little or no appreciation for the positive effects of contacts with the West and of the integration into the world economy. Examples include the provision for infrastructural improvements, the transfer of modern knowledge, the establishment of modern education and modern health care, reduction in internal divisiveness and political unrest, and the creation of larger political units. Instead, the pre-colonial situation is often highly idealized, even though it was frequently characterized by low productivity, famines, epidemics, slave trade, exploitation of the peasantry by the elite, inefficient administration, and various other abuses and shortcomings. 262

Apter, D. (1987) Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and Postmodern Politics, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publication.

• We need to confront the possibility that representative institutions may fail to work in most modernizing societies and, therefore, will be discredited. The pre-occupation of political studies with the strengthening of democratic practices has obscured the need for an examination of the role of pre-democratic forms of government, which, as a result, has received little attention. The politics of modernization requires us to examine the uses of pre-democratic and non-democratic institutions so that we can make a realistic appraisal of those structural principles likely to lead to representative government. The dynamic aspect of modernization for the study of politics can be expressed in the general proposition that modernization is a process of increasingly complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act. 55
• The two most characteristic responses to this state of affairs on the meetings meeting ground between social theory and philosophy have been, first, Marxism, with its insistence on the material plane of reality (which involves the unfolding of historical necessity and the obligation of the idea of freedom and that can only be genuinely "known" through action), and a second response that does not have a convenient name. The latter involves theories of choice that arise from the analysis of alternative situations in normative, structural, and behavioral terms. This second view depends on a probabilistic rather than a deterministic universe, and its central principle is that there is a relationship between freedom and choosing and that the understanding of this relationship is the object of social analysis. 57
• …Marxism's insistence on an evolving material universe that proceeds from a lower to a higher plane. Modernization, in this view, can be understood as a series of altering material relationships out of which a more abundant (and kindlier) world will eventually emerge. 58
• One important criticism of Marxism is that it cannot present the universe as a contrived reality. Such a criticism may sound surprising. If one accepts the view that there is more than one layer of reality, however, then the idea that there is a single layer, the material, on which items of knowledge may be grafted is unacceptable. 58
• The Marxian-existential leads to a single place of reality, the material. The probabilistic leads to a factoring of truths observed at each layer of reality - a probabilistic consensus (not truth but likelihood). The Marxism - existential, by virtue of its emphasis on "totalization" (synthesis), makes that single reality all-encompassing and, therefore, too gross to provide answers to questions that lie within it. 59
• Some would place the origin of inquiries into modernity in ancient Greece. 60
• …a political system becomes a system of choice for a particular collectivity. Government…is the mechanism for regulating choice. Different political systems will not only embody different ways of choosing but vary in their priorities. Governments will vary in the ways they regulate choice. Thus there are different systems of choice, and there are choices between systems. One of the characteristics of the modernization process is that it involves both aspects of choice: the improvement of the conditions of choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of choice. 61
• …no government is better than its moral standards, and no valid moral judgment is premature. 64
• This is the basis of the modern collectivist community (the scared-collectivity type): the generation of new power through unity, the unfolding of a moral and scientific personality through the mystique of developing toward a higher plane. Politically, one would not want to represent the people as they are, because "as they are" is debased by the imperfections of the society. Here is the principle of legitimacy is potentiality, and its main emphasis is on development. It is not surprising, therefore, that many political leaders of modernizing nations are attracted to the Marxian view. 75
• …just as in the pure theory of competition there should be no monopoly of power in the political sphere. Power needs to be dispersed, and various systems have been devised to ensure its dispersal. These include the formal checks and balances of our won system and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in Europe. 76
• The sacred-collectivity model in its broadest implications contains essentially three elements. Behaviorally, it is made up of units whose singular characteristic is potentiality. Individuals, for example, are perceived as nothing more than potentials. Structurally, the political community is the means of translating potentiality into some sort of reality. Hence, the society is the key to social life. Moreover, as the primary instrument of socialization, the political community is essentially an educational body. It exists for the improvement of the community itself. Normatively, the sacred-collectivity is an ethical or moral unit. Thus the morality of the individual depends on the morality of the system, which embodies those higher purposes that may be enshrined in kinship, political ideals, and so on. Included under the rubric of this essentially Aristotelian view of the political community would be most traditional societies, theocracies, and certain modernizing ones as well. 77
• Seen as a modernizing force, the sacred-collectivity stresses the unity of the people, not their diversity. It depends less on the free flow of ideas than on the disciplined concentration upon certain political and economic objectives. It claims a "higher" form of reality than that of the secular-libertarian model, because social life is directed toward the benefit of the collectivity rather than toward that of the self. It is more disciplined because more is concentrated on the priorities of the polity. Equality in the economic sphere is often regarded as a goal to be achieved by the eventual elimination of private property, although not all collectivity systems are socialist. Political inequality exists, but for equalitarian reasons. 77
• Pluralism consists not in the number of individual participants (one man, one vote) but rather in groups in competition. These groups (political) try to maximize their power, and individuals give over their loyalties to them. Group-oriented democracy is to the classic libertarian tradition what large scale enterprise is to the pure theory of economic competition, and in theory has the same relationship to the libertarian model as monopolistic competition has to pure competition. 79
• The modernizing autocracy tends to have a traditionalist ideology associated with a monarch or king who represents the nation. Authority remains at the top, although, in fact, it may be shared through a variety of instrumentalities such as councils, parliaments, party groups, and so on. Examples are Thailand, Morocco, and Ethiopia. 81
• Reconciliation systems are likely to attempt to realize modernization through a process of localized initiative and individualized entrepreneurship, including private and private-public forms of enterprise. In contrast, mobilization systems are likely to see modernization as a process of centralized planning and governmental enterprise. Mobilization systems are most successful as "conversion" systems, that is, in (a) establishing a new polity and (b) converting from late modernization to industrialization. 82
• Modernization first occurred in the West through the twin processes of commercialization and industrialization. The social consequences of these processes can be summed up in the following rather paradigmatic categories: the growth of lending a fiscal devices, the need to support modern armies, the application of technologies in competitive market situations, and the influence of trade and voyages on the scientific spirit - all of which are evidence that modernity in the West attacked religion and superstition, family and church, mercantilism and autocracy. Indeed, we have come to consider science as the antidote of faith, with Galileo as a kind of folk hero of modernization. His triumph is the triumph of reason, and reason as applied to human affairs is the foundation of modernity. In many non-Western areas, modernization has been a result of commercialization and, rather than industrialization, bureaucracy. Some of the values appropriate to industrial countries have been spread by enterprising men, sometimes in the context of politics and trade and at other times in the context of religion and education. Modernization can thus be seen as something apart from industrialization - caused by it in the West causing it in other areas. 89
• Elements of marginality can…be regarded as a critical factor in the development of modernization skills. A second factor is the accessibility of innovative roles, a condition that affects youth primarily. In particular, education in the form of either apprenticeship or more formal schooling has been important in stimulating an interest in the roles of modernity, as have the power and prestige consequences of the roles themselves. Third the mass media and…the growth of communications in general have made it possible to conceive of modernity even in the absence of many of its qualities. 90-1
• Political modernization came to have two meanings in colonial systems. First, it meant that there had to be a "Westernized" secular elite that could participate in political life; and, second, there had to be "Westernized" forms of government so that the elites could be represented. This was characteristic of the British pattern of political evolution in colonial territories, although there were some profound exceptions to the genral rule itself is of very recent origin. 95
• Modernization employs particular roles that have been drawn from various industrial societies (and ordinarily associated with Western industrial society, although modernization can no longer be claimed as peculiarly Western. 100-1
• Development, modernization, and industrialization, although related phenomena, can be placed in a descending order of generality. Development, the most general, results from the proliferation and integration of functional roles in a community. Modernization is a particular case of development. Modernization implies three conditions - a social system that can constantly innovate without falling apart (and that includes among its essential beliefs the acceptability of change); differentiated, flexible social structures; and a social framework to provide the skills and knowledge necessary for living in a technologically advanced world. Industrialization, a special aspect of modernization, may be defined as the period in a society in which the strategic functional roles are related to manufacturing. It is possible to attempt the modernization of a given country without much industry, but is not possible to industrialize without modernization. It is possible for a modernizing country to have a large manufacturing sector and yet fail to develop an industrial infrastructure because its industry is merely an extension of the industrial system of another country. This is a common problem in many Latin American countries. They have a large number of foreign firms involved in processes, assembly, and light industry. These activities build up a local body of workers and technicians, whose operations, however, are integrated with the system of the metropolitan country rather than with their own. This is a normal characteristic of late modernization and represents a classic case of imperialism. 105
• Industrialization is that aspect of modernization so powerful in its consequences that it alters dysfunctional social institutions and customs by creating new roles and social instruments, based on the use of the machine. 106

Kohn, M. (December 1987) “Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy: 1987 Presidential Address,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, pp. 713-731.

• Many discussions of cross-national research contrast two research strategies—one that looks for statistical regularities, another that searches for cultural and historical differences. 716
• Finding cross-national similarities greatly extends the scope of sociological knowledge. Moreover, cross-national similarities lend themselves readily to sociological interpretation; cross-national differences are much more difficult to interpret. 716
• …the lawful explanation of cross-national differences requires more explicit consideration of historical, cultural, and political-economic particularities than does the lawful explanation of cross-national similarities. Ultimately, the distinction between cross-national similarities and differences breaks down, and the issues cannot be so simply and neatly dichotomized. 717
• In the absence of appropriate cross-national evidence, though, there would be no way of knowing whether this (or any other) interpretation applied outside the particular historical, cultural, and political contexts of the United States. No analyses based solely on U.S. data could tell us whether the relationship between social stratification and personality are an integral part of the social-stratification system typical of industrial societies, or are to be found only in the United States, or only in countries that have capitalist economies, or only in countries characterized by Western culture, with its purportedly higher valuation of self-direction. 718
• The key, of course, is the truism that if consistent findings have to be interpreted in terms of how the countries—or the studies—differ. 719
• Finding a cross-national difference often requires that we curtail the scope of an interpretation, by limiting our generalizations to exclude implicated variables or relationships or types of countries from a more encompassing generalization. 721
• …cross-national research has been used in the service of political oppression. In a less dramatic way, cross-national research has too often been a mechanism by which scholars a mechanism by which scholars from affluent countries have been employed scholars in less affluent countries as data-gatherers, to secure information to be processed, analyzed, and published elsewhere, with little benefit either in training or in professional recognition for those who collected the data. 724
• This flexibility…comes at a price: When one finds cross-national differences, it may not be clear whether the crucial “context” that accounts for the differences is nation or culture or political or economic system. Still one can at least try to assess which of these contexts might logically be pertinent to explaining a particular cross-national difference. And, for many types of research, one can then proceed to design new studies to differentiate among contexts. 725
• Establishing collaborative relationships that can be sustained and will develop throughout the course on what can be counted on to be difficult research is much more problematic. 727
• Even when such collaboration exists, sharing knowledge, interpreting within a common framework, even having enough time together to think things through at the crucial junctures, does not come easily. Unless one has a good reason why research should be cross-national, it generally isn’t worth the effort in making it cross-national. 728
• I would not wish to mislead anyone into thinking that its very considerable advantages do not come at equally considerable cost. 728
• The intent in all analyses of cross-national similarities is to develop generalizations that transcend particular historical experiences in a search for more general explanatory principles. In short, the method may be historical, the interpretations should be sociological. 728

Simpson, E.S. (1987) The Developing World: An Introduction, Essex, England: Longman Scientific and Technical.

• Essentially development strategies are concerned with making a country more productive by making a fuller use of its resources with the aid of more efficient economic processes. The strategy implements a certain pattern of investment designed to initiate certain forms of economic activity, to stimulate particular sectors which, it is hoped, will create a favorable economic, social psychological environment to bring about the "quick emergence of a political, social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion" (Rostow, 1956). The mechanics of the strategy are capital investments in the land for agriculture, in forestry, mineral and energy resources to make a fuller use of these resources and also to make a fuller and more productive use of the resource of labor. The productivity of labor is this increased by a considerable margin, be it in agriculture, mining or in manufacturing, to a level over and above the previous pertaining. These developments make infrastructural demands. Capital is required to be invested in the transport infrastructure in road, rail networks, rolling stock and vehicle resources, in ports and ports facilities. Energy supplies of a scale vastly greater than those made available by wood fuel, become necessary as factory production is introduced and as transport modernizes. Power stations, transmission and distribution networks, appear in sectoral development plans. Beyond these directly productive investments come the demands of the social infrastructure for education, training, health facilities, and for administrative functions. All these investments, these economic injections and activities, are interrelated. 116
• Indeed it is of interest that inflexibility is not only characteristic of primary industry economies of the Developing World but also of the least successful countries and areas among the industrial nations of Europe and the continuing industrial revolution. The situation is made particularly difficult in developing countries where populations are not only increasing but where the resource base is diminishing as soils are over-utilized. There would seem, therefore, to be a case for instituting developments which would broaden the range of economic activities away from those characterized by diminishing returns to those where inputs of capital and labor were more significant than natural resources and where scarce capital could be used more effectively. 119
• In a broad front approach aiming at setting up a range of consumer goods industries, essentially substituting for imports, producing for and creating a market by enlarging the industrial wage-labor force, it is not possible to keep them advancing at the same rate. Adjustments and re-adjustments will have to take place continuously due to differing levels of efficiency and productivity resulting in differential movements of prices which in turn will result in changes in expenditure and demand patterns. It is a form of industrially based development which is subject to a number of constraints. 121
• Over the longer term a pool of industrial labor would have been created which by its very existence would facilitate industrial changes. 122
• If agricultural production cannot meet the needs of the enlarging industrial and urban population as well as those of the vast rural community, then food imports become necessary and the economic development, so earnestly desired, may fall behind. What is vitally necessary is a planned development which incorporates agriculture and the rural sector. It must be part of any balanced growth program. It rarely is. Development planning, therefore, requires, first, a balance between components in the productive sectors of industry, second, a balance between industry and agriculture, between urban and rural communities, and third, a balance between investments in the directly productive sector and infrastructural investments. 122
• …infrastructural investment presents problems. Unavoidably it makes too great a demand on scarce capital at first without immediate returns but if it is neglected it creates bottlenecks which impede subsequent developments. 123
• Trade can…generate finance for capital investment and promote growth. However, as has been seen, the creation of this situation is not without its difficulties. Time lags in returns on infrastructural investments may, for example, hold up other developments intended to generate productive capital. Trade may not be able to develop sufficiently, for external reasons, to generate the necessary income for investment. These and other bottlenecks which balanced-growth policies need to avoid are common occurrence so much so that the majority of developing countries have had to seek external finances to maintain their development programs. The problems of the Developing World's countries and their development paths thus require an external or international dimension. 127

Weber, M. (1987) General Economic History, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

• The monopoly of raw material may be conditioned by the exclusive occurrence of certain materials - stone, metals, or fibers, most commonly salt, metal, or clay deposits - within the territory of the tribe. The result of exploitation of a monopoly may be the appearance of wandering trade. It may be carried on by those who conduct the industry, as in the case of many Brazilian tribes or the Russian "kustar," who in one part of the year as a farmer produces products and in the other part peddles them. Again, it may be qualities of workmanship that are monopolized, as frequently in the case of wool products of artistic distinction, the worker being in the possession of a trade secret or special skill not readily transferred. 122
• Through the combination of individual tribal groups under an overlordship, tribal industries which originally lay side by side horizontally have here become arranged vertically in a stratification, and the ethnic division of labor is now found around persons subjected to a common master. 123
• …the special features of slave holding made for the possibility of the development of such an establishment into a modern factory. The human capital consumes more in the very moment when the market fails, and its upkeep was a very different matter from that of a fixed capital in machines. Slaves were especially subject to vicissitudes and exposed risk. When a slave died it meant a loss, in contrast with present conditions where the risks of existence are shifted onto the free workers. 128
• Slavery was profitable only when the slave could be cheaply fed. This was not the case in the north, where in consequence slaves were preferably exploited as rent payers. 132
• Wage work is always the rule where the work is done for the wealthy classes, price work where it is done for the mass of the people. The mass buys single, ready-made articles; hence, the growth in the purchasing power of the mass is the basis for the appearance of price work, as later for that of capitalism. 134
• Commercialization involved, in the first place, the appearance of paper representing shaes in enterprise, and, in the second place, paper representing rights to income, especially in the form of state bonds and mortgage indebtedness. This development has taken place only in the modern Western world. Forerunners are indeed found in antiquity in the share-commandite companies of the Roman publicani, who divided the gains with the public through such share paper. 279
• Ritualistic considerations were responsible for the concentration of Jewish economic life in monetary dealings. Jewish piety set a premium on the knowledge of the law and continuous study was very much easier to combine with exchange dealings than with other occupations. In addition, the prohibition against usury on the part of the church condemned exchange dealings, yet the trade was indispensable and the Jews were not subject to the ecclesiastical law. Finally, Judaism had maintained the originally universal dualism of internal and external moral attitudes, under which it was permissible to accept interest from foreigners who did not belong to the brotherhood or established association. Out of this dualism followed the sanctioning of other irrational economic affairs, especially tax farming and political financing of all sorts. In the course of the centuries he Jews acquired a special skills in the matters which made them useful and in demand. But all this was pariah capitalism, not rational capitalism such as originated in the west. In consequence, hardly a Jew is found among the creators of the modern economic situation, the large entrepreneurs; this type was Christian and only conceivable in the field of Christianity. The Jewish manufacturer, on the contrary, is a modern phenomenon. If for no other reason, it was impossible for Jews to have a part in the establishment of rational capitalism because they were outside the craft organizations. 360
• …Judaism was nonetheless of notable significance for modern rational capitalism, in so far as it transmitted to Christianity the latter's hostility to magic. Apart from Judaism and Christianity, and two or three Oriental sects (one of which is in Japan), there is no religion with the character of outspoken hostility to magic. 360
• Since Judaism made Christianity possible and gave it the character of a religion essentially free from magic, it rendered an important service from the point of view of economic history. For the dominance of magic outside the sphere in which Christianity has prevailed is one of the most serious obstructions to the rationalization of economic life. Magic involves a stereotyping of technology and economic relations. When attempts were made in China to inaugurate the building of railroads and factories a conflict with geomancy ensued. The latter demanded that in the location of structures on certain mountains, forests, rivers, and cemetery hills, foresight should be exercised in order not to disturb the rest of the spirits. 261

Evans, P. and Stephens, J. (1988) "Studying Development Since the Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy," Theory and Society, No. 17, pp. 713-745.

• The modernization approach projected a trajectory for developing countries that replicated the experience of the advanced capitalist countries. Variations from this track were theorized as aberrations, deviations to be corrected. This left proponents of the theory open to charges of ethnocentrism and created problems for those trying to explicate the apparently deviant paths of particular cases. 715
• Instead of assuming that increased contact between core and periphery would foster more rapid development as modernization theorists and traditional Marxists had, the "dependency school" made the opposite assumption. 717
• The principle obstacle to change at the local level was not irrational attachments to traditional values, it was the very rational attempts of local elites and their foreign allies to defend their own power and privilege. 717
• The world-system approach provides a vision in which the logic of capital accumulation dictates not just relations among classes but also those among states and geographically defined zones of production. The position of individual states and societies within the world system may shift, but the structure of the system as a whole defines the pattern of development both globally and within individual societies. 718
• The new comparative political economy has not aimed at charting progress along a presumed unilinear path of societal development but rather an uncovering, interpreting and explaining distinctive patterns of development. 719
• Versions of the dependency perspective in which the interests of international capital are implacably opposed to Third World interests and cutting ties with international economy is the best development strategy can no longer be sustained. 725
• From the way in which it treats questions of "dependency" to its attempt to include geopolitics in the analysis of North-South relations, the approach of the new comparative political economy to the international system is clearly consistent with its approach to class analysis and the state. A more interactive view of the dynamics connecting domestic and international factors that gives greater weight to geopolitical motivations complicates the analysis of development, just as the approach taken to class analysis and the state complicates earlier perspectives on domestic dynamics. 727
• To apply the apparatus of rational choice to a process of social change, the relevant decisions and the social actors who have the power to effect them must already have been identified. 731

Evans, P. and Stephens, J. (1988) “Development and the World Economy, in Neil Smelser’s Handbook of Sociology, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 739-773.

• The emergence of “modernization theory” in the late fifties and early sixties set the stage for the contemporary synthesis. The body of literature built around the concept of modernization was the first substantial set of writings by mainstream sociologists and political scientists that focused on what was happening in the Third World. Interest in modernization clearly stemmed in part from America’s new position of international hegemony, but it also grew out of a rediscovery of the central themes of classical nineteenth-century sociology. 739
• Thomas Kuhn is responsible for the most dramatic model of how theoretical visions evolve. In his view, scientific paradigms always generate, along with evidence that confirms their validity, anomalies that they cannot explain. When the burden of the anomalies grows too great, e new paradigm eventually emerges, which views the same evidence in a new light, interprets it in different ways, and opens new avenues for amassing additional knowledge. 740
• Originally designed to model American society, Parsonian-structural functionalism became the underpinning for an important stream of what came to be known as “modernization theory.” His reconstruction was both an exegesis of the nineteenth-century classics and an original model in his own right. 741
• Marx seemed to believe that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future (Marx, 1867, pp. 8-9). 743
• [Dependency and the World System] Ties with developed countries was the problem, not the solution. 745
• The principle obstacle to change at the local level was not irrational attachments to traditional values, it was the very rational attempts of local elites and their foreign allies to defend their own power and privilege. 745
• It is not that industrialization produces the working class, which in turn produces the welfare state; rather, it is that the variable strength of working-class organizations, which is in turn dependent on other political, economic, and historical factors, is responsible for variations in the distributive impact and expenditure patterns of the welfare state. 747
• All social institutions are transformed by development. New forces of production create new relations between gender and work that in turn restructure family roles. The intrusion of the market disrupts communities and stimulates new social movements. Technological advances in information processing alter both the content of cultural communication and the possibilities for political repression. The increasing intensity of interconnection between the international political economy and domestic social structures produces an equally wide range of effects. International migration restructures the labor markets of both sending and receiving countries while the growth of international capital markets creates new constraints on social welfare policies. Any selection of a few “issues and debates” out of myriad possibilities must be considered in some respects arbitrary. 748
• Traditional reading of neoclassical economic theory suggested that the state’s developmental role was best limited to ensuring property rights and eliminating obstacles to the emergence of efficient markets. Modernization theory appeared to offer the same prescription. 749
• …dependency theorists argued that reliance on markets domestically meant the eventual dominion of transnational capital and that the “unequal exchange” that occurred as a result of participation in international markets prejudiced the developmental prospects of the Third World. 749
• Lipset argued that there is a functional interdependence between various aspects of development and democracy: industrialization and urbanization are associated with increases in wealth, education, and literacy, mass communication, income equality, and the size of the middle class, and these in turn facilitate the development of political democracy. 752
• Scholars using comparative historical case studies to attack the problem rejected the results of cross-national statistical studies, arguing that the general prediction accounted for neither the timing of the emergence of democracy in Europe, the regression to authoritarian rule in major European powers in the interwar period, nor the fact that a number of major developing countries had shown an “elective affinity” for authoritarian rule rather than democracy as their economic development proceeded. 752
• At the beginning of this period [1870-1920] no country was democratic; by the end, three-quarters were. As Therborn (1977) points out, in almost all these countries, the organized working class and the socialist parties representing them played a key role in pressing for the breakthrough of democracy. The strength of the working class in itself does not, however, explain the emergence of democracy. Success in the struggle for democracy depended on the ability of the working class to find allies; failure was predicated on the emergence of an antidemocratic coalition with agrarian roots. 752
• The war and its outcome accelerated the transition to democracy because it changed the balance of power in society strengthening the working class and weakening the upper class. 752
• Since both Marxist theory and the modernization approach have assumed a secular trend toward large-scale , bureaucratically organized production, this research suggests either that both theories are wrong or that the internationalization of labor has a regressive effect on the way in which work is organized in the advanced countries. Instead of being able to benefit from the more protective institutions that prevail in the labor markets they were entering, immigrants find themselves unable to escape the organizational form that prevailed in the labor markets they left behind. The consequences of transitional capital flows from labor are also symmetrical. Even in the NICs, which have received the largest influx of international capital, informal labor markets that allow labor little protection persist. In addition, repressive institutional arrangements in these countries drastically curtail the extent to which the increased supply of capital improves labor’s bargaining. 756-7
• Because the modernization of productive capacity has not been accompanied by commensurate advances in local labor organization, Third World workers have not benefited to the degree that the modernization approach might have predicted. 757
• The combined effects of the internationalization of markets for labor, capital, and commodities increase the degree to which First World workers while undercutting the historically constructed institutional arrangements that characterize advanced industrial countries. 757
• …modernization approach, which sees links between developed and developing countries as simply channels for the infusion of modern cultural traits or opportunities to benefit the workings of comparative advantage. The contemporary synthesis of these two positions views positive effects of international ties as possible but contingent on the ability of Third World states to renegotiate the nature of their links to the industrial north. 757
• north-south economic ties are not simply given to the structure of the international economy but also depend on the political will and skill of Third-World states, which in turn depend on patterns of alliance and conflict among local classes and economic groups as well as the nature of the state apparatus itself. 757
• The aim is rather to explicate the political and social structural factors that enable individual countries to transform ties to their benefit, while simultaneously analyzing the way in which the changing structures at the international level facilitate or limit possibilities for transformation. 757
• Dependency and world-system theories, following the lead of Marxist theories of imperialism tended to reduce geopolitical maneuvering to economic interests and motivations. 758
• Overall, recent work on the interaction of national development and the world political economy has four salient characteristics. First, it has attempted to examine the consequences of international flows for domestic institutions and how these are different in different regions of the world system. Second, it has moved towards a synthesis of the modernization and dependency positions on the consequences of international ties for developing countries, emphasizing the contingent character of these consequences. Third, it has moved toward a more recursive view in which the world political economy both shapes and is shaped by the historical trajectories of development within individual nation-states. Finally, it has brought geopolitics back into the traditional economic analysis of core-periphery relations. 758-9

Singer, H., and Ansari, J. (1988) Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International Disorder, 4^th ed., London: Unwin Hyman.

• A slowing-down of growth and rising unemployment combined with speeded-up inflation expressed itself in a major recession in the industrialized countries. 'Stagflation' was an entirely new experience because the foundation of the Bretton Woods system was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 10

Arrighi, G. (1989) “The Developmentalist Illusion: A Reconceptualization of the Semiperiphery,” pp. 11-42.

• Semiperipheral states (often referred to as "semi-industrial" or "semi-industrialized") are then defined as states that occupy an intermediate position in this network of unequal exchange: they reap only marginal benefits when they exchange with core states, but they reap most of the net benefits when they exchange with peripheral states. This conceptualization is based on a number of assumptions that in my view are highly questionable on both priori and historical grounds. The first questionable assumption is that "industrialization" is the equivalent of "development" and the "core" is the same as "industrial." Interestingly enough, this assumption cuts across the great divide between the dependency and the modernization schools. For both schools, to "develop" is to "industrialize" by definition. 11
• Following Marx and Schumpeter, world-systems analysis conceives of capitalism as an evolutionary system in which the stability of the whole is premised on the perennial change in and of the parts. 15
• Processes of exploitation provide core states and their agents with the means to initiate and sustain processes of exclusion. Processes of exclusion generate the poverty necessary to induce the rulers and subjects of peripheral and semiperipheral states to continually seek reentry into the world division of labor on conditions favorable to core states. 17
• The very success of struggle against exploitation leads to self-exclusion from access to the wealthiest markets and the most dynamic sources of innovations. Individuals states can and do succeed in crossing the gulf that separates the modest wealth of the semiperiphery from the oligarchic wealth of the core, as Japan has recently done and few others did before Japan. But individual successes lead to a tightening of the exclusionary and exploitative tendencies of core states and thereby deepen and widen the gulf for those who are left behind. It therefore becomes inherently more and more difficult to change status upward. 18
• Wealth is long-term income. 18
• While industrialization was used to develop military capabilities comparable to those of core states, proletarianization was a key instrument in providing the resulting military-industrial complexes with the human and natural resources required by their development, maintenance, and competitive expansion. 29
• What kind of world-system will emerge out of this turmoil is hard to say. On the one hand, the escalation of racial, ethnic, and religious animosities in the semiperiphery may link up with and enhance similar trends in the core and periphery. Left unchecked, this tendency may well plunge the world into a situation of systematic chaos worse than that of the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the attempts and struggles to contain and counteract this escalation may create in the semiperiphery new forms of popular democracy capable of laying the foundation of less exploitative and exclusionary world-system. 35

Chase-Dunn, C. (1989) Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, pp. 201-333.

• It has been discovered that the so-called developed and undeveloped regions are often in interaction with one another, and that this interaction often importantly alters the structures of both partners. 201
• Much of the literature about the evolution of states and empires supports the notion that core/periphery systems have been important dimensions of organization in the ancient world systems. 202
• …core states are internally and externally strong, contain relatively integrated nations, and have articulated national economies in which production is relatively capital intensive and ages are relatively high. Core states have relatively less internal economic and political inequality than do peripheral states. 203
• …in comparison with historically previous world-systems, this world system is much less reliant on direct political-military coercion, and more reliant on economic exploitation which is organized through the production and sale of commodities. 204
• Wallerstein and other theorists have criticized the notion that equates the core/periphery dimension with a division of labor between processed manufactures and the production of raw materials or agricultural commodities--the level of processing. Both raw material and agricultural production may be carried out as core production if capital intensive technology is combined with skilled, well paid labor, it is argued. Thus the distinction between core agriculture and peripheral agriculture, and also core industry and peripheral industry, is made possible, with the underlying difference having to do with the level of profits and wages, and these are assumed to be associated with the relative degree of capital intensity. 205
• Arrighi and Drangel argue that core activity consists in the ability of some actors to capture relatively greater returns by protecting themselves to some extent from the forces of competition. Peripheral activity, on the other hand, is exposed to strong competition and thus the levels of returns (profit, rent, and wages) is low. 206
• I will define core activity as a certain kind of production of relatively capital intensive commodities (core commodities) which employ relatively skilled, relatively high paid labor. This is a relational idea because the level of capital intensity which constitutes core production during a specific period is defined as relative to the average level of capital intensity in the world-system as a whole. Since average capital intensity is a rising trend, forms of production which once were core production may become peripheral production at a later time. 207
• Rather than core/periphery dimension is a continuous variable between constellations of economic activities which vary in terms of their average relative levels of capital intensity versus labor intensity. 207
• …in the sense of completely self-contained economic systems, there are no national economies in the world-system. But regions and nation states do differ in terms of their relative levels of economic integration, as pointed out by dependency theorists and Marxists scholars such as Amin and de Janvry. 208
• It is worthwhile to remember that core states are also dependent on the existence of the larger world-economy, but it is important to recognize the very different extent and nature of this dependence. 208
• As suggested by Galtung's terms, "the periphery of the center" and "the center of the periphery," there are important regional inequalities within countries. Many of the processes of uneven development which we study at the level of the world- system also occur within countries… . 209
• The semiperiphery idea is an important one because it enables us to focus on how the existence of intermediate regions affects core/periphery dynamics in the world system as a whole. It also encourages us to examine the ways in which intermediate actors have different strategies, and intermediate states have different developmental possibilities--different in the sense of systematically differentiated from either typical core or typical peripheral regions. Wallerstein does not claim that the semiperiphery is a homogenous zone or set of states. Rather he contends that being in a semiperipheral location vis-à-vis the core/periphery is a condition which encourages certain kinds of behavior. 211
• The idea of semiperipheral states containing a balance of both core and peripheral activities is useful because this condition is likely to produce contradictory economic and political interests within the boundaries of a single state. Wallerstein argues that this was an important reason why France was unable to make a more effective bid for hegemony in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though France was definitely a core power, the effort to hold together a vast territory with conflicting and regional interests reduced the resources available for competition with England for hegemony, and produced an ambivalent and vacillating international economic policy. 211
• The definition of core and periphery described above focuses on relative levels of the capital intensity of commodity production. This is an indicator of the economic basis of national power in a capitalist world-economy, but other theorists conceptualize the core/periphery hierarchy more directly in terms of power relationships among states. 215
• It is somewhat ironic that the very measure which is most often used by modernizationists as an indicator of national "development"--GNP per capita--is also arguably an indicator of world-system position. 216
• …in most cases high GNP per capita designates high productivity per labor hour due to the employment of capital intensive production techniques. 216
• …capitalist imperialism (the export of capital to peripheral areas, the extraction of raw materials, and the penetration of new markets) is simply an alternative which exists for core capital, but is not necessary to the reproduction and expansion of capitalist social relations. This supposes the possible existence of a world in which the core/periphery hierarchy has disappeared and yet capitalism remains the dominant mode of production. 221
• …the core areas of the world-system remain dominated by capitalists. Socialists revolutions have happened, not in the core as Marx predicted, but rather in the semiperiphery and the periphery. 221
• [Marx] "The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production."
• This direct use of coercive force has moved slowly in the direction of institutionalized economic power based on law and private property, although the element of coercion in core/periphery relations and within the periphery is still greater than within the core. 225-6
• It is simply not the case that world-system theory only has implications for processes which operate at the level of the whole system. 313
• There is only one world-system now, but historically there have been many and a social scientist may make systematic comparisons across these cases in order to bring evidence to bear on a hypothesis. 315

Gereffi, G. (1989) “Rethinking Development Theory: Insights East Asia and Latin America,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 505-533.

• Japan and its regional neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have made the most impressive economic strides of any nations in the world in the postwar era. They registered record economic growth rates not only during the prosperous 1960s when international trade and investment were expanding worldwide, but they also have managed to sustain their dynamism throughout the 1970s and 1980s in the face of severe oil price hikes, a global recession, and rising protectionism in their major export markets. 506

Stephens, J. ( March 1989) “Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, No. 5, pp. 1019-77.

• The condition for the development of a peasant revolution leading to communism is the existence of a weak bourgeoisie, a powerful agrarian elite, a highly centralized state, and high peasant revolutionary potential owing to increased traditional forms of exploitation in noncommercialized agriculture, the existence of solidaristic peasant communities, and weak ties to the (often absentee) landlords. 1021
• The critical condition for the development of fascism is the development of a coalition of large landholders, the crown (the monarch, bureaucracy, and military—i.e., the state), and a politically dependent bourgeoisie of medium strength. 1) The landed upper classes must be strong, or, more precisely, they must be the politically dominant force into the modern era (i.e., late 19^th century), and must retain a significant amount of that power in a “democratic interlude.” 2) … The method of labor control leads the landlords to seek an alliance with those in control of the means of coercion, the state, and it accounts for the strong antidemocratric impulse of the aristocracy. 3) The country has to have experienced sufficient industrialization so that the bourgeoisie is a politically significant actor, but it cannot be more politically powerful than the landed classes. … 4) The bourgeoisie is kept in a politically dependent position as industrialization is aided, and to some extent directed, by the state through protection, state credits to industrialists, state development of infrastructure, promotion of modern skills, and even state development of enterprises later handed over to private entrepreneurs. … 5) … The dependence of the bourgeoisie on the state in the German case was conditioned by the top-down nature industrialization, which was made possible by the existence of a strong bureaucratic state. … 6) Finally, there must be no revolutionary break with the past. Thus, peasant revolutionary potential must be low (for the obverse reasons pointed to in the case of peasant revolution), or else the whole process, in particular the power of the landlords, would have been broken earlier. 1021-3
• Lipset (1960) argued that there is a strong relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy… (S.M. Lipset, 1960, Political Man, Garden City, NY: Anchor). 1024
• Lipset argued that industrialization leads to increased wealth, education, communications, and equality, which, in turn, are associated with a more moderate lower and upper class and a larger middle class (which is by nature moderate); and this in turn increased the probability of democratic politics. Subsequent, considerably more elaborate, cross-national statistical studies all confirmed that there was a strong relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy. 1024
• Industrialization in early industrializers, such as Britain, France, and Belgium, was propelled by the light consumer goods industries, especially textiles. The relatively small amount of capital required for the development of these industries facilitated industrialization without dependence on the state… 1025
• …military success was one factor that distinguished the successful state builders from the unsuccessful ones, and success in war was greatly facilitated by “strong coalitions between the central power and major segments of the landed elite” (Charles Tilly, 1975, Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” pp. 3-83, in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by C. Tilly, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 40-44) 1028
• By the eve of World War I, Switzerland (1880s), Norway (1898), and France (1875-84 for the consolidation of parliamentary government based on male suffrage and rights of assembly, etc., or 1913 for the secret ballot reform) had become democratic, and in 1915 Denmark joined this group. 1029
• The change in the underlying class structure as indicated by labor-force figures is significant enough: between 1870 and 1910, the nonagricultural workforce grew in these countries by one-third to one-half, to an average of 61%. The change at the level of class formation and class organization was even more significant: in no country in 1870 were the socialists a significant mass-based party, and the trade unions organized a miniscule proportion of the labor force… 1034
• In the immediate postwar elections, the socialists’ electoral share increased to an average of 32%, while trade union organization grew spectacularly, increasing two and a half-fold. The organized working class were also the most consistently prodemocratic force in the period under consideration: at the onset of World War I, European labor movements, all members of the Second International, had converged on an ideology that placed the achievement of universal suffrage and parliamentary government at the center of their immediate program. 1034
• First, in the two agrarian democracy cases (Switzerland and Norway), the role of the working class was secondary or nonexistent even in the final push to democracy. Second, in other cases, not only did the working class need allies in the final push; in earlier democratic reforms, multiclass alliances were responsible for the success of the reform (France, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium). 1035
• [In Italy] Forces internal to the state, particularly the security forces, also contributed to the fascist victory. Most army officers were sympathetic to the extreme nationalist organization, and, at crucial points, such as the Fiume invasion and the march on Rome, the government was reluctant to order the army to act against the radical nationalist for fear that they would not obey. The police generally tolerate, often facilitated, and sometimes even participated in the violent attacks of the Fascists on the Socialists, peasant organizations, and trade unions. Without such help from the security forces, the tremendous growth of the movement in the critical winter-spring of 1920-21 would have been impossible. 1044
• Eley (1984) argues that the origins of Imperial Germany’s authoritarianism lie in the combination of an aristocratic enclave in the state, the threat of a powerful socialist labor movement, and important economic and religious divisions in the bourgeoisie that prevented the presentation of a united political front. In addition, the high degree of concentration in the Germany economy gave large employers a capacity for repression on the industrial front, which manifested itself in a largely successful anti-union drive in the late Imperial period. This made compromise with labor a less necessary and attractive alternative. (Geoff Ely, 1984, “The British Model and German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History Before 1914,” pp, 39-158, in The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany, by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Oxford: Oxford University Press.)
• …the Swedish Bourgeoisie did not have the option of allying with an agrarian upper class with an electoral base in the countryside. Thus, it was relatively isolated, and resistance to democratic reform was a less realistic option. 1048
• An examination of election results in this period indicates that the Nazis received votes from everyone who was not absorbed in the socialist/working class or Catholic countercultures. I contend that the authoritarian and militaristic ideology of the ruling groups of Imperial Germany contributed to the susceptibility of every other sector of the population to the reactionary appeals of Naziism. Under the influence of the increasingly desperate economic conditions of the Depression, these social groups turned from the traditional conservative authoritarianism of their old parties to the radical racist authoritarianism of the Nazis. 1051
• …the Nazis failed to penetrate the socialist and Catholic countercultures. 1052
• The overview of the transition to democracy conformed Therborn’s (1977) contention that the working class, represented by socialist parties and trade unions, was the single most important force in the majority of countries in the final push for universal male suffrage and responsible government, though in several of the small holding countries the small peasants or the urban middle class played the major role. This contradicts the modernization view, as advanced by Lipset (1960), which argues that economic development and democracy are connected primarily through the expansion of education, the growth of the middle class, and so on. Rather, it was the growth of the working class and its capacity for self-organization that were most critical for the final breakthrough of democracy. (Goran Therborn, 1977, “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy,” New Left Review, 103:3-41) 1064
• …by focusing only on the final step of the process, Therborn rather exaggerates the role of the politically organized working class. The working class needed allies in the final push, and earlier suffrage extensions that incorporated substantial sections of the lower classes, rural and urban, were often led by other social groups, usually the urban middle class or small peasantry, with the working class playing only a supporting role. 1065
• Rokkan argued that the overlapping of nation building and mass mobilization created a climate favorable to the development of mass hypernationalism. One can add to this the experience of World War I, which was also a component in the fascist trajectory, as it was directly related to the development of the right-wing paramilitary organizations that fed into fascism. Thus as I argued in my initial discussion of Moor’s work, fascism was only one form of modern capitalist authoritarianism; it is not equivalent to it, as Moore indicates. (Stein Rokkan, and Jean Meyriat, 1969, International Guide to Electoral Statistics, The Hague: Mouton.) 1069
• …agricultural modernization was a necessary feature of all successful developers because of the macroeconomic function of agriculture as a market for manufactured goods and because of industry’s contribution to rising agricultural productivity. Land concentration, and thus income concentration, impeded the former. 1072
• …though autonomous state action contributed to the outcome and adequate state repressive capacity was essential to it, the capacity to intervene effectively in the economy, to develop modern skills in the population, and so on was not essential for the installation of modern authoritarianism. 1073

Amin, S., Arrighi, G., Frank, A., and Wallerstein, E. (1990) Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World System, New York: Monthly Review Press.

• We believe that we cannot make an intelligent analysis of the various states taken separately without placing their so called internal-life in the context of the world division of labor, located in the world economy. Nor can we make a coherent analysis that segregates "economic", "political" and "social" variables. 9
• We believe that we cannot begin to appreciate this history or these current dilemmas without placing these movements within the framework of the historical evolution of the capitalist world-economy as a whole, of which these movements themselves have been an integral part. 10

"Conclusion: A Friendly Debate," pp. 233-243

• Lenin's concept of imperialism (a transformation of competition from market competition among enterprises into military competition, i.e., war, among core states. 235
• For Amin, nationalism today cannot develop significantly in the absence of socialist content.238
• it is capitalism's success that will breed it failure; that the more capitalism expands, recuperates oppositions, and adjusts difficulties, the more its is led into impasses from which there is no exit. 243

Inglehart, R. (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 13.

• From a Marxist perspective, nationalization of industry and state control of the economy constituted the core solution to all other social problems: Abolishing private ownership of the means of production would eradicate exploitation, oppression, alienation, crime, and war. 8
• In the American context, the liberals were those who supported a growing role for the state; the conservatives were those who opposed it, Well into the 1970s, Western political elites continued to define the meanings of “Left” and “right” in terms of state intervention in the economy and society. 8
• It no longer seems self-evident that the expansion of state authority constitutes progress—even to those on the Left. One of the key developments of recent years has been a growing skepticism about the desirability and effectiveness of state planning and control, a growing concern for individual autonomy, and a growing respect for market forces. 8
• …the growth of the welfare state has begun to reach its limits: when government expenditures reach 60 percent of gross national product (as is now the case in a number of Western societies), there is virtually no room for further expansion; taxation becomes massive, and the majority of the public feels the burden. 10
• Because populations tend to increase until they meet the available food supply, most cultures have been forced to deal with problems of scarcity. For human beings, cooperative behavior is generally a more effective response to this problem than a war of all against all—and virtually all societies tend to temper ruthless economic competition by inculcating norms of sharing, mutual obligation, and cooperation. 13
• …rational choice models have fruitfully analyzed the relationships between economics and politics, but left unexplored the linkages that culture has with both politics and economics. 15
• The recent economic history of advanced industrial societies has significant implications in light of the scarcity hypothesis. These societies are a remarkable exception to the prevailing historical pattern: The bulk of their population does not live under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This fact seems to have lead to a gradual shift in which needs for belonging, esteem, and intellectual aesthetic satisfaction became more prominent. As a rule, we would expect prolonged periods of high prosperity to encourage the spread of Postmaterialist values; economic decline would have the opposite effect. 68
• The unprecedented economic and physical security of the postwar era has led to an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values. The young emphasize Postmaterialist goals to a far greater extent than do the old, and cohort analysis indicates that this reflects generational change far more than it does aging effects. 103
• Given that gradual impact of replacement, it seems likely that even by the year 2000 Materialists will still be about as numerous as Postmaterialists. 103
• …surveys carried out repeatedly over many years show enduring cross-national differences in levels of overall life satisfaction, happiness, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order. 422
• …the younger and better-educated birth cohorts consistently showed high levels of politicization than did the older groups in their country; and politicization levels have been gradually rising in most countries as younger cohorts replace older ones in the adult populations. 423
• …intergenerational population replacement during this period led to a gradual decline in the proportion of Materialists and an increase in the proportion of Postmaterialists among Western publics. 423
• Materialist/Postmaterialists values seem to be part of a broader syndrome of orientations involving motivation to work, political outlook, attitudes toward the environment and nuclear power, the role of religion in people’s lives, the likelihood of getting married or having children, and attitudes toward the role of women, homosexuality, divorce, abortion, and numerous other topics. 423
• Wars of conquest seemed inevitable because they were potentially profitable. Throughout history, tribes and nations have fought to control hunting grounds, water, agricultural land, and other natural resources. Under conditions of extreme scarcity, such wars might be the only means for a given people to survive. 424
• …for one high-technology society to attack another would be irrational because the costs would vastly outweigh any conceivable gains: Nuclear weapons, together with equally deadly bacteriological and chemical ones, enable both sides to destroy in minutes far more than they would gain even in the event of total victory and enslavement of the enemy. 424-5
• Imperialism loses its cost-effectiveness for societies with a high technological level, which may be why the last Western power to give up her colonial empire was Portugal—by far the poorest country in Western Europe, with a per capita income about one-quarter of that of Britain and France. 425
• With economic development and the rise of Postmaterialist values, people not only have less need to plunder their neighbors, but seem to become less willing to do so. 425
• …not only does the cost/benefit ration become unfavorable to imperialism at high levels of technology; even more important, safer and easier ways to get rich become available. 425
• Throughout the communist world, carious regimes are experimenting with ways to diminish the stultifying effects of excessive centralized control and to give greater scope to individual initiative. 427
• Evidence from numerous countries makes it clear that Postmaterialists are far likelier than Materialists to give a high priority to self-expression, not only on the job and in the community, but in national politics as well. 429
• Postmaterialists have markedly lower rates of economic growth, much high divorce rates, and much lower birth rates, than do societies that remain predominantly Materialists. Culture not only responds to changes in the environment; it also helps shape the social, economic, and political world. Culture provides maps of the universe. The maps are crude, but we use them because they provide some guidance on how to get where we want to go and a sense of what life means. 432
• …the desire to know and understand is inherent in human nature. How to make a living may be the first question people ask, but the question of why we live will probably always be with us. 433
• The story of humanity may turn out to be a cruel joke, if we use our technological cleverness to exterminate the species. Or we could go onto heights still undreamed of, reaching a mobility a little lower than the angels. The answer is not yet in. 433

So, A. (1990) Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theory, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

• Without theories, social scientists would find it difficult to carry out empirical research. Scientists use theories to help them define what needs to be studied, and to guide them in sharpening research questions and in deciding what evidence is necessary to support their arguments. In this respect, theories are very powerful research tools. Theories shape researchers’ thinking processes, lay the foundation for their analytical frameworks, guide their research theses, and set their research agendas. In addition, theories lead researchers to adopt certain methodologies, attract them to examine certain data sets, and influence them to draw certain conclusions and policy implications.11
• Theories are not static entities. They attack other theories, and they defend their own arguments. After engaging in heated theoretical debates, they can transform themselves into better research tools than they were before. The field of development offers a perfect example of the dynamics of change in theoretical perspectives.12
• In presenting these three schools, I have adopted an approach that can be called “a generous interpretation”. For example, in reviewing the key theories of the modernization school, I take on the perspective of a modernization researcher. I take the position of an advocate, presenting modernization theories in as strong a light as impossible, trying to convince the reader of the merits of the modernization school.14
• It is appropriate to characterize modernization studies as belonging to a school because their researchers formed an energetic “social movement with its own sources of funds, close interpersonal links and rivalries, its own journals and publication series, a sense of shared mission and camaraderie, and, of course, its hangers on, peripheral allies, and even its acceptable heretics.” (Chirot, D. (1981) “Changing Fashions in the Study of Social Causes of Economic and Political Change,” pp.259-282 in James Short (ed.) The State of Sociology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 261.) 18
• The classical evolutionary theory had the following features (see Comte 1964). First, it assumed that social change is unidirectional; that is, human society invariably moves along one direction from a primitive to a advanced state, thus the fate of human evolution is predetermined. Second, it imposed a value judgment on the evolutionary process the movement toward the final phase is good because it represents progress, humanity, and civilization. Third, it assumed that the rate of social change is slow, gradual, and piecemeal evolutionary, not revolutionary. The evolution from a simple, primitive society to a complex, modern society will take centuries to complete.19
• For Parsons, human society is like a biological organism and can be studied as such. The organism metaphor provides the key to understanding Parsons ’s work. 20
• Just as the parts that make up a biological organism (such as the eye and the hand) are interrelated and interdependent in their interaction with one another, so the institutions in a society (such as the economy and the government) are closely related to one another. Parsons uses the concept of “system” to denote the harmonious coordination among institutions. Second, just as each part of a biological organism performs a specific function for the good of the whole, so each institution performs a certain function for the stability and growth of the society. Parsons formulates the concept of “functional imperatives,” arguing that there are four crucial functions that every society must perform, otherwise the society will die:
• Adaptation to the environment performed by the economy
• Goal attainment performed by the government
• Integration (linking the institutions together) performed by the legal institutions and religion
• Latency (pattern maintenance of values from generation to generation) performed by the family and education. 20
• If one of the parts changes, then the other parts will change accordingly in order to restore equilibrium and reduce tension. 21
• When one institution experiences social change, it causes a chain reaction of changes in other institutions so as to restore equilibrium. From this angle, Parsons’ social system is not a static, stationary unchanging entity; rather, the institutions that constitute the system are always changing and adjusting. 21
• As the left hand of the human body will not fight with the right hand, so Parsons assumes that institutions will generally be in harmony, rather than in conflict, with one other. Furthermore, as a biological organism will not kill itself, so Parsons assumes that society will not destroy its existing institutions. 21
• For Levy, modernization is defined by the extent to which tools and inanimate sources of power are utilized. 24
• Levy further argues that all relatively nonmodernized societies have more in common with each other as regards social structure, than with any relatively modernized societies. 24
• The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them…. The pattern always penetrate; once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized society.24
• According to Levy, relatively nonmodernized societies are characterized by the following: low degree of specialization; high level of self-sufficiency; cultural norms of tradition, particularism, and functional diffuseness; relatively little emphasis on money circulation and market; family norms such as nepotism; and one-way flow of goods and services from area to urban areas. In contrast, the characteristics of relatively modernized societies include the following: high degree of specialization and interdependency of organizations; cultural norms of rationality, universalism, and functional specificity; high degree of centralization; relatively great emphasis on money circulation and market; the need of centralization; relativity great emphasis on money circulation and market; the need to insulate bureaucracy from other context; and two-way flow of goods and services between towns and villages. 25
• For Smelser, modernization generally involves structural differentiation because, though the modernization process, a complicated structure that performed multiple functions is divided into many specialized structures that perform just one function each. The new collection of specialized structures, as a whole, performs the same functions as the original structure, but the functions are performed more efficiently in the new context than they were in the old. 26
• What happens after a complicated institution has differentiated into many simpler ones? Smelser argues that although structural differentiation has increased the functional capacity of institutions, it has also created the problem of integration, that is, of coordinating the activities of the various new institutions. 27
• According to Smelser, new institutions and roles have to be created to coordinate the newly differentiated structures. 27
• According to Smelser, social disturbances are the result of lack of integration among differentiated structures. These disturbances can take the form of peaceful agitation, political violence, nationalism, revolution, or guerrilla warfare. Those who are displaced by structural differentiation are most likely to participate in these social disturbances. 28
• Then, according to Rostow, after moving beyond the precondition stage, a country that wants to have self-sustained economic growth must have the following structure for takeoff: Capital and resources must be mobilized so as to raise the rate of productive investment to 10% of national income, otherwise economic growth cannot overtake the rate of population growth. 29
• First, productive investment can come from income detained though confiscatory and taxation devices. For example, in Meiji Japan, productive investment was obtained thought very heavy taxation of the peasantry in order to transfer economic resources from the countryside to the city. In socialist Russia, also, productive investment was obtained by confiscating the landlords’ property and channeling it into urban investment. Second, productive investment can come from such institutions as banks, capital markets, government bonds, and the stock market, which serve to channel the nation’ resources into the economy. Third, productive investment can be obtained though foreign trade. Foreign earnings from exports can be used to finance the importation of foreign technology and equipment. Fourth, direct foreign capital investment such as building subways and opening mines can also provide productive investment for Third World countries. The critical factor, therefore, is to have 10% or more of the national income to be plowed back continuously into the economy. 30
• Based on his five-stage model of growth (traditional society, precondition for takeoff , takeoff, the drive to maturity, and high mass-consumption society), Rostow has found a possible solution for the promotion of Third World modernization. 30
• Coleman refers to differentiation is the process of progressive separation and specialization of role and institutional sphere in the political system. For example, political differentiation includes the separation of universalistic legal norms from religious, the separation of religious and ideology, and the separation between administrative structure and public political competition. Greater functional specialization, more structural complexity, and a higher degree of independence of political institutions are the products of the differentiation process. 31
• The first set of assumption shared by modernization researchers are certain concepts drawn from European evolutionary theory.33
• Modernization is a phased process. 33
• Modernization is a homogenizing process. 33
• Modernization is a Europeanization (or Americanization) process. 34
• For example, since Western Europe and the United State are highly industrialized and democratic, industrialization and democracy have become the trademarks of modernization perspective. 34
• Modernization is an irreversible process. 34
• In other words, once Third World countries come into contact with the West, they will not be able to resist the impetus toward modernization. Although the rate of change will vary from one country to another, the direction of change will not. Thus Levy calls modernization a “universal social solvent” that dissolves the traditional traits of the Third World countries. 34
• Modernization is a progressive process. 34
• For Coleman, the modernized political system has a much better capacity to handle the functions of national identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution than the traditional political system. 34
• Finally, modernization is a lengthy process. It is an evolutionary change, not a revolutionary change. It will take generations, or even centuries, to complete, and its profound impact will be felt only though time. 34
• Influenced by these Parsonian ideas, modernization researchers have implicitly formulated the concept of modernization with the following traits. 34
• Modernization is a systematic process. The attributes of modernity form a consistent whole, thus appearing in clusters rather than in isolation (Hermassi 1978). Modernity involves changes in virtually all aspects of social behavior, including industrialization, urbanization, mobilization, differentiation secularization, participation, and centralization. 35
• Modernization is a transformative process. 35
• Modernization is an immanent process. Due to its systematic and transformative nature, modernization has built change into the social system. Once a change has started in one sphere of activity, it will necessarily produce comparative change in other sphere (Hermassi 1978). 35
• First, modernization theories help to provide an implicit justification for the asymmetrical power relationship between “traditional” and “modern” societies (Tipps 1976) .36
• Second, modernization theories identify the threat of communism in the Third World as a modernization problem. 36
• Third, modernization theories help to legitimate the “meliorative foreign aid policy” of the United States (Chirot, D. (1981) ”Changing Fashions in the Study of Social Causes of Economic and Political Change,” pp.259-282 in James Shorts (ed.) The State of Sociology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 269). 36
• His cross-national research revealed that countries with high scores on achievement motivation have high economic development. 40
• According to McClelland, it takes about 50 years for a nation’s economic development to match its trend of rising achievement motivation. 40
• Finally, what are the sources of achievement motivation? Where does it come from? As a psychologist, McClelland tends to locate it in the family, especially in the process of parental socialization. 41
• The following are some of the traits shared by modern men, according to Inkeless:
• Openness to new experience: Modern men are willing to try new activities or to develop new ways of doing things.
• Increasing independence from authority figures: Modern men are not under the control of such figures as parents, tribal heads, and emperors.
• Belief in science: Modern men believe that human beings can conquer nature.
• Mobility orientation: Modern men are highly ambitious; they want to climb up the occupational ladder.
• Use of long-term planning: Modern men always plan ahead and know what they will accomplish in the next five years.
• Activity in civil politics: Modern men join voluntary associations and participate in local community affairs. 42
• He points out that from Aristotle to the present, the literature tends to assert that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. (Lipset, S.M. (1963) “Economic Development and Democracy,” pp. 27-63 in S.M. Lipset Political Man, Garden City, NY: Anchor, p. 31.) 48
• Lipset entertains the idea that this high correlation may be a result of the different phases of modernization: starting with urbanization, followed by the development of literacy and the mass media, and, finally, leading to the birth of the democracy institution of participation. 50
• Lipset basically provides a social class explanation: “Economic development, producing increased income, greater economic security. And widespread higher education, largely determines the form of the class struggle (as above p. 45)” that lays the foundation of democracy. 50
• Naturally, in poor countries, the upper class resists granting political rights to the lower class--which often intensifies the latter’s extremist reactions. On the other hand in wealthy countries, where there are enough resources for some redistribution to take place, it is easier for the upper class to extend some rights to the lower class. 51
• ”Wherever industrialization occurred rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities between pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged” (as above, p. 54). This is because under slow industrialization, workers have been employed in an industry for a long time, and those newcomers who have been pulled from the rural areas and who might have supplied the basis for an extremist party are always in the minority. But if industrialization is rapid, it results in a sudden growth in the number of unskilled workers from the rural areas, thereby providing the fuel extremist politics. 52
• Since the United State has democratic institutions, modernization researchers assume that democracy is a major component of modernization. But is democracy necessary for economic development? 54
• The critics point out that many Third World countries have in fact gotten worse over the past century. It seems that the modernization process can be stopped or even reversed, contrary to the claims of the modernization school. 55
• They point out that traditional values will always be present in the process of modernization. As the cultural lag theory points out, traditional values will persist for a very long time even though the original conditions that gave rise to them have disappeared. 56
• Modernization researchers anchor their arguments at such a high level of generalization that their propositions are beyond time and space limitations. 57
• From the neo-Marxist viewpoint, the modernization perspective is a cold war ideology that is used to justify the intervention of the United States in Third World affairs. 57-8
• Although modernization researchers simply assume that Third World countries have attained political autonomy at the termination of formal colonial domination, the neo-Marxists argues that these countries are still politically, economically, and culturally dominated by Western countries. Consequently, the neo-Marxists criticize modernization researchers’ neglect of such a crucial factor as foreign domination in the shaping of Third World development. 58
• First, the new modernization studies avoid treating tradition and modernity as a set of mutually exclusive concepts. In new modernization research, tradition and modernity not only can coexist, but can penetrate and intermingle with each another. 61
• As a result of paying more attention to history and concrete case studies, the new modernization studies do not assume a unidirectional path of development toward the Western model. Instead, these studies take it for granted that Third World countries can pursue their own paths of development. 61
• The economic foundation of this benevolent paternalism is that it helps the entrepreneur to attract and retain workers in industries of highly fluctuating production. The political consequence of paternalism is that it retards the growth of class-consciousness among workers. Wong asserts that when paternalism is working, labor discontent is expressed more in the form of individual acts, such as absenteeism and resignations, than in the collective acts of bargaining and strikes. 63
• The negative enablements. Davis argues that Japanese religious have posed no obstruction to change for the following reasons. First, with respect to Buddhism, it had done nothing to prevent the rapid development of the Japanese countryside. Unlike Islam, Buddhism sought to impose no sacred law upon society that ultimately would obstruct change. For example, Buddhism imposes no restrictions on a person’s occupation. Most Buddhist priests just limit their services to funerals and the routine performance of ancestral rites. 71
• The literature’s explanation of this strong correlation between wealth and democracy is that a wealthy economy makes possible high levels of literacy, education, and mass media exposure, all of which are conductive to democracy. A wealthy economy also moderate political tensions through providing alternative opportunities for unsuccessful political leaders. In addition, an advanced, complex, industrialized economy cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means; decision making is necessarily dispersed, power is shared, and rules must be based on the consent of those affected by them. Furthermore, a country with a wealthy economy tends to have more equally distributed income than do poor countries, and thus a smaller impoverished mass. 79
• As countries develop economically, they move into a zone of transition in which traditional political institutions become increasingly difficulty to maintain. Development alone does not determine what political system will replace those institutions. Instead of moving in a linear direction toward Western-style democracy countries in the zone of transition may have choices among different alternatives, and their future evolution is dependent upon the historical choices made by their political elites. In short, although economic wealth is a necessary condition for democracy, it is not a sufficient one. A study of democratic transition, therefore, must consider other factor. 80
• The third factor that Huntington highlights is external environment. As Huntington succinctly states, democratization is the result of diffusion rather of development, ascribed in large part to British and American influence, though settlement, colonial rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition. Where American armies went in World War II, democracy followed. Where Soviet armies went, communism followed. In this respect, the rise and fall of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states. 81
• In Islam, for example, there is no distinction between religious and politics (or between the spiritual and the secular), and political participation has historically been an alien concept. 82
• In sum, Huntington concludes that the preconditions of democratization are economic wealth, pluralistic social structure (an autonomous bourgeoisie and a market-oriented economy), greater influence vis-à- vis the society of existing democratic states, and a culture that is tolerant of diversity and compromise. He argues that with the exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce such a development. Some combination of the above preconditions is required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of the combination can vary greatly from one case to another. 82
• The first is a linear model that draws from both British and Swedish experience. In the British case, democratization progressed from civil rights to political rights, to gradual development of parliamentary supremacy and a cabinet government, and finally to an incremental expansion of suffrage over the course of a century. In the Swedish case, it took the following route: national unity, prolonged and inconclusive `political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules, and finally habituation to the working of those rules.83
• The second model of democratization is a cyclical one of alternating despotism and democracy. This model is most common in Latin American nations. In this model, key elites normally accept the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any substantial succession of government coming to power though the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military intervention as they are of elections. The military intervenes when a radical party wins election, when there is economic chaos (e.g., high inflation and unemployment), or when there is widespread political unrest. 83
• Once a country enters into this cyclical pattern of alternating military authoritarian and civil democracy, it appears to be difficult for it to break the cycle. 83
• In this model, the development of an urban middle class leads to growing pressures on the authoritarian regime for political participation and contestation. 83
• In conclusion, Huntington suggests that the United States can contribute to the democratic development in Third World nations in the following ways: by assisting their economic development, by fostering their market economies and the growth of a vigorous bourgeoisie, by exercising greater influence than it has in world affairs, and by helping the elites of these countries enter the transition zone to democratization. 85
• According to Blomstrom and Hettne (1984), the dependency school represents “the voices from the periphery” that challenge the intellectual hegemony of the American modernization school. (Blomstrom, M. and, Hettne, B. (1984) Development Theory in Transition: The Dependency Debate and Beyond—Third World Responses, London, Zed.) 91
• Many populist regimes in Latin America tried out the ECLA developmental strategy of protectionism and industrialization though import substitution in the 1950s, and many Latin American researchers had high hopes for a trend toward economic growth, welfare, and democracy. However, the brief economic expansion in the 1950s quickly turned into economic stagnation. In the early 1960s, Latin America was plagued by unemployment, inflation, currency devaluation, declining terms of trade, and other economic problems. Popular protests were followed by the collapse of popular regimes and the setting up of repressive military and authoritarian regimes. 91
• Emerging from the historical context of the 1960s, the dependency school was therefore a response to the failure of the ECLA program, the crisis of orthodox Marxism, and the decline of the modernization school in the United States. 93

(1) While orthodox Marxists see imperialism in a “center’s” perspective as a stage of monopoly capitalism in Western Europe, neo-Marxists see imperialism from the “peripheral” point of view, focusing on the indictments of imperialism on Third World development.

(2) Orthodox Marxists tend to advocate a strategy of two-stage revolution. A bourgeois revolution has to take place before a socialist revolution occurs. Since most Third World countries are backward orthodox Marxists, on the other hand, believe that the present situation in the Third World is ripe for socialist revolution. They want revolution now. They perceive the bourgeoisie at the creation and tool of imperialism, incapable of fulfilling its role as the liberator of the force of production.

(3) If socialist revolution occurs, orthodox Marxists would like it to be promoted by the industrial proletariat in the cities, while neo-Marxists are attracted to the path of socialist revolution taken by China and Cuba. Neo-Marxists have high hopes for the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in the countryside, and guerilla warfare by the people’s army is their favorite strategy of revolution. 95

• According to Franc, most of the theoretical categories and development policies in the modernization school have been distilled exclusively from the historical experience of European and North America advanced capitalist nations. To the extent, these Western theoretical categories are unable to guide our understanding of the problems facing Third World nations. 96
• Frank argues that this national transfer of economic surplus has produced underdevelopment in Third World countries and development in Western countries. In other world, the historical process that generates development in the western metropolises also simultaneously generates underdevelopment in Third World satellites. 97
• The first two of these are colonial dependence and financial-industrial dependence. In colonial dependence, the commercial and financial capital of the dominant country, in alliance with the colonial state, monopolized the control of land, mines, and human resources (serf or slave) and the export of gold, silver, and tropical products from the colonized country. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, financial-industrial dependence emerged. Although still dominated by the big capital of European centers, the economies of the depend countries were then centered upon the export of raw materials and agricultural products from consumption in European countries. Unlike that in the previous epoch, the production structure in this stage was characterized by an export sector with rigid specialization and monocultivation in entire regions (e.g., the Caribbean and the Brazilian northeast). 99
• According to Dos Santos, there are fundamental structural limitations placed on the industrial development of underdeveloped economies, first, industrial development now dependent on the existence of an export sector. Only the export sector can bring in the needed foreign currency for the purchase of advanced machinery by the industrial sector. In order to preserve its traditional export sector, an underdeveloped nation must maintain the preexisting between production and maintenance of power by the traditional decadent oligarchy. In addition, since the export sector (specially the marketing network) is usually controlled by foreign capital, it signifies political dependence on foreign interests too. 100
• First, the unequal capitalist development at the international level is reproduced internally in an acute form, with the productive structure of underdeveloped countries torn between a “traditional” agrarian export sector and a “modern” sector of technological and economic-financial concentrations.101
• The context of a local cheap labor market combined with the utilization of a capital-intensive technology has led to profound differences among various domestic wage levels. 101
• Third, this unequal production structure has imposed limits on the growth of internal markets in underdeveloped countries. The growth of consumer-goods markets is limited by the low purchasing power of the labor force and by the small number of jobs created by the capital-intensive sector. 101
• The monopolistic control of foreign capital, foreign finance, and foreign technology at national and international levels that prevents underdeveloped countries from reaching an advantageous position, resulting in the production of backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within their borders. 102
• The onslaught from without carried out by central capitalism upon the precapitalist formations caused certain crucial retrogression to take place. For example, local crafts were destroyed without being replaced by domestic industrial production. Amin notes that the agrarian crisis of the contemporary Third World is largely a result of these setbacks. 101
• Amin points out that “extraversion does not result from inadequacy of the home market but from the superior productivity of the center in all field, which compels the periphery to confine itself to the role of complementary supplier of products for the production of which it possesses a natural advantage: exotic agricultural produce and mineral. “With such extraversion distortion, the level of wages in the periphery become lower than at the center.102
• At the center, hypertrophy of the tertiary sector reflects the difficulties in realizing surplus value in monopoly capitalism, so more resources have to be spent in the marketing and the accounting of commodities. However, at the periphery, hypertrophy of the tertiary sector is mainly a result of the contradictions inherent in peripheral capitalism, namely, sluggish industrialization, increasing unemployment, desperate migration from rural to urban areas, and so on. According to Amin, this hypertrophy of unproductive activities hampers capital accumulation in peripheral countries.102-103
• Amin warns that researchers should no confuse underdeveloped countries with the now-advanced countries as they were at earlier stages of their development. This is because underdevelopment countries possess the following distinctive structural features: (1) the extreme unevenness that is typical of the distribution of productivity at the periphery, (2) disarticulation due to the adjustment of the orientation of production at the periphery to the needs of the center, and (30 economic domination by the center, which is expressed in the form of trade and financial dependence.103
• Finally, the specific form of underdevelopment, assumed by these peripheral formation depends upon (1) the nature of the precapitalist formation that was there previously, and (2) the form and the periods in which the peripheries were integrated into the capitalist world-system.103
• Dependency is understood to be an external condition, that is, imposed from the outside. The most important obstacle to national development, therefore, is not lack of capital, entrepreneurial skills, or democratic institutions; rather, it is to be found outside the domain of the national economy. The historical heritage of colonialism and the perpetuation of the unequal international division of labor are the greatest obstructions to the national development of Third World countries. 104
• Dependency is treated as a component of regional polarization of the global economy. On the one hand, the flow of surplus from Third World countries leads to their underdevelopment; on the other, the development of Western countries is benefited by this influx of economic surplus. 104
• Finally, dependency is seen as incompatible with development. Is development possible in the periphery? For the dependency school, the answer is generally no. Although minor development can occur during periods of isolation, such as during a world depression or a world war, genuine development in the periphery is highly unlikely with the continual flow of surplus to the core. 105
• In fact, the dependency school asserts that the periphery has too much harmful core contact already. Since the era of colonialism, the political economy of the periphery has been totally restructured to suit the needs of the core, thereby leading to the development of underdevelopment. 105
• Consequently, the dependency school suggests that peripheral countries should sever their ties with core countries. Instead of relying upon foreign aid and foreign technology, peripheral countries should adopt a self-reliance model relying upon their own resources and planning their own paths of development so as to achieve independence and autonomous national development. 105
• With respect to the causes of Third World problems, the classical modernization perspective offers an internal explanation, pointing to such traits as traditional culture, lack of productive investment, and absence of achievement motivation in Third World countries. The classical dependency perspective, in contrast, offers an external explanation, stressing the role played by colonialism and neocolonialism in shaping the underdevelopment of Third world countries. 111
• Discouraged Indian manufacturers in the early years of British rule in order to encourage the rising manufacturers of England. Their fixed policy, pursued during the last decade of the eighteen century and the first decade of nineteenth, was to make India subservient to the industries of Great Britain, and to make the India people grow raw produce only, in order to supply the material for the looms and manufacturies of great Britain. This policy was pursue with unwavering revolution and with fatal success; orders were sent out, to force India artisans to work in the Company’s factories; commercial residents were legally vested with extensive powers over villages and communities of Indian weavers; prohibition tariffs excluded India silk and cotton goods from England; English goods were admitted into India free of duty or payment of a nominal duty…. The invention of the power-loom in Europe completed the decline of the Indian industries; and when in recent years the power-loom was set up in India, England once more acted towards India with unfair jealousy. An excise duty has been imposed on the production of cotton fabrics in India which...stifles the new steam-mills of India. 112
• After a colonial government is firmly in control, I begin to rely on the native to rule the colony. Of course, not every native eligible usually only those native elites are chosen who have sworn loyalty to the colonial administration and whose interests are closely tied to those of the foreigners. The dependency school calls these native elites the “clientele social class” and identifies native landlords as the most likely candidates to be recruited into colonial administration, because they are afraid of peasant protests and need the colonial government to back them up with power. In return, the colonial government wants the landlords to keep peace in the countryside and to promote export agriculture. 114
• In order to facilitate political domination, the British adopted an education policy that aimed “to keep the natives of India in the profoundest state of barbarism and darkness.” 114
• Mexico’s foreign debt, for example, also jumped from around $7 billion in the early 1970s to around $38 billion in the late 1970s, and then further to $106 billion in 1989. the extent of this debt problem can be demonstrates by the fact that he foreign debt in Mexico in the mid-1980s amounted to about 76% of its GNP (Time, January 8, 1989, p.33). About 80% of Mexico’s export earnings were used to keep up with the interest payment on its foreign debt alone. From the dependency perspective, the foreign debt problem represents an intensification of financial dependency, a process that has played a crucial role in the shaping of the development of Latin American countries in the 1980s. 116
• In addition, dependency researchers point out that the debt trap exerted a profound impact on the domestic societies of the debtor nations. First, there was the problem of currently devaluation. 119
• Second, sine the domestic currency was worth less than before, there was a trend toward rising inflammation. In the early 1980s, Mexico’s annual inflammation rate was approximately 80%. 119
• Due to cutbacks in state investment in the industrial sector and restrictions on foreign imports such as machinery, the optimistic economic growth of Latin American in the 1970s vanished. Instead, the debtor nations experienced a drastic economic decline in the 1980s. Mexico’s GNP, in instance, dropped from +8% in 1978 to -5% in 1983. Economic decline resulted in massive unemployment, with many debtor nations having an unemployment rate of over 50%. 120
• Currency devaluation, rising inflation, and economic decline inevitably led to the intensification of political conflict in the societies of the debtor nations. 120
• There was an increase in anti-Americanism in Latin American nations. The Latin American people began to blame the lowering of their living standards and their suffering on American banks and the American government. 120
• From the dependency perspective, the debtor- creditor relationship is a political one.121
• Nonetheless, the Latin American nations are borrowing money from some money of the most powerful organization in the world he multinational financial institutions. The foreign banks could easily wage an economic war to overthrow the debtor governments. The creditors could ask for a freeze of the assets of the debtor nations in the United States, set up an economic blockade to cut off all trade with and loans to the debtor nations, and request that foreign companies pull their business out of the debtor nations.121
• Dependency researchers point out the interesting fact that larger the foreign debt, the greater the outflow of domestic capital to the core nations.
• Dependency is the result of the imposition of set of external conditions on third World development.132
• Thus Marxist critics of the school charge that the dependency perspective has overemphasized the factor of external conditions, and has neglected the role of internal dynamics such as class conflict and the state. 132
• The dependency school does not believe that these domestic classes and institutions could resist foreign domination and promote independent development for Third World countries. 132
• Since Cardoso wants to bring history back in, he employs the term dependency not as a theory to generalize the universal pattern of underdevelopment, but as a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations in Third World development (Palma 19780). 135
• Cardoso reports that foreign capital occupied 72.6% of the capital-goods sector, 78.3% of the durable consumer-goods sector, and 53.4% of the nondurable consumer-goods sector for the ten largest firms in each sector in Brazil in 1968. This growing industrial power of foreign-owned manufacturing firms that sold their products to the Brazilian market was also reflected in the advertising business. In 1967, the twelve major advertisers in Brazil included Volkswagen, Gillette, ford, Nestle, Coca-Cola, and Shell. And by being the largest advertising sponsors, foreign firms exercised influenced on the mass media newspapers, magazines, and television.139
• Cardoso deliberately uses the phrase associated-dependent development because it combines two notions that generally have appeared as separate and contradictoy dependency and development. Classical modernization theories focus only on modernization and development, while classical dependency theories and imperialism view the basic relationship between a dependent capitalist country and underdeveloped country as one of extractive exploitation that perpetuated stagnation. But Cardoso asserts that a new phase has emerged as a result of the rise of multinational corporations, the immersion of industrial capital into peripheral economies, and a new international division of labor. 141
• Since foreign corporations aim to manufacture and sell consumer goods to the domestic market, their interests coincide with economic growth in at least some crucial sector of the dependent country. From this angle, development implies a definite articulation with technological, financial, organization, and market connections hat only multinational corporations can assure. 141
• Evans presents a model of “tripe alliance” of state, multinational, and local capital, and shows how the interaction of external and internal contradictions have worsened Brazilian dependent development, marking the leadership of the triple alliance increasingly problematic. 151
• Development implies the accumulation of the capital in the context of an expansion of the variety of an increasingly differential internal division of labour, an expansion of the variety of goods that may be produced locally, more flexibility as to the goods can be offered on international markets and therefore less vulnerability to the international system. 151
• Although the concept of dependency is originally derived from studies of the underdevelopment of Latin America countries, it can be disengaged from that region and used as an approach 9or a methodology) to examine development. 158
• The new dependency studies have paid more attention to historically specific situations of dependency than did classical dependency studies. 164
• The state in the Third World is no longer perceive as a dependent state for foreigners, but as active agency that tacitly works together with local capital and international capital. 164-165
• Their willingness to acknowledge the coexistence of two contradictory processes dependency and development. 165
• When the United States became a superpower afterworld War II, American social scientists were called upon to study the problems of Third World development. This started the modernization school, which dominated the field of development in the 1950s. However, the failure of modernization programs in Latin America in the 1960s led to the emergence of a neo-Marxist dependency school. This dependency school was highly critical of the modernization school, frequently attacking it as rationalization of imperialism. From Latin America this school quickly spread to the United States, since it fit nicely with the antiwar sentiments of many American students. 169
• The ideological battle between the modernization school; and the dependency school began to subside. The debate on Third World development became less ideological and emotional. A group of radical researchers led by Immanuel Wallerstein found that there were many new activities in the capitalist world-economy that could not be explained within the confines of the dependency perspective. 169
• The Vietnam War, the Watergate crisis, the oil embargo in 1975, and the combination of stagnation and inflammation in the late 1970s, as well as the rising sentimental of protectionism, the unprecedented government deficit, and the widening of the trade gap in the 1980s all signal the demise of American hegemony in the capitalist world-economy. 170
• He has incorporated many concepts from the dependency school such as unequal exchange, core-periphery exploitation, lerstein has also adopted many basic tenets of the dependency school, such as the argument that “the ‘feudal’ forms of production characteristic of much of American history are not ‘persist from the past’ but rather products of Latin America’s historical relations with the core”(Kaye, Harvery (1979) ”Totality: Its Application to Historical and Social Analysis by Wallerstein and Genovese,” Historical Reflections, 6:405-419, p. 409). In fact, Wallerstein (1979, The Capitalist-World Economy, New York: Cambridge: University Press, p. 53) has included the concepts of Frank, Dos Santos, and Amin as part of his world-system perspective, on the grounds that these concepts have in common a critique of both the modernization school and the Marxist developmentalist perspective. 171-2
• For Wallerstein, world-system perspective is not a theory but a protest “a protest against the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century” (1987, “World-System Analysis,” pp. 309-324, in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner, (eds.) Social Theory Today, Stanford, Stanford University Press). 173
• In traditional scientific inquiry, “the social sciences are constituted of a number of ‘diciplines’, which are intellectually –coherent groupings of subject-matter distinct from each other” (Wallerstein, 1987, p. 310). 173
• Social science divisions are actually derived intellectually from the dominant liberal ideology of the nineteenth century, which argued that state (politics) and market (economics) were analytically separate domains, that sociology was thought to explain the irrational phenomena that economics and political science were unable to account for, and that anthropology specialized in the study of the primitive people beyond the realm of the civilized world evolved, the contact line between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’, ‘political’ and ‘economic’, blurred. Scholarly poaching became commonplace. The poachers kept moving the fences, without however breaking them down. 174
• The three presumed arenas of collective human action the economic, the political and the social action. They do not have separate “logics”. More importantly, the intermeshing of constraints, options, decisions, norms, and “rationalities” is such that no useful research model can isolate “factors” according to the cathegories of economic, political and social, and treat only one kind o variable, implicitly holding the others constant. We are arguing that there is a single “set of rules” or a single “set of constraints” within which these various structures operate. In short, the various disciplines of social science are actually but a single one.174-175
• “Social science is the statement of the universal set of rules by which human/social behavior is explained. (Wallerstein, 1987, p. 313). 175
• In traditional social science inquiry, ”human history is progressive, and inevitable so” (Wallerstein, 1987, 322). It seems that both liberal evolutionary theorists and Marxist developmentalists have shared the basic assumption of progress. For Wallerstein, however, “world-system analysis wants to remove the idea of progress from the status of a trajectory and open it up as an analytical variable. There may be better and there may be worse historical systems (and we can debate the criteria by which to judge). It is not at all certain that there has been a linear trend upward, downward or straightforward. Perhaps the trend line is uneven, or perhaps indeterminate. Were this conceded to be possible, a whole a new arena of intellectual analysis is immediately opened up” (p. 322-3). 179
• We are living in a period of real historical choice, historical social science that feels comfortable with the uncertainties of transition, that contributes to the transformation of the world by illuminating the choices without appealing to the crutch of a belief in the inevitable triumph of good.” 180
• Wallerstein proposes a trimodal system consisting of core, semiperiphery, and periphery. 180
• The semiperipheral country stands in between in terms of the kinds of products it exports and in terms of the wage levels and profit margins it knows. Furthermore, it trades or seeks to trade in both directions, in one mode with the core…. It is often in the interests of a semiperipheral country to reduce external trade, even if balanced, since one of the major ways in which the aggregate profit margin can be increased is to capture an increasingly large percentage of its home market for it home products. 181
• At moment of world –market contraction, where typically the price level of primary export from peripheral countries goes down more rapidly than the price level of technologically advanced industrial exports from core countries, the government of peripheral state are faced with balance-of-payments of problems, a rise in unemployment, and a reduction of state income. One solution is “import-substitution”, which tends to palliate these difficulties. It is a matter of “seizing the chance” because it involves aggressive state action that takes advantage of the weakened political position of core countries and the weakened political economic position of domestic opponents of such policies. 182
• Done in more intimate collaboration with external capitalists, promotion by invitation is more a phenomenon of monuments of expansion than of monuments of contraction in the capitalist world-economy. 183
• An example showing that “a clearly enunciated and carefully pursued strategy of development including economic independence as a goal can be consistent with an accelerating rate of economic as well as social and political development.” 184
• According to Wallerstein, the key to a semiperipheral breakthough is that a country must have a market available that is large enough to justify an advanced technology, and for which it must produce at a lower cost than the existing producers. Asemiperipheral country can enlarge a market for its national products in one of the following ways:

(1) It can expand its political boundaries by unification with is neighbors or by conquest, thus enlarging the size of its domestic market.

(2) It can increase the costs of imported goods though tariffs, prohibitions, and quotas, thus capturing a larger share of its domestic market.

(3) It can lower the costs of production by providing subsidies for national products, thus indirectly raising the raising the price of imported goods relative to the subsidized items. The costs of production can als be lowered by reducing wage levels, but this policy would increase external sales at the risk of lowering internal sales.

(4) It can increase the internal level of purchasing power by raising wage levels, but this policy may increase internal sales at the risk of lowering external sales.

(5) It can, though the state or other social institutions, manipulate the tastes of internal consumers though ideology or propaganda. 184-185

• “Establishing a system of state ownership within a capitalist world-economy does not mean establishing a socialist economy.” 186
• “States ownership countries have, in fact, lower standards of living than those countries is still manifestly enormous.” 186
• A socialist government when it comes will not look anything like the USSR, or China, or Tanzania of today. Production for use and not for profit, and rational decision on the cost benefits (in the widest sense of the of the term) of alternative uses is a different mode of production, one that can only be established within the single division of labor that is the world-economy and one that will required a single government. 186-187
• By identifying the present socialist states as mere semiperipheral countries (or states-owned capitalist enterprises) trying to make it to the core in the capitalist world-economy. Obviously, this new perspective calls for a reinterpretation of the history of the capitalist world-economy over the past four centuries. 187
• According to Wallerstein, a capitalist world-economy began to form centered in the European continent in the sixteenth century. This world- economy possessed a set integrated production process that Wallerstein calls “commodity chain”. The total surplus extrocted from these commodity chains was always concentrated to a disproportionate degree in some zones rather than in others. Peripheries are those zones that lost out in the distribution of surplus to the core zones. 187
• “The monopolization could occur because of some technological or organizational advantage which some segment of the producers had or because of some politically enforced restriction of the market.” 188
• In order to restore the overall rate of profit in the world-economy and to ensure its continual uneven distribution, it is necessary to (1) reduce the cost of production by reduction of wage cost (both by further mechanization of production and by site relocation), (2) create new monopolized leading products via innovation, and (3) expand effective demand though further proletarianization of segments of the work force. 189
• Wallerstein notes that the transformation of the capitalist world-economy since 1945 has been remarkable in two respects. First, the absolute expansion of the world-economy since 1945 in terms of population, value produced, forces of production, and accumulated wealth has probably been as great as that for the entire period of 1500-1945. This remarkable development of the percent-forces of production has meant a massive reduction of the percent-age of the world population engaged in producing primacy goods, including food products. In the process, nations have come close to exhausting the pool of low-cost labor that has hitherto existed. Virtually all households are now at least semiproletarianized (part peasant and part wageworker), and economic stagnations continue to produce the consequence of transforming segments of these semiproletarianized households into fully proletarianization of household translates into higher-cost wage labor and the decline of profit margins in the capitalist world-economy. Second, the political strength of the antisystemic forces has increased by an incredible amount. Since 1845 there have been triumphs from all branches of the antisystemic movements, including the creation of socialist countries (due to the military prowess of the Soviet Union or to internal revolutionary forces), the triumph of national liberation movements, and the coming to power of social-democratic/labor parties in the Western world. Despite their differences, these variants of the antisystemic forces all share three elements: Each was the result of the upsurge of popular forces in its own country, each involved parties or movements that the double policy objective of economic growth ans greater internal equality.190-191
• According to Wallerstein, the growing disillusionment of the antisystemic movements can be explained by the contradiction embedded in the movements’ twin goal. On the one hand, the movements seek greater internal equality (which involves fundamental social transformations), and on the other thy desire rapid economic growth (which involves catching up with the core states). The movements bring together under one organizational roof those who wish to catch up economically and those who search for social change. 191-192
• Because the antisystemic movements never rose power, they did not have to confront the contradictions of their ideology.
• Since 1945, there has been a “weakening of the political carapace of capitalism which, by allowing the anti-systemic movements to arrive at the state power in large numbers, exposed the deep internal cleavage of these movements, the rift between those who sought upward mobility and those who sought equality” (Wallerstein, (1988) “Development: Lodestar or Illusion,” Economic and Political Weekly, 23 (39), pp. 2017-2023, p. 2022). 192
• “National development may well be a pernicious policy objective. This is for two reasons. For most states, it is unrealizable whatever the method adopted. And for those few states which may still realize it, that is transmute radically the location of world-scale production and thereby their location on the interstates ordinal scale, their benefits will perforce be at the expense of some other zone” (p. 2022). 192-193
• Instead of endorsing the national movements that have prevailed in the movement literature since the nineteenth century, implementation by a world- level strategy that requires implementation by a world-level movement. In particular, Wallerstein calls for a worldwide attack on the flow of surplus at the point of productions: ”Suppose that anti-systemic movements concentrated their energies everywhere in the OECD countries, in the Third World countries, and yes, in the socialist countries as well, on efforts defined as retaining most of the surplus created. One obvious way would be to seek to increase the price of labor or the sale by the direct producers” (p. 2023). Wallerstein further explains that the concern of this world-level movement “must be how at each point on very long commodity chains a greater percentage of the surplus can be retained. Such a strategy would tend over time to “overload” the system, reducing global rates of profit significantly and evening out distribution. Such a strategy might also be able to mobilize the efforts of the many varieties of new social movements, all of which are oriented in one way or another more to equality than to growth….[The premise of this strategy is that] global rates of profit are quite open to political attack at a local level. And, as the local victories cumulate, a significant cave-in of political support for the system will occur” (p. 2023). 193-194.
• Wallerstein stresses that his world-level strategy of promoting surplus retention by the producers is different from the former strategy of national class struggle. In the nineteeth century, the fight against inequality through class struggle took place in the workplace (via trade unions) and in the political arena of the nation-state (via socialist parties). But the capitalists could easily fight back in several ways. They could recruit new workers from the worldwide pool of reserve households, they could use the state to repress such movements, and, if they failed to control the nation-state, they could be relocate the locus of their capital to other zones without necessarily losing long-term control over it. In this respect, Wallerstein argues that class struggle movements ”cannot afford their close links to the state, even to the regimes they have struggled to bring to power.” Instead, class struggle movements must be waged at the world level in order to be affective in forcing the pace of the transformation of the capitalist world-economy. 194-195
• First, the unit of analysis for the world-system perspective is, of course, the world –system. Unlike the dependency perspective insists that the whole world should be taken as a unit of social science analysis. Wallerstein argues that historical explanation should proceed from the viewpoint of the world-system, and all phenomena are to be explained in terms of their consequences for both the totality of the world-system and its subparts. 196
• Once we assume that the unit of analysis is such a world-system and not the state or the nation or the people, then much change in the outcome of the analysis. Most specifically we shift from a concern with the attributive characteristics of state to concern with the relational characteristics of states. We shift from seeing classes (and status groups) as groups within a state to seeing them as groups within a world-economy. 196
• Unlike classical dependency theorists, who formulate the strategy of socialist de-linking as a solution to Third World development, world-system analysts doubt the viability of this de-linking strategy. 196
• Unlike the dependency school, the world-system school has a unique theoretical structure. Instead of a simplistic core-periphery model, Wallerstein’s capitalist world-economy has three layers: the core, the semiperiphery, which stands between the core and the periphery and exhibits characteristics of both. The formulation of the semiperiphery concept is a theoretical breakthrough because it enables researchers to examine the complexity and the changing nature of the capitalist world-economy. This three-tiered model allows Wallerstein to entertain the possibilities of upward mobility (a core moving into the semiperiphery moving into the periphery). 198
• The concept enables researchers to ask such interesting questions as why a few East Asian states are able to transcend their peripheral statuses in the late twentieth century. 198
• In sum, in that the world-system school is different from the dependency school in that it treats the whole world as its unit of analysis, adopts a historical methodology that perceives reality as a state of flux, develops a trimodal theoretical structure, abandons the deterministic point of view on the direction of development, and has a much broader research focus. 199
• Wallerstein contends that “neither ‘the development’ nor the ‘underdevelopment’ of any specific territorial unit can be analyzed or interpreted without fitting it onto the cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the world-economy as a whole” (1979, “Underdevelopment Phase B: Effect of the Seventeenth-Century Stagnation on Core and Periphery of the European World-Economy,” pp. 73-84, in Walter Golfrank (ed.) The World System of Capitalism: Past and Present, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 73). 201
• The core countries not only competed for colonial territories, they also struggled among themselves for the hegemonic domination of the capitalist world-economy. 202
• The second cycle began in 1826, reached its peak in 1921 with 168 colonies, then declined to 58 colonies in the 1969 (the year in which Henige completed his study). 206
• The first wave of colonialism, which is often characterized as “settler colonies”, was the most disruptive. The term settle refers not only to the transport of corelike societies to the peripheral areas, but also to the uprooting of local peoples, their virtual annihilation though enslavements. When the second wave emerged, since its scale and amount of disruption were less, it was more a matter of “occupation” than the replacement of one people and social arrangement with another. The third wave was more a matter of ” dependence “ and ‘influence.” Control by the core has become less overt and more indirect in its effect upon peripheral peoples and social arrangements. 210
• With respect to the scope of colonialism, with each wave more of the world has been included are brought within the web of the world-economy. The first wave reached a peak of 147 colonies in 1770, and the second climbed to a peak of 168 in 1921. Bergesen and Schoenberg argue that the third wave seems to be even more extensive than the second with arms sales including even the former independent states of Latin America. 210
• The Research Agenda. The world-systems perspective directs researchers to examine global dynamics. 218
• These kind of global research questions have seldom been raised by modernization and dependency researchers. 219
• The Methodology. The world-system perspective has adopted a long-term historical approach to study of research problems. 219
• The data base. Current data sets, most of which have been collected at the national level, are insufficient to answer the global research questions posed by the world-system researchers. Consequently, these researchers have begun a quest for new, world level data sets. 219
• In sum, the world-system school has made a significant contribution by starting a new direction of research toward the study of cyclical movements of the world-economy, the long waves of colonialism, and world labor movements. 220
• “…the theory’s atemporal categories have imperceptibly been given a life of their own and have imposed [whatever author’s intentions] of the social reality that was meant to be understood by them, so now the categories make that reality fit their own priori selves” (Zeitlin, M. (1984) The Civil Wars in Chile (Or the Bourgeoisie Revolutions That Never Were, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 220-1
• Zeitlin charges that the world-system perspective seldom examines the historical specific “class relations within nations that shape the global relations between them and that determine how these global relations will affect their internal development” (as above, p. 233). 223
• …the world system perspective has been criticized for reification, for neglect of historically specific development, and for stratification analysis. 223
• Although the general focus of the world-system school has been on global dynamics, this focus nevertheless should not preclude researchers from applying the global perspective to the study of historical developments at the national or local level. 226
• …the adoption of world-system analysis for the study of local regions may even throw new light on old issues that anthropologists have taken for granted, because anthropologists have too often “developed a defensive blindness to the macrostructures that shaped the societies they studied” (Nash, J. (June 1981) “Ethnographic Aspects of the World Capitalist System,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 10: pp. 393-423, p. 409). 227
• Recently, Wallerstein has further underscored the need for a world-level class struggle movement by means of which the producers would attack the flow of surplus at the point of production. 227
• Wallerstein contends that “classes do not have some permanent reality. Rather, they are formed, they consolidate themselves, they disintegrate or disaggregate, and they are re-formed. It is a process of constant movement, and the greatest barrier to understanding their action reification” (1979, The Capitalist World-Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 224). 227
• …”class represents an antinomy, as a dialectical concept should. On the one hand, class is defined as a relationship to the means of production, and hence position in the economic system which is world-economy. On the other hand a class is a real actor only to the extent that it becomes class-conscious, which means to the extent that its I organized as a political actor. But political actors are located primarily in particular national states. Class is not the one or the other. It is both, and class analysis is only meaningful to the extent that it is placed within a given historical context” (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 196). 229
• Unlike the dependency school, which has specialized in the study of the periphery, the world-system perspective has a much broader research focus. It examines not only the periphery, but also the semiperiphery and the core countries. 230
• In the modernization literature, there is a cultural explanation that asserts that neo-Confucianism encourages individual commitment to the work ethic and loyalty to the company, and that it is familism aspect helps to pull resources and capital together through kinship networks. 230
• The neo-Marxist literature has recently put forward an authoritarian state explanation to account for the rapid industrialization of East Asian countries. It shows that when the state is strong and authoritarian (with military government, one-party rule, and suppression of dissent), and when the state managers are committed to development, the state can quickly build up the infrastructure, impose import-substitution, and promote export-industrialization. 231
• In order to understand why Hong Kong started to industrialize in the 1950s, one must know the nature of the capitalist world-system in that period. The 1950s were a time of post-war recovery for the core countries, and there was a large demand for consumer goods and cheap raw materials. Moreover, labor costs in the core countries began to rise, resulting in a trend of transfer of some of the labor-intensive production to the periphery. 231
• It was this conjuncture of refugee capital and refugee labor that provided the impetus for Hong Kong’s industrialization. It was as if the best of Socialist China’s assets in terms of capital and labor has suddenly been transplanted to Hong Kong the real the benefits of the economic upswing of the capitalist world-system. 232
• This “unequal exchange” between cheap Chinese products and Hong Kong currency subsidized the Hong Kong economy, lowered the cost of living, and strengthened Hong Kong’s competitiveness in the world market. 232
• In the United States, although many manufacturing jobs were lost, numerous new jobs have been created in the so-called ascending industries. Unlike the knowledge-intensive “ascending” high-tech industries (e.g., the electronic industry), the “descending” industries were labor-intensive and restricted by technological absolescence (e.g., the garment industry). No researcher had predicted the sudden revival of the descending industries in the United Sattes in the late twentieth century. Surprisingly, despite their differences, the ascending and descending industries share the following job characteristics: Their small firms tend to offer unstable, low-skilled, low-paying jobs; their working conditions are very poor, and their factories are in run-down building in the inner cities. There is neither overtime work compensation nor unemployment insurance; minimum wage and standard labor regulations are frequently not observed; and the workers are allowed to carry the parts home and assemble them with their children at the kitchen table. 239
• From a world-system analysis, the rise of high-tech industries signals a new era in the international division of labor. Capital-intensive and labor-intensive industries could be relocated to the periphery, while knowledge intensive industries could remain in the core. From a national viewpoint, however, this new international division of labor was condemned by core workers as deindustrialization. 242
• Deindustrialization—the relocation of U.S. manufacturing industries to Third World countries—was certainly a good strategy to cut production costs and to make the U.S. products competitive. However, this global option was becoming less available in the 1980s than before. In many prosperous Third World states such as King Kong, labor was no longer cheap, and the governments had imposed stricture regulations on the transnational corporations than before. 243
• The plant closings that took place during the deindustrialization process, for instance, frequently led to worker resentment and public protest. 243
• To promote reindustrialization, many municipal governments have also established “inner-city enterprise zones,” where investor corporations enjoy tax privileges and exemptions from environmental protection laws and where workers have waved the right to form labor unions. 244-5
• Reindustrialization has probably slowed down the deindustrialization process, since more jobs have remained within the United States. Possibility due to this wave of reindustrialization, the recession of the early 1980s proved to be short-lived. 245
• In passing, it should be noted that from a world-system perspective, the transnational corporations generally have had an edge over national unions. Labor is less mobile than capital (since labor is tied to a particular community or region), and can protest only within the boundaries of a nation-state. But capital is highly mobile because it can move from one nation to another in search of labor, raw materials, credit, and markets. Each move across national boundaries, therefore, strengthens transnational capital at the expense of the national labor unions, local communities, and the nation-state, leading to loss of jobs, decrease in tax revenues, and dislocation of the national economy. Unable to exert its influence on state policy through labor unions, the white working class has reacted to its declining class interests by reasserting its “superior” ethnic status. In Southern California, for example, this has taken the form of an “English as the official language” movement, showing the hostility of many in the white community toward the multilingual abilities of new immigrants. If this sentiment continues, there may be intensification of racism and ethnic conflict in the 1990s, Reindustrialization, therefore, has served to intensify ethnic divisions in the working class. It has created conflicts within the working class instead of between the working class and the transnational corporations. 246
• …core hostilities and withdrawal from the capitalist world-economy led China to pursue a radical mobilization policy. In order to arouse uninterrupted enthusiasm from the masses, socialist China put forward an egalitarian destratification policy, eliminating the interests of all classes except those of the peasants and workers. 250
• Unlike global-level studies, national-level studies are inclined to highlight the intricate interactions between global dynamics and national forces such as classes, ethnic tensions, and state policies. 258
• In the case of the United States, it has been pointed out that global dynamics have strongly affected class relations, state policy, and ethnic relations. Deindustrialization and reindustrialization have structured the contour of class struggle in the United States, leading to the weakening of organized labor in the manufacturing industries and the revival of sweatshop production through the practice of subcontracting. To assist reindustrialization, some municipal and state governments have established inner-city enterprise zones to attract business investment. National and ethnic relations, too, have been affected. Nationalism was on the rise in the 1980s because U.S. workers blamed foreign imports for their depressed economic situation, and racism was also intensified because many white workers accused immigrants of taking away their jobs. 259
• In summary, it may be helpful to point out similarities and differences between the new dependency studies. The two kinds of studies are similar with respect to their focus on the interaction between external and internal dynamics. 259
• And unlike the new dependency studies, which assume that Third World countries cannot completely break out of the situation of dependency, the world-system studies postulate that under certain conditions it is possible to have mobility in the world-economy. Thus they explain that Hong Kong and China could escape peripheral status, while the United States could lose its hegemonic status in the capitalist world-economy. 260
• American social scientists conceptualized modernization as a phased, irreversible, progressive, lengthy process that moves in the direction of the American model. Strongly influences by Parsons’s functionalist theory, they looked upon modernity as incompatible with tradition. 261
• According to Kuhn’s model, a scientific discipline grows through a process of revolutionary transformation rather than through a linear accumulation of verified hypotheses. Kuhn asserts that a scientific discipline begins with the setting up of a paradigm—a common frame of reference, a definition of the situation, or a shared worldview that provides a basic focus of orientation. The consolidation of the paradigm occurs as the discipline acquires a recognized place in the scientific community and curriculum, develops its own journals, writes its own textbooks, and informs a set of classical studies. 263-4
• Anomalies of major dimensions that cannot be explained by the paradigm then begin to appear. When the burden of the anomalies grows too great, a scientific revolution occurs. A new paradigm eventually emerges, offering a competing gestalt that redefines crucial problems, introduces new methods, rewrites textbooks, and establishes unique new standards for solutions. 264
• …Kuhn’s model underestimates the degree to which a paradigm can modify itself. For Kuhn, normal science is rigid—it does not readily countenance threats to its foundation, and provides only ad-hoc modifications to cover the anomalies that it cannot explain. 265
• Kuhn’s model ignores the possibility of a pluralistic academic discipline. Kuhn assumes that the new paradigm must replace the old one. Otherwise the scientists will not have a fundamental frame of reference. This assertion may be true for disciplines in the physical sciences, but it is not totally appropriate for the field of development in social science. Since the mid-1970s, the field of development has been characterized by the coexistence of the modernization, dependency, and world-system perspectives. However, none of these perspectives have been able to turn itself into a paradigm by completely eliminating the other perspectives. On the contrary, the coexistence of several competing perspectives has furnished a fertile intellectual environment for substantive research in the field of development in the 1980s. 266
• Many researchers observe that the field of development is moving in the direction of synthesis. 266
• Instead of portraying modernization as a progressive process, and instead of emphasizing the damaging effects of dependency, recent studies indicate that development has both beneficial and harmful effects. Researchers now need to examine each concrete case against its own historical conjuncture before deciding whether development has a positive or negative effect and on which segment of the population. For example, when Japan modernized its economy, Japanese workers turned to folk religion for refuge. When China withdrew from the capitalist world-economy, the interests of the Chinese peasants and workers were developed at the expense of the interests of the Chinese capitalists and bureaucrats. 267-8
• The modernization school still focuses on the relationship between modernity and tradition, although now more on the positive role and tradition than before. The dependency school still analyzes the linkages between dependency and development, although now more on the positive side of development than before. And the world-system school still examines the secular and the cyclical trends of the world-economy and their impact, although now its is more concerned with microregions than before. 268

Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990) Cultural Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 215-259.

• In study of political culture (as distinct from culture generally) should pay special attention to the ways in which the boundary between political and nonpolitical is socially negotiated. More important, it also means that political scientists must give up the notion that the distinction between politics and other spheres (whether economic, social, or something else) is “out there” in the world, read-made to be picked up and used. If, moreover, the boundaries between the political and nonpolitical are socially constructed, then the study of political culture must assume a central place in the discipline. 217
• …political culture must not be treated as an uncaused cause purportedly explaining why people behave as they do, yet incapable of itself being explained. To do so is to posit a world in which values are disembodied, unattached to human subjects. People’s continued adherence to certain doctrines and habits must themselves be explained. 218
• A plausible theory of political culture must not turn the individual into an automaton, passively receiving and internalizing political norms. 218
• The tendency to attach culture to nations persists despite strong evidence suggesting that variation in political attitudes and values within countries are often greater than those between countries. 219
• A fatalistic orientation (the attitude that nothing one can do will influence the government to fix the roads) is thus a learned (and rational) response to a distant, capricious, and unresponsive power imposed from without. 224
• [Banfield, E. (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, NY: Free Press, p. 109.] “Where everything depends upon luck or Divine intervention, there is no point in community action. The community, like the individual, may hope or pray, but it is not likely to take its destiny into its own hands.”
• Nor are fatalists likely to build up the leaders that might help them better their collective condition. Banfield reports that “apparently there has never been in Montegrano a peasant leader to other peasants.” Indeed, Banfield flatly predicts that “there will be no leaders and followers” in such a society. For even in the unlikely event that an individual takes the initiative to offer leadership, according to Banfield, “the group would refuse it out of distrust (p. 97).” The absence of leadership, in turn, impedes the collective organization the peasants need to break out of their cycle of despair and distrust. Fearful of being exploited by others—employers, theirves, landlors, politicians, neighbors—the fatalist, Banfield contends, will prefer authoritarian political systems, in which people are “looked after” and laws are rigorously enforced. 227
• People, like nature, are seen as capricious, occasionally benevolent but much more often bad. Unable to predict when power will be abused and when it will not, the fatalist is predisposed to support authoritarian systems, which give them predictability without responsibility. 227
• The way of life we see from Banfield, is self-reinforcing and self-replicating. No efficacy, no collective action, no pooling of resources, no economic growth, no defense against adversity, no efficacy. No trust, no cooperation, no democracy, no defense against arbitrary authority, no trust. The consequence of a fatalist orientation is to sustain a mode of social organization that inhibits economic growth and democracy, thereby leaving the adherents vulnerable to the caprice of nature and people, and thus refueling the existing fatalistic bias. 227
• Politics, from the communitarian perspective, is, “ideally a matter of concern for every citizen, not just for those who are professionally committed to political careers. Indeed, it is the duty of every citizen to participate in the political affairs of his community.” [Elazar, D. (1972) American Federalism: A View from the State, 2d. ed. NY: Crowell, p. 97]
• …black slavery was “only the worst example of American reliance on force—on man oppressing his fellow man rather than partaking in mutual love. Oppression of man by man in all its forms, not simply southern racial bondage, made up the American slave system.” [Friedman, L. (1982) Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American Abolitionism 1830-1870, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 2763-4] 239
• Were everyone were to participate in every decision, the political system would be overloaded and governing would become impossible; were everyone were to defer to their superiors, democracy would cease to be responsive to citizen needs and thus give way to authoritarianism. 247
• A population that is withdrawn from the political sphere increases the scope for the exercise of arbitrary governmental power, thus further fueling the citizenry’s withdrawal from politics. This self-replicating pattern leaves a grim outlook for democracy in societies with predominantly fatalistic political cultures. 256
• Democracy…requires the participatory norms that come with the low-grid cultures of individualism and egalitarianism in order to check the abuse of power. 256
• In moderation, egalitarianism is a tonic, or perhaps better, an astringent for the establishment cultures. Just as a balance between passivity and involvement is necessary for democracy, so we would suggest a blend of allegiance (“my country right or wrong”) and skepticism (“question authority”) is healthy for democracy. A willingness to oppose authority is as essential as a willingness to support authority Egalitarianism punctures authority’s pomposity. 257
• That which we today identify as free societies—those with the rule of law, alteration in office, and the right to criticize—are a product of the interpenetration of hierarchy, individualism, and egalitarianism. Too much egalitarianism, to be sure, may reverse these democratic benefits. If egalitarians become dominant, they may enforce draconian measures (viz, the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese Cultural Revolution) to achieve equality of condition. 257
• Excluding cultural biases, we can now see, weakens democracy by enlarging its blind spots. 258

Goldstone, J. (1991) “An Analytical Framework,” In A. Jack, Ted Roberts Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri (eds.) Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 37-49.

• Revolution—the forcible overthrow of a government followed by a reconsolidation of authority by new groups, ruling through new political (and sometimes social) institutions—is a complex process. Although the fall of a government may be sudden, the causal trends leading up to that fall, the ensuing struggle for power among contenders, and the reconstruction of a stable state of span decades. 37
• In my work on early modern revolutions, I identify three conditions whose conjunction led to state breakdown: fiscal distress, elite alienation, and conflict, and a high potential for mobilization of the populace. 37
• [Conditions of State Breakdown] The first condition is a decline of state resources relative to the state’s expensive and commitments, and relative to the resources of potential domestic and international adversaries. Historically, when the revenues of state become, over time, insufficient to pay the standing army and bureaucracy, award pensions and favors to supporters, and meet the costs of building roads, ensuring the supply of grain to cities, maintaining order, enforcing justice, and overseeing local administration, the authority of the state wanes. The state is then forced to seek new sources of income. Early modern and contemporary Third World states have turned to borrowing, new taxes of dubious legality, and simple corruption—demanding payments for offices, honors, and the right to do business. When expenses still overrun revenues, as debts mount and funding for the military grows strained, the loyalty of the commercial community and the army grows tenuous. 38
• Only when, in addition to widespread alienation from the state, elites are sharply divided over the future direction of institutional change is a revolutionary struggle likely to arise. 39
• The risk of revolution should not be seen to rise greatly only if state debt increases, or only if elite alienation and polarization are rising, or only if access to land or real wages in autonomous popular communities falter, but if all three of these elements are rising together, then the risk of revolution increases very rapidly indeed. 40
• New ideological movements are sometimes…heralded as a cause of revolutions. 42
• New ideologies do not suddenly appear—the Enlightenment, liberalism, communism, and fundamentalist Islam were evident for generations before becoming identified with revolutionary activity. Instead, existing ideologies become revolutionary when they are seized on and used by groups that are dissatisfied with their circumstances or with regime performance. The conditions that give rise to state breakdown—state fiscal distress, usually accompanied by increasing demands on taxpayers, corruption, and military failures; problems among the elite and aspirants to elite status in achieving positions commensurate with what they feel they deserve; and problems of land scarcity, unemployment, falling wages, and associated unrest among the populace—also give rise to a widespread perception that something has “gone wrong” in society. 42-3
• To dominate a revolution, an ideology needs a well-organized carrier able to interpret that ideology for a mass audience. 45
• Rectification of formal grievances—reducing ostentation in government, purging corrupt old retainers and unpopular laws, creating a new constitution, and accepting greater popular participation in politics—can usually be quickly accomplished, to the credit of new authorities. Yet rectification of material grievances usually requires more than mere formal and procedural changes. Generally, it means that a measure of redistribution of assets held by formerly privileged groups is required. 46
• Once a new ruling group begins to consolidate its authority, usually though the forging of revolutionary armies, internal repression, and assertive nationalism, the task of reconstructing stable political institutions looms large. The manner in which postrevolutionary elites approach this task is usually conditioned by three factors: the class and economic structures of the prerovolutionary society, the international context of the revolution, and the experiences of the new elites under the old regime and in the revolutionary struggle. 47
• Revolutionaries who suffer and sacrifice to achieve the overthrow of foreign domination, or overturn a capitalist regime in the name of restoring land to the peasants and freedom to labor, are willing to take extreme measures and demand great popular sacrifices in order to stamp out foreign influence or attain their social goals. 48
• Postrevolutionary states generally become one party-states, and when significant threat from internal challengers is perceived, they often become police states. 49
• Only when revolutions are fought primarily against external opponents—e.g., anticolonial revolutions in which there are a few strong loyalists or collaborators, as in the United States and Algeria—are postrevolutionary regimes able to reconstruct their states without fear of attach from internal adversaries, and hence exhibit less of a “garrison” mentality. 49

Peet, R. (1991) Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development, New York: Routledge.

• Even in Marxism, which claims to be a science of all human existence, there is a need to well on certain aspects of the whole life experience. 1
• Economic development in capitalist societies is conventionally measured as the size and rate of growth of the gross domestic product - that is the volume of the 'total final output of goods and services produced by an economy' (WB, 1989:291). 3-4
• …the geographic distribution of income across societies is more uneven than the most inegalitarian class structure in any one society. 6
• Dependency theory argues, on a neo-Marxist basis, that contact with the Europeans may indeed bring 'modern' elements to the societies of the Third World, but has also connected them to an exploitative social order. 10
• Marxism has a dialectical understanding of history, in which change stems from contradictions between human groups and between society and the natural world. 10
• …ideology is a partial or biased account directly or indirectly constructed on behalf of a certain class, national or ethnic interest. 18
• Drawing explicitly on biology, Parsons (1966:2) derives a general paradigm which analysis any system in terms of four functional categories: (1) the maintenance of the highest 'governing' or controlling patterns of the system; (2) the internal integration of the system; (3) its orientation to the attainment of goals; (4) its more generalized adaptation to the broad conditions of the environment. 22
• …modernization theory is interested in elaborating the differences between traditional and modern societies in terms of their positions on various indices of modernity or development, and to the extent to which they approximate the model of modern industrial society. Modernization theory asks: what impedes advance and what are the conditions and mechanisms of social transition, from traditional to modern? 26
• (Hoselitz, 1960:60) 'An economically highly advanced society...is characterized by a complex division of social labor, a relatively open social structure in which caste barriers are absent and class barriers are surmountable, in which social roles and gains from economic activity are distributed essentially on the basis of achievement, and in which, therefore, innovation, the search for an exploitation of profitable market situations, and the ruthless pursuit of self-interest without regard for the welfare of others is fully sanctioned. 29-30
• …the main problem for a theory of economic growth is to determine the mechanisms by which the social structure of an underdeveloped country can be modernized - that is, altered to take on the features of an economically advanced country. 30
• Modernization 'is not simply an increase in a set of indices. It involves profound changes in individual and group behavior' (Soja, 1968:4). 36
• …the ideas, customs, individual qualities of the members of society develop ad change under the impact of the social relations of production. (Szentes, 1976:71) 40
• …dependency theory was a reaction against the failure of earlier theories to adequately explain economic backwardness in Latin America, or to offer a convincing model of the future development process. 43
• In conventional economic analysis, the theory of comparative advantage argues that the exchange of the center countries' industrial goods for peripheral primary goods is to all countries' advantage. 44
• …import substitution strategy (i.e. replacing industrial imports with domestic production under tariff protection) 44
• The basic hypothesis of the dependency school is that development and underdevelopment are interdependent structures within the global economic system. 45
• …center and periphery become increasingly polarized as capitalism develops the one and underdevelops the other in a single historical process. 47
• …underdevelopment in the periphery result from the loss of surplus which is expropriated for investment in the center (Frank 1969b:3-14).
• 'Placing labor at the heart of the study of modern world history can unite the classical Marxist position of political praxis aimed at the working class, with the global dynamics of class struggle in a world social system. In that unity lies the best hope for peace and a more human world order'. (Berquist, 1984:17). 54
• For Marx, the social relations people enter into for their existence determine the possibility and direction of productive development. Social relations are therefore Marxism's most essential analytical category. 59
• For Marx the most essential aspect of social relations is control over productive forces and resources. 59
• Societies are exploitative when uncompensated surplus labor, or its products, are taken from the direct producers. 61
• Crisis in material development sharpen and intensify ongoing class struggles, given the possibility for broad social change, including political and ideological transformation. This happens only when the productive possibilities of the old society near exhaustion. 63
• …'that economic relations, centrally those between owners and direct producers, are always determinant (in the last instance) with respect to the levels or 'instances' in a society, and with respect to the configuration of society as a whole, but...this determination by the economic structure takes the rather indirect form of assigning to the other, non-economic levels, their place in a hierarchy of dominance with respect to one another, and the kind of articulation between them. (Benton, 1986:72). 66
• …the various aspects of social existence are realigned following the significant change in the social relations of production. 66
• Domination entails polarized development of the world's productive forces, fast development in the dominant countries and slow in the dominated, and thus the expanded reproduction of economic inequalities. This polarized development essentially results from the initial development of machine production in the industrialized countries... 68
• Capitalism gains ascendancy to transform and destroy the old relations of production, and then assimilates them. 70
• An adequate theory of societal development must attend to human actions and their contexts, but it must pay special attention to the structural conditions which limit, direct and divert transformative activity. 104
• Capitalism, therefore, was not some prior intention towards which all history tends. It came about through the dissolution of previous societies and the recombination of their elements on new forms. 107
• …the new capitalist social organization came from a process of disintegration, reassembling, and the formation of new elements which was largely 'internal' or localized, albeit in the context of rapidly changing global conditions. Capitalism is feudalism's errant offspring. 113
• [Clive Thomas, 1974] The crucial features are dynamic divergence between domestic resources and domestic demand and between demand and mass needs. Material development, he says, means initiating economic processes which overcome these divergences; as they are rooted I basic structures a revolutionary break with the past has to occur. ... Immediately production should be reoriented to achieve self-sufficiency in food and provide crucial industrial raw materials, with exports as subordinate objective. ... The transformation of agriculture, however, entails: increasing the size of farming and marketing units; using production techniques which are capital- and skill- intensive; using other modernized inputs to transform productivity; eventually transferring labor to agriculture to other rural and urban activities; and, most significantly, building political and social relations which eliminate exploitation in the rural economy but preserve voluntarism and are based in democratic decision making. 166
• For Thomas, a country incapable of using its own resources to meet its basic requirements remains forever underdeveloped (Thomas, 1974:225). ... [Thomas' model] entails popular control of the production process, but also the planning of consumption to match the possibilities of local production. It involves a transformation in class and gender and in spatial relations towards complete equality. It means excruciatingly hard work for at least a generation before material needs can be fully met. But most importantly it means democracy in all aspects of social and economic life. It is a process not to be supported lightly but only to be undertaken by a people united in their opposition to the structures that now prevail and determined to make entirely new forms of life in the future. 168
• Marxism emphasizes the collective character of human reproduction, asks of any society how is reproduction organized and what relations people engage in for the reproduction of their kind. 185

Benton, T., 1986, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism, New York, St. Martins Press.
Berquist, C., (ed.), 1984, Labor in the Capitalist World Economy, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Frank, A.G., 1969, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, NY: Monthly Review Press.
Hoselitz, B., 1960, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Glencoe: Free Press.
Parsons, T., 1966, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall.
Soja, E.W., 1968, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya: A spatial analysis of Social, Economic, and Political Change, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press.
Szentes, T., 1976, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, 3rd ed, Budapest, Akademia Kiado.
Thomas, C., 1974, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, NY, Monthly Review Press.
World Bank, 1989, World Development Report 1989, NY, Oxford University Press.

Barber, Benjamin ( March 1992) “Jihad Vs. McWorld,” The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 269, No. 3; pp. 53-65.

• Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures – both bleak, neither democratic. The first is retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonization in national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe – a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, against every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being born in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food – with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald’s, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctatntly together at the very same time. 53
• The tendencies of what I am here calling the forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making national borders porous from without. They have one thing in common: neither offers much hope to citizens looking for practical ways to govern themselves democratically.
• The market imperative has also reinforced the quest for international peace stability, requisites of an efficient international economy. Markets are enemies of parochialism, isolation, fractiousness, war. Market psychology attenuates the psychology of ideological and religious cleavages and assumes a concord among producers and consumers – categories that ill fit narrowly conceived national or religious cultures.
• Every nation, it turns out, needs something another nation has; some nations have almost nothing they need.
• …the pursuit of science and technology asks for, even compels, open societies. Satellite footprints do not respect national borders; telephone wires penetrate the most closed societies. With photocopying and then fax machines having infiltrated Soviet universities and samizdat literary circles in the eighties, and computer modems having multiplied like rabbits in communism’s bureaucratic warrens thereafter, glasnost could not be far behind. In their social requisites, secrecy and science are enemies.
• Capitalism and democracy have a relationship, but it is something less than marriage. An efficient free market after all requires that consumers be free to vote their values and beliefs on competing political candidates and programs. The free market flourished in junta-run Chile, in military-governed Taiwan and Korea, and, earlier, in a variety of autocratic European empires as well as their colonial possessions.
• OPEC, the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, the multinational corporation…there are scores of institutions that reflect globalization. But they often appear as ineffective reactors to the world’s real actors: national states and, to an even greater degree, subnational factions in permanent rebellion against uniformity and integration – even the kind represented by universal law and justice. The headlines features these players regularly: they are cultures, not countries; parts, not wholes; sects, not religions; rebellious factions and dissenting minorities at war not just with globalism but with the traditional nation-state. Kurds, Basques, Puerto Ricans, Ossetians, East Timoreans, Quebecois, the Catholics of Northern Ireland, Abkhasians, Kurile Islander Japanese, the Zulus of Inkatha, Catalonians, Tamils, and, of course, Palestinians – people without countries, inhabiting nations not their own, seeking smaller worlds within borders that will seal them off from modernity.
• There were more than thirty wars in progress last year, most of them ethnic, racial, tribal, or religious in character, and the list of unsafe regions doesn’t seem to be getting any shorter. Some new world order!
• How can democracy be secured and spread in a world whose primary tendencies are at best indifferent to it (McWorld) and at worst deeply antithetical to it (Johad)? My guess is that globalization will eventually vanquish retribalization. The ethos of material “civilization” has not yet encountered an obstacle it has been unable to thrust aside.
• …the participatory and direct form of democracy that engages citizens in civic activity and civic judgement and goes well beyond just voting and accountability – the system I have called “strong democracy” – suits the political needs of decentralized communities as well as theocratic and nationalist party dictatorships have done. Local neighborhoods need to be democratic, but they can be. Real democracy has flourished in diminutive settings: the spirit of liberty, Toqueville said, is local. Participatory democracy, if not naturally apposite to tribalism, has an undeniable attractiveness under conditions of parochialism.
• Spread English justice to the colonies by exporting wigs. Let an East Indian trading company act as the vanguard to Britain’s free parliamentary institutions. Today’s well-intentioned quick-fixers in the National Endowment for Democracy and the Kennedy School of Government, in the unions and foundations an universities zealously nurturing contacts in Eastern Europe and the Third World, are hoping to democratize by long distance.

Korzeniewicz, M. and Korzeniewicz, R. (1992) “The Social Foundations of Institutional Action: Argentina and Korea in the Postwar Era,” in Modernization in East Asia: Political, Economic and Social Perspectives, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 81-97.

• Initial steps toward land reform were carried out by North Korea during the war and occupation, but the first formal agrarian reform was carried out by the American Military Government in 1948, when more than 90 percent of previously owned Japanese-owned land was distributed among South Korean peasants. The land reform, which was extended to large farms in 1949, reduced the average size of individual farms to less than 2.2 acres and eliminated almost all large farms. 83
• The merging structure of agrarian relations had several consequences. First, it deactivated a potentially strong social actor, effectively dissipating for decades to come all possibilities of the landowners achieving any significant measure of political power. Second, it made it easier for resources to be channeled from agriculture to industry. In part, many former landlords moved directly into industry and commerce because the bonds issued by the government in compensation for land reform could be cashed into stock of newly created firms. 83
• One of the most important characteristics of industrial labor in South Korea has been that, to a large extent, it has been recruited from the country-side. Three and one-half million workers migrated from rural to urban areas in the 1961-1971 period alone. 92
• …the strong bargaining power of trade unions in the postwar period was made compatible with industrialization through import substitution by means of protectionist structures and an orientation of manufacturing for the domestic market. 95
• Landowners and organized labor were demobilized as a political force in the immediate postwar period. Multinational corporations and financial speculators were successfully screened and regulated by a relatively strong state and did not challenge the basic alliance of state and chaebol. In Argentina, social conflict prevented the adoption of an effective development strategy after the early 1950s. The state never achieved an institutional and organizational coherence that would allow it to function as a broker. In turn, political conflicts had an impact upon the economic terrain. What clearly sets the case of Argentina apart from South Korea was the lack of coherence and continuity in both political legitimacy and economic policy. 95

Packenham,, R. (1992) The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

· "Studies of dependency…constitute part of this constantly renewed effort to reestablish a tradition of analysis of economic structures and structures of domination; one that would not suffocate the historical process by removing from it the movement which results from the permanent struggle among groups and classes…. Studies of dependency continue to live tradition of Latin American thought, reinvigorated in the 1960s by the proposition of themes and problems defined in a theoretical-methodological field not only distinct from what inspired Keynesian and structural-functionalist analyses (the theory of modernization, and of the stages of development that would repeat the history of the industrialized countries), but radically distinct with respect to its inherent critical component" (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1977, p. 9-10). 8

· …Lenin anticipated the dependency idea of the "anti-nation inside the nation" of Cardoso and of all other dependency writers. This notion is crucial in the dependency perspective. It links the national and the class aspects of the analysis. It subordinates the former to the latter, as Marx did, but it pays more attention to the national unit than Marx did. It makes, or rather appears to make, the two aspects of the analysis entirely compatible. It locates the unique solution to the linked problems of class exploitation and national imperialism in the overthrow of capitalism and the installation of socialism. It provides and epistemological device which prohibits the theoretical content of the perspective from being falsified. In these and other ways Lenin's ideas also form part of the background to, and are a source of, dependency ideas. 9

· "[In assessing criticisms of dependency analyses, mainly from others in the Marxist tradition] the problem, in fact, it seems to me, in knowing if dependency analyses constitute the last cry of independence of the ideology embedded in Latin America economic patriotism following the failure of attempts at autonomous national development [under capitalism]. Nor is it, to make another criticism, to know if in the final analysis dependency is merely a consequence of the present stage of development of international capital in the monopoly phase. Nor is it repeating that "the motor of history is the class struggle" and therefore that "the only perspective adequate for the analysis of the historical process in the dominated countries is one that assumes the "class perspective." These affirmations are commonplaces, with the virtues and the limitations of the obvious: they contain grains of truth which are lost in the confusion of a lack of theoretical structure" (F.H. Cardoso, 1972, p. 4-5).

· [Liberal theoretical perspectives] One cluster includes the classical, neoclassical, or orthodox theories of economic development of writers as traditional as Adam Smith and as contemporary as Walt Rostow, Wilbert Moore, and Clark Kerr. From the dependency perspective, such authors "justified the nonindustrialization of the [Latin American] region in view of the comparative advantages that might be obtained with agricultural production for export" (F.H. Cordoso, 1977, p. 9).

· ECLA [Economic Commission of Latin America] had proposed a number of solutions to the problems they diagnosed. Among these were industrialization through import substitution, expanded regional economic organization (for example, Central American Common Market, Latin American Free Trade Association), more foreign aid, more "reliable" foreign investment on better terms for borrowing countries, and greater attention to government intervention and economic planning. The dependency writers argued that such proposals, when implemented, only deepened national dependency, increased socioeconomic inequalities, and fostered authoritarian politics. 17

· Utopianism. The highest value in holistic dependency is Marxist socialism. But socialism is not only a value or constellation of values; even more it is a symbol and a utopian goal. Socialism is vaguely defined at best. Broad verbal formulas, nonexistent future states, or idealized versions of extant systems usually substitute for empirical analysis of socialist cases. 30

· Wallerstein projects an integrated class vision onto the entire world. Capitalism is a world economic system that emerged in the sixteenth century and is with us still. In the capitalist world economy there is one world system of exchange and one world division of labor. National units and class divisions within them exist but can be understood properly only in the context of this world system. There are core, periphery, and semi-periphery states, which frequently contend with one another, but such conflicts by themselves do not alter the fact of the world system as such. The only way such conflicts can alter the world system is "via the intervening variable" of the ""world-class consciousness of the proletariat" (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 293). In this view, the concepts of core, semi-periphery, and periphery states are "intellectual tool[s] to help analyze the multiple forms of class conflict in the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1973, p. 293). 113

· "Socialism involves the creation of a new kind of world-system, neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world government." This seems utopian but not to Wallerstein: "I don't feel this projection as being in the least utopian but I don't feel its institution is imminent" (1979, p. 35). 113

· …Walerstein says that socialist world government "will be the outcome of a long struggle…in all areas of the world economy (Mao's continual 'class struggle') states as such are neither progressive nor reactionary. It is movements and forces that deserve such evaluative judgments" (pp. 35-36). Like holistic dependency, world-systems theory is substantively holistic, utopian, and unfalsifiable. 113

Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. and Stephens, J. (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 155-199.

• They [political parties] were crucial in institutionalizing contestation, in mobilizing pressures from below for an opening of the political system, and in mediating threat perception at the top as to the consequences of making such concessions. Essentially, democracy could only be consolidated where elite interests were effectively protected either through direct influences of elite groups on the state apparatus or through electorally strong political parties. 156
• …democracy is a conjunctual outcome resulting from the contradictions and conflicts within capitalism. 158
• The first essential precondition for the emergence of any form of institutionalized contestation was consolidation of state power. Before state power was consolidated, there was no institutionalization of contestation and thus no movement towards democracy. This does not mean that a strong state had to be established in the sense of effective intervention in economic and social life, but simply that overt challenges to state authority had to come to an end, particularly challenges in the form of armed resistance. 139
• The difficulty of the task of consolidating state power varied with the length and intensity of the independence wars and with eternal warfare in the first century after independence. Exposure to warfare prior to and during the attempt to consolidate state power not only delayed not only the achievement of consolidation, but prolonged fighting and extensive destruction of the economy during the independence wars caste military leaders into a more prominent role in post-independence politics. Later, exposure to external warfare, mostly due to the struggle over borders, further strengthened the position of military strong-men, and defeat in wars was particularly detrimental to peaceful internal competition for power. Where the achievement of consolidation of state power was delayed for a long time, the problems of industrialization of contestation and of inclusion tended to pose themselves simultaneously because economic development had increased pressures from subordinate classes. The greater difficulties in consolidating state power in Latin America compared to Europe explain at least part of the contemporary scarcity of stable institutionalized elite contestation and gradual inclusion of non-elite sectors. 163
• For progress towards democracy to be made, intra-elite conflicts due to geographical and economic diversity and due to scarcity of resources had to be moderate and thus facilitate institutionalized contestation and pressures from subordinate classes for inclusion had to emerge. Without such pressures, no opening of the political system took place, but there was no simple linear relationship between the intensity of such pressures and progress towards democracy. If these pressures were highly threatening to elites, they tended to meet with authoritarian reactions. They degree to which they were perceived as threatening depended in turn on the agents mobilizing and articulating the pressures (radical mass parties were more threatening than clientelistic parties), on the economic vulnerability of elites (labor intensive agriculture made landowners more dependent on politically sanctioned labor control than non-labor intensive agriculture), and on the availability of elites of political institutions for control within a constitutional context (elite political parties or state corporatist institutions.)
• …the more labor intensive agriculture was, the greater the threat perception was on the part of the landowning elite of a potential loss of control over the state apparatus in the wake of an opening of the political system. 165
• Export expansion was not sufficient in itself for the emergence of restricted or full democracy. Democracy depended on the sequences of social structural and political institutional development set in motion by export expansion. 165
• Progress towards democracy only occurred under the crucial precondition of absence of labor intensive agriculture. In fact, in no case where (1) labor intensive agriculture predominated, and (2) agriculture was the crucial export sector, was unrestricted democracy established in South America. Under these conditions, the landowners feared the loss of an abundant supply of cheap labor in the wake of democratization, and they were powerful enough either to resist an opening of the political system altogether or at least to keep the rural sector excluded. 165
• Industrialization raised the potential for pressures for democratization, particularly for greater political inclusion, because it strengthened civil society by increasing the size and the interaction among middle and working classes, but its political effects were mediated by the pre-existing political institutional structures, particularly the party system and the tradition of state intervention in society. Industrialization produced or reinforced already existing pressures for inclusion, but the actual strength of these pressures and their political outcome heavily depended on the agents shaping the political articulation of civil society. The nature of these agents was rooted in the class structure and patterns of political institutionalization set before and during the expansion of the export economy. 166
• In agrarian export economies, with labor intensive agriculture and moderate pressures resulting from later and weaker industrialization, articulated by clientelistic parties, only an opening to restricted democracy occurred. In agrarian export economies with labor intensive agriculture and containment of pressures by strong state involvement, there was no opening at all or only a delayed opening to restricted democracy. 167
• Industrialization was not sufficient for the consolidation of even restricted democracies; the other necessary condition was the continued protection of elite interests through the party system. 169
• The only two full democracies in existence at the beginning of the 1930s, Argentina and Uruguay, fell victim to coups inspired by elite attempts to protect their economic interests from the effects of the Depression. 169
• In a few cases, such as Chile after 1932 and Uruguay after 1942, where civil society and the party system were strong, democracies managed to survive for quite a long time. 169
• Fulfillment of the first precondition for the emergence of a regime form with regularized contestation and more than minimal inclusion, namely consolidation of the state apparatus and the establishment of effective control over a geographically defined continuous population, was rather problematic in most of Latin America. 172
• The next development necessary for the establishment of institutionalized competition for political power, a sustained period of expansion of the export economy giving rise to a prosperous class of export producers and urban merchants and financiers, also occurred at different times and to different degrees in the various cases. 173
• The driving force behind the initial establishment of democracy…was the middle class, or rather, the middle classes, namely urban professionals, state employees and employees in the private sector, artisans and craftsmen. 185
• In a somewhat crude generalization we could say that in Europe the working class in most cases needed the middle classes as allies to be successful in its push for democracy, whereas in Latin America it was the other way around. However, the middle classes by no means allied with the working-class in every case, nor did they genuinely support full democracy in every case. The very position of the middle classes, in between the elites and the masses, made for considerable ambiguity in the perception of their class interests regarding the desirability of full democracy. 185
• A first and easy answer to the question of why the military continued to intervene during democratic periods in some cases but not in others is that “the most frequent sequel to military coups and government is more of the same” (Nordlinger 1977:207); in other words, a tradition and/or relatively recent precedent of military intervention increases the likelihood of renewed intervention. To a certain extent, this is certainly the case; military intervention is more likely and normative underpinnings of contestation are weak to begin with, and it weakens such institutions and norms further. 195
• Based on this set of sequences we can suggest three conditions which in combination seem to have been sufficient to allow for the establishment of viable fully democratic regimes in South America before the 1980s: (1) absence or previous elimination of large landowners engaged in labor intensive agriculture as powerful economic and political actors; (2) significant strength of subordinate classes, particularly the working class, in the balance of power in civil society; (3) political articulation of civil society through two or more string political parties. The first two conditions are a result of the structure of the economy (mineral versus agrarian export sector) and of the level of economic development (industrialization and urbanization). The third, and the second one in part, are a result of historical legacies or deliberate institution building acts, but the challenges they present to would-be institution builders are formidable. The first one is also subject to deliberate political action; that is, a sweeping land reform can eliminate large landowners as a powerful class, but this is an exceedingly daunting task in the South American context. 199
• The path did not get much smoother after the initial achievement of democratic rule. 199

Hout, Wil (1993) Capitalism and the Third World: Development, Dependency, and the World System, Vermont: Edward Elgar.

• The so-called 'theories of global society' are characterized by 'new conceptualizations of the world, a vastly extended problematic, and solutions which suggest that the norms of equality and justice are more important than order and stability' (Holsti, K.J. (1985) The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, Boston: Allen and Uwin, p. 48). 4
• Dependency theory contains the original formulation of the assertion that most Latin American countries have obtained formal political independence during the nineteenth century, but have remained economically subordinate to outside powers ever since. The lack of development of these countries is attributed to their integration in the capitalist world system and the resulting exploitation by colonial powers, such as Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States. 6
• The center-periphery theories may be described as the result of the spatial 'broadening' and theoretical 'deepening' of the dependencia position. The center-periphery theories do not limit their analysis to the countries of Latin America. Instead, they claim to be more general, and applicable to the whole of the Third World. 6
• His [Wallerstein'] analysis is basically analytical history: he tries to determine which were the causes of the rise of the capitalist world economy during the 'long sixteenth century' and of its subsequent spread across the world. Instead of analyzing the world system in terms of two categories (center and periphery), Wallerstein distinguishes three parts, adding the so-called semi-periphery to the aforementioned two. 6-7
• Popper's revolutionary idea was that the classical problem and the philosophy of science, the relation between theory and reality, should not be solved by constructing meta-theories stressing the correspondence between theory and reality, but by taking theories more or less autonomous phenomena. Although theories could never be said to reflect reality in all its respects, and therefore it would be impossible to verify them, it would nevertheless be possible to determine whether theoretical constructions do not correspond with reality: it would be possible to falsify theories. Scientific progress, in Popper's terms, then is the ongoing process of the testing of theories: 'bad' theories - i.e., theories that are not supported by empirical findings - are to be rejected while 'good' theories - theories that have not been rejected - are retained. 8
• In the context of Khun's theory it is difficult to speak of scientific growth; the supporters of the dominant paradigm will undoubtedly see themselves as scientifically more sophisticated than the supporters of paradigms that have become unfashionable. Yet Kuhn's theory does not offer criteria for deciding which theory offers scientific progress, wince the rules and criteria for judging theories are inevitably part of a paradigm. 9
• Generally, theories are legitimized by stressing their value relative to other theories. If one does not posses criteria to judge this value, it remains impossible to assess the theories' contribution toward the growth of scientific knowledge. 9
• "A theory is 'acceptable' or 'scientific' only if it has corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor (or rival). that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts. … For the sophisticated a scientific theory T is falsified if only if another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by T ; (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is included (within the limits of observational error) or the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated" (Lakatos, I. (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, vol. 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-196, p. 116). 10-11
• "The function of a theory is to resolve ambiguity, to reduce irregularity to uniformity, to show that what happens is somehow intelligible and predictable; it is this complex of functions to which I refer when I speak of theories as solutions to problems" (Laudan, L. (1977) Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth, Berkeley, CA: University of Californian Press, p. 11) 13
• It is not feasible to develop indicators that measure theoretical concepts to the full. For these reasons, so-called random effects cannot be kept completely under control, nor can they be estimated with absolutely reliable measurement tools. Some uncertainty will be an inevitable element of research in the social sciences. 14
• …the theory is considered to have pointed out and explained novel, previously undiscovered facts and it is assumed that some of the 'excess empirical content' of the research program has been corroborated. 15
• The coming into being of the theory has mainly been induced by the rejection of the central concepts of other theories, thereby applying both its own and 'borrowed' concepts and approaches. The theories that have been attacked by dependency theorists are: liberal free-trade theory, the E.C.L.A. approach and modernization. 18
• The central element in the explanation is the alleged 'over-saving and under-spending' in capitalist economies. Since the effective demand is too low, due to the unequal distribution of the national income - according to Hobson the working classes receives too small a share of total income, and too much is saved by the owning classes - a substantial part of production remains unconsumed. As a consequence, the expectations of returns from investments become negative. Imperialism is the reaction to these two phenomena: it "is the endeavor of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home" (Hobson, J.A. (1988) Imperialism: A Study, Third Edition, London: Uwin Hyman, p. 85). 19-20
• "The previously separate spheres of industrial, commercial and bank capital are now brought under the common direction of high finance, in which the masters of industry and of the banks are united in a close personal association. The basis of this association is the elimination of free competition among individual capitalists by the large monopolistic combines. This naturally involves at the same time a change in the relation of the capitalist class to state power" (Hilferding, R. (1981) Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, London: Routledge, p. 301). 20
• "…imperialism is the political expression of the process of capital accumulation in its competition for the rest of the non-capitalist world-environment which has not yet been taken into possession" (Luxemburg, Rosa (1975) p. 391). 21
• Lexemburg visualizes capitalism as an economic system, comprising even more parts of the globe until one single worldwide market comes into being. 21
• Luxemburg interprets imperialism as a distinct phase in the development of capitalism, in which foreign loans, the building of railways, the initiation of revolutions in the colonized areas and wars are the main mechanisms for the capitalist countries to serve their interests. Since it is her assumption that capitalist accumulation can only exist as long as there are non-capitalist territories that can be exploited, capitalist accumulation thus contains the seeds of its own decay. 21
• "Imperialism is capitalism as the state of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed" (Lenin, V.I. (1964) Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism: A Popular Outline, in V.I. Lenin Collected Works, vol. 22, December 1915-July 1916, Moscow: Progress, pp. 185-304, pp. 266-7). 23
• According to Dobb, capitalism is not likely to have an equally progressive impact on the underdeveloped countries as it has had on the presently capitalist ones. For political reasons the capitalist states often support reactionary social and political forms, and the capitalists force the underdeveloped countries to perpetuate their relatively primitive forms of production for fear of competition. As a consequence, foreign investments have mainly gone into "mining and plantations and raw material processing, or into the development of export industries as a kind of 'enclave' of the imperial metropolis" (Dobb, M. (1963) Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries, London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 18). 24
• Since the lack of competition leads to higher prices that would be feasible under competitive capitalism, the surplus obtained by monopolistic enterprises will eventually increase to such an extent that it can no longer be absorbed by reinvestment in the firms, nor by investment in other parts of the economy. The economic surplus is then used in other ways. The state in capitalist countries, which, according to Baran, is nothing more than an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie, provides an outlet by spending the surplus on "unproductive purposes of all kinds," most notably on military activities (Baran, (1957) The Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 109-33, pp. 108-9). 25
• The main reason for the economic backwardness of the underdeveloped countries is to be found in the way in which the economic surplus is used. The surplus, the main part of which is produced in agriculture, is appropriated by landowners, moneylenders, merchants, the state bureaucracy of the underdeveloped countries, and, to a large extent, foreign capitalists. The foreign capitalists "take home" the surplus as the returns on their investment, while the others tend to spend their part of the surplus in an unproductive way, for instance on "excess consumption." In Baran's view [as above], all groups engaged in the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries share one interest, namely, the maintenance of the subordinate position of the agriculture and working classes in the developed countries. 26
• "…the first and most important obstacle to the economic development of the underdeveloped countries is their relationship to the advanced capitalist countries which dominate and exploit them. Until this relationship is either completely ruptured or totally transformed - and of the latter there seems to be absolutely no prospect in the foreseeable future - talk about overcoming the many other obstacles to economic development is at best naïve and at worst deliberately deceptive" (Sweezy, P.M. (1967) "Obstacles to Economic Development," in C.H. Feinstein (ed.) Socialism, Capitalism, and Economic Growth: Essays Presented to Maurice Dobbs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 191-7). 26
• The imperialist relationship with the colonies turned out to be beneficial for the European countries: their terms of trade between industrial and primary products changed for the better, they were provided with capital needed to finance their industrialization, and capital owners obtained ample opportunities for investment. The effects on the dependent countries, as analyzed by Barratt Brown, proved to be negative: no entrepreneurial class managed to develop there, since "the whole purpose of the operation, i.e. to provide raw materials for British and European industry, worked against the development of industries in the primary producing countries" (Brown, B. (1970) After Imperialism, Revised edition, London: Heinemann, p. 59) 26-7.
• "The desire and need to operate on a world scale is built into the economics of capitalism. Competitive pressures, technical advances, and recurring imbalances between productive capacity and effective demand create continuous pressures for the expansion of markets" (Magdoff, H. (1972) "Imperialism without Colonies," in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffs (eds.) Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London: Longman, pp. 144-70, p. 148). 27
• "…the value of a commodity, or the quantity for any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labor which is necessary for its production, and not on the greater or less compensation which is paid for that labor" (Ricardo, D. (1971) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Harmondsworth, Penguin, p. 55). 29
• "If Portugal had no commercial connection with other countries, instead of employing a great part of her capital and industry in the production of wines, with which she purchases for her own use the cloth and hardware of other countries, she would be obliged to devote a part of that capital to the manufacture of those commodities, which she would thus obtain probably inferior in quality as well as quantity" (Ricardo as above, p. 153). 29
• The creation of mutual dependence among different economies by free-trade would stimulate politicians to retain peaceful relations in order not to disturb the economic contacts. 30
• "The introduction of outside (relative) prices differing from those which would be established in our economy in isolation will result in some trade, as a result every individual would be better off than he would be at the prices which prevailed in the isolated state" (Samuelson, P.A. (1950) "The Gains from International Trade," Originally published in 1939 in H.S. Ellis and L.A. Metzler (eds.) Readings in the Theory of International Trade, London: George Allen and Uwin, pp. 239-252, pp. 245-6). 31
• "The enormous benefits that derive from increased productivity have not reached the periphery in a measure comparable to that obtained by the peoples of the great industrial countries. Hence, the outstanding differences between the standards of living of the masses of the former and the latter and the manifest discrepancies between their respective abilities to accumulate capital, since the margin of saving depends primarily on increased productivity" (Prebisch, R. (1950) The economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, Lake Success, NY: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, p. 1). 32
• "The center is in a better position to retain the fruits of its general increase in productivity because the increment in manpower does not need, as in the periphery, to press on occupations with a lower productivity ratio to the detriment of the wage level. In other words, general improvements of productivity tend to be fully reflected in the increment of the wage level at the center, while at the periphery a part of the fruits of these improvements is transferred through the fall of export prices and the corresponding deterioration in the terms of trade" (Prebisch, R. (1959) "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 49, No. 2, May, pp. 251-73, p. 262). 33
• …industries in the developing countries must take over the production of the previously imported goods, so that the countries are able to reduce their dependence on foreign markets. Under a policy of import substitution the means that previously were employed to produce export goods would be available for the production of goods for the internal market" (Prebisch, 1950 as above, p. 44-5). 33
• The traditional stage is characterized by a society in which the attainable output per capita is limited, partly because production is predominantly agricultural. The pre-conditions for take-off develop under the influence of scientific progress; scientific innovations are applied in, for instance, agriculture, thereby increasing the funds available for investment. The actual take-off stage is usually triggered off by a particular stimulus, often from outside the national society. The prior development of the society and its economy leads to self-sustained growth: investment levels are higher than before - especially in transport, which has a stimulating effect on the whole economy - and important manufacturing sectors experience high rates of growth. For this to happen, an entrepreneurial elite must have developed. The drive to maturity is characterized by the growth of new economic sectors, supplanting the leading sectors of the take-off stage; in Europe, new activity was mainly concentrated in heavy industry which took the place of agriculture as an important part of the economy. In the age of high mass consumption, consumption instead of production occupies a central place in society. Rostow sees three developments in this phase: the pursuit of power in the form of investment in military strength, the emphasis on the welfare state and the expansion of consumption. According to Rostow, economic modernization is complemented by political development, which is to be perceived as "the collaboration of new and more complex forms of politics and government as societies restructure themselves so as to absorb progressively the stock and flow of modern technology which is, essentially, uniform" (Rostow, W. (1971) Politics and the Stages of Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3). The process of economic growth places several issues on the political agenda, most notably: welfare, constitutional, and security issues. 34-5
• "…apparently one of the primary conditions for increasing industrial development on a world-wide scale, particularly in the economically less advanced countries, is the change in certain social and consequently general psychological conditions still standing in the way of more rapid and effective industrial development" (Hoselitz, B.F. (1965) "Unity and Diversity in Economic Structure, in B.F. Hoselitz Economics and the Idea of Mankind, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 63-96, p. 93). 35
• Lerner defines modernity as: "primarily a state of mind - expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change. The nations of the North Atlantic area first developed the social processes - secularization, urbanization, industrialization, popular participation - by which this state of mind came to prevail. The 'Western model' is only historically Western; sociologically it is global" (Lerner, D. (1964) The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York; Free Press. p. iix). 35
• According to Almond, a more developed political system has been successful in: "the acquisition of new capability, in the sense of a specialized role structure and differentiated orientations which together give a political system the possibility of responding effectively, and more or less autonomously, to a new range of problems" (Almond, G.A. (1970) Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory, Boston: Little and Brown. p. 172). 37
• In the modernization process, which, in Pye's view, also has to be a process of nation-building, the spread of political capacities among the population is a crucial element. 37
• Laclau's criticism of dependency and world system theories, and his main argument for separating these from (neo-) Marxism, is based on the idea that capitalism is to be interpreted as a 'mode of production' and not as a 'mode of exchange,' which is in effect the common approach of dependency theorists. In Laclau's view, these theorists have left the correct Marxist oath since their analysis does not place enough emphasis upon the economic basis of the capitalist structure and upon the relations among classes. 41
• …the analysis of capitalism in dependency theory is clearly different from that in the neo-Marxist theories. While the latter stress the property relations dominating capitalist production and view capitalism as production with privately owned means, the former accentuates relations of exchange and defines capitalism as production for the market. As a consequence of this difference, dependency theory locates the rise of capitalism around 1500, whereas neo-Marxist theories generally date it in the eighteenth century. The general conclusion with respect to the traditional economic and neo-Marxist theries can be that the dependency theory offers an alternative interpretation of the concepts of imperialism, exploitation, and capitalism. The world-wide relations among states of different levels of development are not just interpreted as the subjugation of non-Western by Western Countries, but as part of an international division of labor, in which the Western countries possess the main industrial productive capacity and the non-Western countries are forced to produce mainly primary commodities (agricultural products and raw materials). 41-2
• Trade is interpreted as one of the main instruments in the capitalist world system for the transfer of surplus from the periphery to the center, making the periphery worse and the center better off. Unequal trade relations are interpreted as fostering underdevelopment in the periphery and development in the center. The free trade theorists advocate the opening up of countries as a strategy for growth and development. This development policy is based on the assumption of mutually beneficial trade; those countries having abundant labor would, in this kind of reasoning, benefit from the production and export of commodities for which labor is the main factor of production. Dependency theorists see this as a defective argument, since such policies would only serve to prolong exploitative relations of unequal exchange. For this reason the dependency theorists recommend 'disassociation' of Third World countries from the international capitalist economic system in order to counter exploitation and underdevelopment. 43
• The final characteristic of the unequal relationship is that it is a cause of underdevelopment external to the developing countries. 45
• The only development strategy considered viable for the dependency theorists is the resolute disassociation or delinking of the economy from the international system. 48
• The essence of functional explanation is that a certain event is said to occur because its effect is assumed to have a function in the context of a certain theory. A good example of functional explanation can be found in Marxist theory, which interprets the exploitation of the labor force as a necessary requirement for the accumulation of capital. Both the repression of labor and the introduction of welfare arrangements can be explained by defining these as a function of the exploitation of labor. Repression might contribute to exploitation of labor. Repression might contribute to exploitation because a less rebellious labor force makes possible the extraction of a larger quantity of surplus value. The introduction of welfare arrangements might enhance exploitation because it renders the labor force quiescent and leads to an increase of production, and thereby profit. In the work of Anre Gunder Frank, functional explanation takes the form of relating events and processes occurring in the capitalist world system, or in parts thereof, to the interests of the dominant part of the system, the metropolis, and the ruling class. Specifically, occurrences are related to the accumulation of capital in the metropolis. These are considered to take place because of their contribution to the accumulation of capital. 54
• "Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system. Economic development and underdevelopment are not just relative and quantitative, in that one represents more economic development than the other; economic development and underdevelopment are relational and qualitative, in that each is structurally different from, yet caused by its relation with, the other. Yet development and underdevelopment are the same in that they are the product of a single, but dialectically contradictory, economic structure and process capitalism. Thus they cannot be viewed as the products of supposedly different economic structures or systems, or of supposed differences in stages of economic growth achieved within the same system. One of the same historical process of the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously generated - and continues to generate - both economic development and structural underdevelopment" (Frank, A.G. (1969) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 9). 56
• Frank has mentioned several mechanisms of exploitations, which can be grouped into broad categories of exploitation by means of trade and exploitation by means of investment. The first category has already been referred to above: it concerns the exchange of manufactured goods from the metropolis for agricultural products and raw materials from the satellites. According to Andre Gunder Frank, this exchange is unequal because the prices of the satellites' products show a tendency to fall relative to those of the metropolitan products. This tendency is reflected in the deterioration of the terms of trade of the developing countries. The second category of exploitation is connected to the metropolitan investments in the satellite economies. According to Andre Gunder Frank, the exploitative element of these investments is to be found in the use of their returns. Unlike the situation in which capital owners invest for productive purposes - a situation usually characterized by the reinvestment of the returns from the original investment -, the metropolis-satellite relationship causes the use of profits in a way that is detrimental to the developing countries. Profits made on investments in developing countries will usually not be reinvested there. In the case of domestic capital, the profits will normally be spent on luxury consumption. When the profits are the result of foreign investments, a substantial part will as a rule be repatriated by the form responsible for the project. In either case, the developing country as a whole does not benefit from the investments. 60
• Frank's solution for underdeveloped countries is a radical one: they have to withdraw or, in other words, dissociate, from the existing world system and follow a non-exploitative development strategy, which enables the underdeveloped countries to accumulate the capital they need for their own purposes. 60
• "If dependence were purely 'external', it could be argued that objective conditions exist which would permit the 'national' bourgeoisie to propose 'nationalist' or 'autonomous' solution to the problem of underdevelopment. But in our view, such a solution does not exist - precisely because dependence is invisible and makes the bourgeoisie itself dependent" (Frank, A.G. (1972) Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment: Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 3-4). 61
• [Double determinism] First, the dependence on the metropolis is seen as a factor influencing and conditioning the political, social and economic situation in the satellite countries. Secondly, the economic requirements connected with the position of the satellite bourgeoisies are interpreted as dominating the political and social circumstances of the underdeveloped countries. As a result, politics and social relations are extremely polarized; there is hardly any common ground on the basis of which cooperation between political and social groups would be possible. 61
• "…the development of an export economy with an excessively unequal distribution of income, the drain of economic surplus to the metropolis, the transformation of the national and local economic and class structure as a function of world capitalist development and metropolitan developmental needs, the natural alaliance between the metropolitan colonial power and the local reactionary interests and their underdevelopment policy, the close connection between the length and intensity of capitalist colonization and the ultra-underdevelopment" (Frank, A.G. (1979) Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 148-9). 62
• According to Andre Gunder Frank, the effect of the internationalization of the division of labor on the indigenous modes of production in the non-European areas was not the same in all parts of the world. The Spanish colonies in Latin America were the first to experience its influence: the conditions under which agriculture and mining operated there were adapted to the needs and interests of the metropolitan economies. This meant that production became increasingly commercialized and oriented toward Europe. During the same eighteenth centuries, Africa has become part of the 'historical process of world capitalist development as a consequence of the creation of plantation economies in the America's that were dependent on imported slave labor. 63
• North America became part of the capitalist metropolis, with the southern part of the United States becoming a regional satellite; in Frank's interpretation, "the development of the North at the expense of the underdevelopment of the South itself generated a growing crisis as a result of the development of northern productive forces: the Civil War" (Frank, 1979, p. 81, as above). 64
• In Asia, it was especially India that experienced important changes in its relation to the developed countries. According to Frank, the development of Industry in the metropolis required "the destruction of industry and of the socio-economic nexus between manufacturing and agriculture in the countryside" (Frank, 1979, p. 88, as above). As a consequence of Britain's protectionism, India's textile, iron and steel industries were destroyed. 65
• "The desperate need of Third World countries to borrow from Peter to pay Paul exposes them to pressures so intense they amount to blackmail by the International Monetary Fund and the big Western banks to adopt policies that further export promotion. These policies are the standard IMF package: currency devaluation, reductions in public spending and in subsidies for social purposes and reduced wages, all of which increase the exploitation of the poor and often lead to "IMF riots". Therefore, the imposition of these measures usually requires an increase in political repression, which the IMF sometimes calls for by demanding the replacement of one economies minister or even a whole government by another" (Frank, A.G. (1981) Crisis in the Third World, London: Heinemann, pp. 132). 68
• Capital accumulation can be considered the motive force for the capitalist world system, and since it is dependent upon the rate of profit of the economic transactions - this itself being dependent upon exploitation - the tendency of the rate of profit to fall causes periodic crises. According to Frank, the crises generate a pressure for new inventions and also engender "an accelerated change of transformation in the international division of labor." Frank concludes that "it is in the periods of economic crises that the unequal structure of the world economy undergoes its most rapid transformation" ((1983) The Unequal and Uneven Historical Development of the World Economy, Research Memorandum, No. 8327, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, p. 16). It is also during those crises that "the 'rise' from the periphery and …the 'decline' at the center" takes place and leads to the "development of intermediate, semiperipheral economies and powers" ((1981) Crisis: In the Third World, London: Heinemann, p. 3). The major crises in the capitalist world system, in Frank's view, took place during the seventeenth century, from 1762-1790, from 1873-1895, in the 1930s (the Great Depression) and between 1967 and the mid-1980s. The main reaction to those crises were, respectively, the commercial revolution of the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution,, the metropolitan expansion by means of imperialism, the creation of neoimperialism and monopoly capitalism, and the rise of neo-conservatism in the West and the transfer of (parts of) production processes to the Third World. 68
• In Frank's view, the military coups in many Third World countries are to be explained in the context of the periodic crises pervading the world capitalist system. The internal polarization of the satellite countries is an important variable in the dependency-development nexus. On the one hand, the degree of dependence determines the rise to power of certain socio-economic groups that are to play a role in world-wide exploitation and accumulation. On the other hand, the internal polarization contributes to the underdevelopment of the satellite countries, because then some groups have an interest in exploiting and, thereby underdeveloping parts of their own countries. The concentration of production, meaning the reliance on the production of a small number of commodities, is influenced by the degree of dependence and by the situation in the capitalist world system. The more dependent countries will be driven to a situation of (near-) monoculture, which in itself is seen as an impediment to achieving more development. The situation in the capitalist world system also influences the concentration of production. It has already been indicated above that a situation of world economic countries enables the satellite countries to change something about their own situation. During periods of crises, the satellite countries will therefore try to diversify their economy by producing more types of commodities than before. This is thought to curtail the possibilities of exploitation by the metropolitan countries and to reduce the level of underdevelopment. 71
• …Amin's explanation of the rise of imperialism during the final decades of the nineteenth century: " Throughout the nineteenth century, until the 1880s, because real wages at the center did not increase sufficiently, a form of expansionism was necessary that conferred certain functions upon the periphery. Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, however, real wages at the center increased at a faster rate, and this has caused the expansionism of the capitalist mode to assume new forms (imperialism and the export of capital) and has also given the periphery new functions to perform" (Amin, S. (1976) Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 76). 75
• "Products, when they are commodities, posses value; …this value is measurable; …the yardstick for measuring it is the quantity of abstract labor socially necessary to produce them; and, finally, …this sum is the sum of the quantities of labor, direct and indirect (transferred), which are used in the process of production. The concept of the commodity and the existence of the law of value, formulated in this way, are inseparably interconnected" (Amin, S. (1978) The Law of Value and Historical Materialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 9). 76
• "The imports that the advanced countries of the West receive from the Third World represent, it is true, only 2 or 3 percent of their gross internal product. … But these exports from the underdeveloped countries represent 20 percent of their product. … The hidden transfer of value due to unequal exchange is thus of the order of 15 percent of this product, which is far from being negligible in relative terms, and is alone sufficient to account for the blocking of the growth of the periphery, and the increasing gap between it and the center. The contribution that this transfer makes is not negligible, either, when seen from the standpoint of the center, which benefits from it, since it comes to about 1.5 percent of the center's product. But this transfer is especially important for the giant firms that are its direct beneficiaries" (Amin, S., 1976, as above, p. 144). 79-80
• Underdevelopment is not so much a quantitative as it is a qualitative characteristic. 80
• "The reason for the creation of such an export sector has been the possibility to obtain from the periphery those products which are necessary for the formation of constant capital (raw materials) or variable capital (foodstuffs) at production prices which are lower than they would have been at the center for analogous products (or for evident substitutes in the case of specific product such as coffee or tea" (Amin, S. (1972) "LE MODELE THEORIQUE D'ACCUMULATION ET DE EDEVLOPPEMENT, DANS LE MONDE CONTEMPORAIN: LA PROBLEMATIQUE DE TRANSITION," REVUE TIERS-MONDE, vol. 13, No. 52, October-December, pp. 703-26, p. 708). 81
• Since the periphery is outward-oriented it does not maintain the means necessary for the pursuit of an autcentered development policy. The surplus that is realized on the production in the periphery cannot be used for investment, since the better part is tapped by the center; the remainder of the surplus is collected by large landowners who tend to use it for the luxury consumption. This is also the reason why, according to Amin, the so-called multiplier mechanism does not apply to underdeveloped countries. As he writes, the multiplier effect is present "only if demand creates its own supply through the intermediary if production. This intermediary, overlooked by Keynes, is essential. In a country where there are no free productive forces, the extra demand is lost in a price increase" ((1974) Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 2 vols., New York: Monthly Review Press). 81
• The processes sketched here lead to the "marginalization of the masses" (1976, as above, p. 194). This entails, among other things, "the proletarianizing of the small agricultural and craft producers, rural semiproletarianization, and impoverishment without proletarianization of the peasants organized in village communities, urbanization, and massive growth in both open unemployment and underemployment in the towns, etc." (1976, as above, p. 194). These development are not accompanied by industrialization, since…the extroverted economy of the periphery is not able to generate enough surplus to support such industrialization. From Amin this concludes that "this lack of a way forward through autocentric industrialization accounts for the increased 'pressure on the land' that is so frequently to be observed in the Third World" 1976, as above, p. 205). This means that many Third World countries experience "urbanization without industrialization." This situation is crucially different from the experience of the presently developed countries during their history, since these have been able to pursue autocentric development strategies. 82
• The mercantilist period introduced a major change for the Third World. The development of mercantile capitalism in the countries of Europe led to the expansion of European influence on economic activities across the world. In this period, accouding to Amin, capitalism was still in a "prehistoric form," with the bourgeoisie accumulating it on the basis of slave-based export agriculture in America. In Europe, furthermore, feudalism disintegrated and agriculture was proletarianized and commercialized. Linked with this, capitalist production relations and wage labor started to develop ((1974, as above, pp. 50-3). 84
• The period of integration of the periphery into the capitalist world system started with the industrial revolution in the capitalist countries. The importance of this period is underlined by Amin when he writes that "it was in this period that the international specialization between industrial and agricultural countries was decided" (1974) as above, p. 41). 85
• The basis of Samir Amin's ideas about delinking is to be found in his fifth theoretical assumption, stressing that a development policy can only be successful if it is autocentered or autocentric. This means that economic and social policy decisions should not be subjected to considerations imposed by the interests of other countries - if the latter would be the case, the development policy would be extroverted. According to Amin, the presently developed countries are the ones that have followed an autocentered development course par excellence. With, and because, of, the expansion of capitalism and the creation of capitalist world system, no country - with the exception of Japan, which has never been integrated in the system - has been able to pursue an autocentered capitalist development policy since the rise of modern imperialism. The underdeveloped countries, which have been exposed to extroverted development, have not been able to orient their economies towards the production of mass consumption and capitals goods, which is the essential precondition for autocentered development. Their economies have, on the contrary, been export-oriented; the internal markets have not been able to grow and for this reason mass consumption has not developed. 88
• "Delinking is not synonymous with autocentric development. It indicates another phenomena: a demand imposed by the system. It is the condition for autocentric development, on the basis of a legacy of peripheral capitalism. … In a word, it deals with a principle: that of 'delinking' the criteria of rationality of internal economic choices from those governing the world system. These criteria are only the economic choices from those governing the socio-economic system. We have argued that the world capitalist system as a whole - centers and peripheries included - was governed by the same law of value that we categorize as 'world capitalist.' … We have therefore proposed that one should define the criteria of economic rationality on the basis of constraints and social relations internal to the nation" (Amin, S. (1990) Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World, London: Zed, pp. 18-9). 89
• He argues that, therefore, any attempt at introducing a development policy conducive to the needs of the presently underdeveloped countries will require a socialist political order: "we support the view that delinking, whether one likes it or not, is associated with a 'transition' - outside capitalism and over a long time - towards socialism" (Amin, 1990, as above, p. 55). 89
• Samir Amin has formulated several conditions which, in his view, are necessary for a policy of delinking to succeed. In the first place, agriculture should be given economic priority to ensure that enough food be obtained for the entire population. Secondly, the interests of industry should be made subservient to the progress of productivity in agriculture; industrial production should therefore be focused on inputs for agriculture (fertilizer, equipment), infrastructural works and preservation and processing of the produce. Thirdly, the production process should be subjected to national and popular control, exercised by the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the government, on the other. Fourthly, technology should not be "bought," in the developed countries, but should be developed or adjusted to the specific needs of Third World countries. Fifthly, external relations should be limited and differ fundamentally from those characteristic of the import substitution and export-oriented strategies. Finally, a "national structure of interdependent pricing and financial instrument" should be developed, in order to bring incomes in accordance with needs and not necessarily with (sectorally unequal) productivity. According to Amin, a strategy of delinking can only be introduced when the country concerned is characterized by a minimum level of "real" democracy. The history of the world capitalist system has resulted in a sharp polarization between distinct parts of the system and it is this polarization. 90
• The kind of democracy accompanying the process of delinking should have, in Amin's view, an explicit "social dimension." It is not sufficient for the peripheral countries to have a formal democratic political system, since this does not ensure popular involvement and support. Instead, the democratization following delinking should entail the participation of workers and peasants in economic decisions regarding, for instance, investments, prices and wages. 90-1
• Galtung elaborates on the these of self-reliance because it is, in his perspective, a policy option that would enable the developing countries to further their development without having to make too many concessions in the developed countries. 94
• "Imperialism permits center countries to grow and theoretically even able to become increasingly egalitarian because the periphery needed for capitalist growth is located outside themselves. But these periphery countries have no outside peripheries unless they also engage in imperialism, as they sometimes do. If not, then their peripheries are doomed to stagnation, unless they break out of the structure" (Galtung, J. (1980) The True World: A Transnational Perspective, New York: Free Press, p. 126). 97
• "Imperialism is a relation between a center and a periphery Nation so that (1) there is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nation and the center in the periphery nation, (2) there is disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations, (3) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation" (Galtung, J. (1971) "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 81-117, p. 83). 98
• "There is a pattern, a total social formation that drives people towards overconsumption in one ay or another. … This pattern, or social formation, is what could be referred to as overdevelopment, just like underdevelopment is a pattern that enforces underconsumption upon people. It is obvious from what has been said that these are two sides of the sme coin, that they are dialectically related" (Galtung, J., Preiswerk, R., and Wemegah, M. (1981) A Concept of Development Centered on the Human Being: Some Western European Perspectives, No. 8, Geneva: University Institute for the Study of Development, pp. 16-17). 101
• …the only way for the periphery to attain a reasonable level of development is found in its dissociation from the capitalist world system and its pursuit of self-reliance. 104
• Self-reliance is to be interpreted as a strategy for periphery countries to attain a higher level of development, coping with the structural limitations imposed by the capitalist world system. The strategic view is directly linked to a substantive definition of development in different books and articles, it is clear that the satisfaction of human needs is fundamental to his conception of development. 104
• As the fundamental material needs he mentions: physiological needs, individual environmental needs, the need for group/family environmental protection, health, education, the freedom of expression and impression, and the freedom to move and to be visited. The basic non-material needs concern the following: creativity, identity, autonomy, togetherness, participation, self-fulfillment, and a sense of meaning in life. In order to have these needs fulfilled in the periphery countries, most attention should be paid to the least privileged in those countries: "The best strategy for development … would be to stimulate those processes that give first priority to the satisfaction of the basic needs of those most in need. This would mean, concretely, giving first priority to the production of food, clothes, housing, etc., for the undernourished, the unclad and the shelterless, and giving first priority to the provision of more opportunities for, say, creative, meaningful work for those who have the most boring, degrading work (not necessarily the same people a those who are undernourished). Thus, what is rejected is … the idea that need satisfaction will take place, or can only take place, through a tricke-down process, starting with providing those already well off materially with more material satisfaction, and those well-off non-materially (intellectuals, for instance) with even more non-material satisfaction" (Galtung, J. (1979) Development, Environment and Technology: Towards a Technology for Self-Reliance, New York, UN, p. 4). 104-5
• The first requirement [in order to guarantee an adequate process of development in the periphery, according to Galtung] is the decentralization of the periphery society, meaning that the dependence on the center in the periphery is reduced. Decentralization is also meant as an instrument of emancipation for the people of the periphery: people would regain control over their own resources, be it capital, labor or raw materials. The second, requirement…is that the "local parasitic elites" have to be removed from the opposition of power which they have obtained. It is assumed that the elites will use the resources of the periphery country primarily for their own benefit and that their (economic or political) power has to be broken in order to permit an equitable development of all social groups. Galtung's third and fourth requirements are closely related. …s stronger political mobilization in the periphery and a higher level of consciousness about the functioning of the current structures and the possibilities for building new structures would be essential for the periphery to sustain a viable development strategy. 105
• …self-reliance is not the same as autarky; self reliance "implies a redirection and recomposition of trade and cooperation, not the building of tight walls around all units" (Galtung, J. (1980) "Self-Reliance: Concepts, Practice and Rationale, in J. Galtung, P. O'Brien and R. Preiswerk (eds.) Self-Reliance: A strategy for Development, London: Bogle-L' Ouverture, pp. 19-44, p. 27). Self-reliance, understood as the enhanced autonomy of the periphery, can be realized at several levels. Apart from the national level, Galtung, has alos mentioned the local (i.e., sub-national) and regional (Third World) levels: "Thus, far from being antithetical to trade, exchange and cooperation a consistent policy of self-reliance may even increase the exchange level in the world because it will engender much more cooperation between neighbors in geographical and social space. The point is not to cut out trade but to redirect it and recompose it by giving preference to cooperation with those in the same position, preferring the neighbor to the more distant possibility, cooperation to exchange, and intra-sector to inter-sector trade" (Galtung, 1980, as above, p. 26). 105-6
• The building of a self-reliant society and, a fortiori, of a world system consisting of self-reliant societies could only take place "from the bottom up": "One would start with what is available locally and needed locally, and build from their in circles of equitable exchange" (Galtung, J. (1980) "The politics of Self-Reliance, in G, O and P as above, pp. 355-83, p. 360). 106
• In order for self-reliance to be a viable policy, the Western technology (or alpha-type technology) has to be supplanted, at least partially, by a non-Western variant (or beta-type technology). The alpha-type technology, as a representative of alpha-structure, tends to increase its scale as it has no size limitation, and results in the total manipulation of nature. The beta-type technology has size limitations and is more dependent on nature: "If people are to have meaningful relations with each other and not be fitted into center-periphery hierarchies, and in addition are to participate in deciding what happens around them, then there is an upper limit to how many can become members of a beta-unit. This is one reason why family-run farms and shops, and villages, have the size they have. Moreover, if the beta-structure is more inward-oriented, more local and decentralized, the economic cycles (not super-cycles, which belong to the alpha-structure) on which it is based materially would be more exposed to the discontinuities of nature in space and time" (Galtung, J., 1979, as above, p. 10). 106-7
• By introducing beta-type technologies, which imply equal exchange, a horizontal division of labor, autonomy, solidarity, participation and integration, the currently underdeveloped countries would be able to escape from the oppression and exploitation of the alpha-type capitalist world-system. 107
• In Galtung's view, countries can only alter their position in the world division of labor when they succeed in breaking out of the existing world structure and are able to establish, economic, social and political self-reliance. 107
• "If there is one thing which distinguishes a world-system perspective from any other, is its insistence that the united of analysis is a world-system defined in terms of economic processes and links, and not any units defined in terms of juridical, political, vultural, geological, or other criteria" (Hopkins, T.K., and Wallerstein, I. and associates (1982) "Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System," in T.K. Hopkins, I. Wallerstein, R.L. Bach, C. Chase-Dunn, and R. Mukherjee (eds.) World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology, vol. 1, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 41-82, p. 72). 114
• "The development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the creation of all the major institutions of the modern world class: classes, ethnic/national groups, households - and the 'states.' All of these structures postdate, not antedate capitalism; all are consequences, not case" (Wallerstein, I. (1984) The Politics of the World-Economy: The State, the Movement, and the Civilization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 29). 115
• "Ethno-national consciousness is the constant resort for all those for whom class organization offers the risk of a loss of relative advantage through the normal workings of the market and class dominated political bargaining" ((1979) The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 228). 115
• "Where can we find 'societies' other than in the minds of analysts, or of the orators? Social science would, in my view, make a great leap forward if it dispensed entirely with the term. … My own unit of analysis is based on the measurable social reality of interdependent productive activities, what may be called an 'effective social division of labor' or, in code language, an 'economy'" (Wallerstein, 1984, as above, p. 2). 116
• In Wallerstein's view, the capitalist world economy managed to survive over more than 500 years because no one political entity succeeded in controlling the world-wide division of labor. Wallerstein goes as far as considering capitalism and the modern world economy (a single division of labor couples with multiple polities and cultures) as 'obverse sides of the same coin.' implying that the one could not have survived with the other (1979 as above, p. 6). 117
• According to Wallerstein, the history of the capitalist world system demonstrates that a mode of exploitation will be eliminated when it becomes less economical than other modes. For instance, slavery was abolished when cash-crop production and wage labor proved to be more efficient means of exploiting the work force (1979 as above, p. 28). 117
• "…there is a middle tier, which shares in the exploitation of the lower tier, but also shares in being exploited by the upper tier" (1979 as above, p. 223). 118
• The capitalist world economy has expanded gradually over the last five centuries; it was not until the twentieth century that all parts of the world were incorporated into this world economy. Before the twentieth century, large parts of the world still belonged to the external arena of the world economy. According to Wallerstein, the defining characteristic of the external arena is the fact that production processes can be accounted for by other considerations than the maximization of capital accumulation in the core. 119
• "Incorporation means fundamentally that at least some significant production processes in a given geographic location become integral to various of the commodity chains that constitute the ongoing divisioning of labor in the capitalist world-system" (Wallerstein, I. (1989) The Modern World-System III, The Second Era of the Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s, San Diego, CA: Academic Press, p. 130). 119
• France has been the principal industrial power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it was not in this country that the industrial revolution took place, since its position in the capitalist world economy was not favorable. Wallerstein argues that "it is the world-economy which develops over time and not subunits within it" (1989 as above, p. 33), and therefore the relative competitive strength of France and Britain is a prime explanatory factor in the account of the industrial revolution. The French Revolution is, in his view, part and parcel of the development of the capitalist world economy: it is interpreted as "the moment when the ideological superstructure finally caught up with the economic base. It was the consequence of the transition not its cause nor the moment of its occurrence" (1989 as above, p. 52). According to Wallerstein, the French Revolution occurred as a consequence of France's sense of imminent defeat in the struggle for hegemony with Britain. He sees the revolution as "a relatively conscious attempt by a diverse group of the ruling capitalist strata to force through urgency needed reforms of the French state in light of the perceived British leap forward to hegemonic status in the world economy" (1989 as above, p. 111). The revolution was also the first important antisystemic or anticapitalist movement in the modern world system; it was the rise of the popular masses - the peasants and the sansculottes - against the feudal ruling classes. 125
• The most important antisystemic movements in the history of the modern world system, according to Wallerstein, were the socialist and nationalist movements, in recent times supplemented by "new social movement" (1984 as above, pp. 123-6). 128
• The socialist movement, which was created in the nineteenth century, "was rooted in the intensification of the processes of capitalist centralization of economic activities" (Arrighi, G., Hopkins, T.K., and Wallerstein, I. (1989) Antisystemic Movements, London: Verso, p. 88). At first the movement had a revolutionary aim, the overthrow of the capitalist system. In the West, the movement gradually became reformist and participated in the political process. …the social democratic parties in Western Europe achieved a large number of their objectives in the two decades after the Second World Way. The working class experienced a substantial rise in its standard of living and its organizations obtained an equal position in the political structure. 128
• The deterioration of the developing countries' terms of trade has often been interpreted as an indication of the extent of exploitation of these countries. It has been argued that, as the price level of primary products decreases while the price level of manufactured goods increases, the developed countries are paying less and less for the imports of raw materials and agricultural products. The consequence of this tendency for the developing countries would be reduced export revenues. 143
• The analysis have also shown…that the dependence on a small number of primary commodities is potentially harmful to the development of Third World countries. 170
• Some theories consider imperialism to be a direct result of capitalism. Most notably, these are the traditional economic and neo-Marxist theories of imperialism. To a certain extent, the dependency theorists also adhere to this view. The identification of imperialism with capitalism is not a necessary element of structural theories of the world system, however. Many authors are led to believe that the coincidence of the spread of capitalism and the heyday of imperialism during the nineteenth century is not accidental, but that one factor (capitalism) caused the other (imperialism). Many studies show that there is certainly no one-to-one relationship between capitalism and imperialism. Secondly, there are non-capitalist states that can aptly be called imperialist. Thirdly, many actions of the imperialist nations cannot be explained as economically inspired. 173
• …the Keynesian economist Joan Robinson has argued that "the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all" ((1964) Economic Philosophy, Harmondsworth, Penguin, p. 46). 174

Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, chapters 1 and 4.

• The rules and standard operating procedures that make up institutions leave their imprint on political outcomes by structuring political behavior. Outcomes are not simply reducible to the billiard-ball interaction of individuals nor to the intersection of board social forces. Institutions influence outcomes because they shape actors’ identities, power, and strategies. Whatever other factors may affect their form, institutions have inertia and “robustness.” They therefore embody historical trajectories and turning points. 8
• In the Republic Plato argued that governments vary in accordance with the dispositions of their citizenry. 11
• Economic modernity is somehow associated with high-performance public institutions. 86
• Citizenship in a civic community is marked, first of all, by active participation in public affairs. 87
• The dichotomy between self-interest and altruism can easily be overdrawn, for no mortal, and no successful society, can renounce the powerful motivation of self-interest. Citizens in the civic community are not required to be altruists. In the civic community, however, citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed “self-interest properly understood,” that is, self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is “enlightened” rather than “myopic,” self-interests that is alive to the interests of others. 88
• Such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency. 88
• The more that politics approximates the ideal of political equality among citizens following norms of reciprocity and engaged in self-government, the more civic that community may be said to be. 88
• Civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government, it is argued, both because of their “internal” effects on individual members and because of their “external” effects on the wider polity. 89
• Participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors. 90
• “When some view is represented by an association, it must take clearer and more precise shape. It counts its supporters and involves them in its cause; these supporters get to know one another, and numbers increase zeal. An association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously directs them towards a clearly indicated goal.” (Tocqueville) 90
• …associationism is a necessary precondition for effective self-government. 90
• The most successful local organizations represent indigenous, participatory initiatives in relatively cohesive local communities. 91
• In every community, the more educated feel more efficacious, for education represents social status, personal skills, and connections. 110
• Educated citizens in the least civic regions feel almost as impotent as less educated citizens in the most civic regions. 110
• Social disharmony and political conflict are often thought inimical to effective governance. Consensus is said to be a prerequisite for stable democracy. 116
• Edmund Burke suggested that the well ordered society must be considered a partnerships, “ a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection.” 116

Schuurman, F. (1993) “Introduction: Development Theory in the 1990s,” in Frans Schuurman (ed.) Beyond the Impasse, New York: Zed, pp. 1-49.

• There was also a reasonable level of agreement about the role of multinational corporations:

• Multinationals impose a universal consumption pattern, without taking local needs into account.
• They use capital-intensive techniques in areas with large labor resources.
• They out-compete national capital, or undertake joint ventures with local capital.
• They use a variety of methods to transfer capital (e.g., fictitious price systems).
• They involve themselves in national political economic affairs, via (among others) their relationships with the local bourgeoisie. 5

• The basic idea of the modes of production theory is that a number of modes of production coexist in a society, and that they have a relationship to each other (regarding exchange of labor, goods, capital, etc.). 6
• …it was thought that a relationship between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production was favorable for the capitalist mode of production. Apartheid was used as a classic example of an articulation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. The workers lived in their traditional homelands, where they had land that didn’t produce enough to live on, and so had to offer their labor to South African industry. Salaries, however, could remain low, because workers had some income from their land. This example shows that a capitalist mode of production not only relates to existing non-capitalist modes of production, but it can also create new ones. The conclusion was that in many developing countries capitalism articulated with non-capitalist modes of production and so retarded the development of these countries. 6-7
• Like Frank, Wallerstein argued that a capitalist world economy had existed since the 16^th century, that is, since the beginning of the colonial era. 8
• …in the modernization theory, culture is seen as something static and, in the Third World, a possible obstacle to development. In Marxist analysis, on the other hand, culture is seen as being determined by the economy. The neo-Weberian approach, however, sees culture as creative process that must be studied in locally oriented research. 15
• Post-imperialism is not a development theory; at most it is a theory regarding a recently arisen international oligarchy. This ‘managerial’ bourgeoisie is a new class which defends its interests against the proletariat and the old oligarchic classes. In the Third World this results in a great diversity in relations between the state and (international) capital. 20
• Exploitative behavior towards nature, it is argued, is a typical patriarchal attitude, in which both women and nature are given a subordinate role. Women’s emancipation would, therefore, also lead to less exploitative relations with nature. In addition, attention to ethnic minorities in the Third World—who generally are considered to treat nature in a less damaging manner—can give further shape to sustainable development. 22
• Science is not employed to emancipate humanity, but enlisted by capital and subjugated to efficiency rather than truth. There is no one single truth, as depicted by modernity philosophy; rather there is a plurality of perspectives, each with its own language, its own rules and myths. 23
• …certain emancipatory goals, such as Citizenship and Participation, are found in all social movements and as such there is a feasible basis for meaningful relations between social movements, which can further substantiate the concept of radical democracy. 29

Slater, D. (1993) “The Political Meanings of Development: In Search of New Horizons,” Frans Schuurman (ed.), Beyond the Impasse, Zed Books, pp. 93-112.

• “…democracy is impossible without a democratic passion, a passion for the freedom of each and of all, a passion for common affairs which become….the personal affairs of each” (Castoriadis, C. 1990, “Does the idea of Revolution Still Make Sense? –an Interview with Cornelius Castoriadis,” Thesis Eleven no. 26, pp. 123-38: 137).
• I would argue that the primary thrust of the Marxist position has been characterized by three interrelated problems. In the first place, there has been a strong tendency to view the economy as determinant in the last instance. This has meant that the accumulation, valorization, and devalorization of capital have been a logic which determines the pattern of social and political processes. 101
• …when there has been an analysis of socio-political change, the key subject is always a class subject, a clas struggle has always been defined as the struggle. Here we have two major difficulties: i) the constitution or formation of the subjectivity of social agents is short-circuited, that is, the process through which an individual is constituted as a social subject, in all its complexity and potential volatility, and in some instances as an eventual class subject, is by-passed – instead the class category, as one possible point of arrival, is taken as a pre-given analytical point of departure; and ii) in a related manner, it has been assumed that in the construction of social consciousness, the point of production is central. 102
• …there has always been a strong inclination to pre-suppose that there is a pre-given, privileged social subject, cast in the role of the historical bearer of the revolutionary break from capitalism – I refer of course to the working class. But history has shown something else. Looking at the Cuban or Nicaraguan revolutions, it is clear that at a certain historical moment, a variety of social subjects, unified around a certain vision, a particular political horizon, which combined a range of attitudes, feelings, objectives, hopes and ideas around questionsn of the nation, of the fight against dictatorship, of social justice, of the struggle against imperialism, came together and took a series of actions that culminated in the moment of revolution. 102
• Another meaning of development can be found in the context of movements of resistance and the creation within civil society of another kind of democratic innovation. 108
• Sustainable development is most often defined as a strategy to satisfy the needs of the present generation without interfering with the needs of future generations. 22-3
• The term sustainable development encompasses development strategies which range from light-green to dark-green, from romantic nostalgic conservatism to utopian socialism, from absolute zero growth in the economy to maintaining the present world economic growth rate. As a result, the ‘green’ notion of sustainable development could be incorporated without effort into both the ‘blue’ development model (neo-liberal) and the ‘red’ development model (socialist, and these days social democratic). In a number of cases one can therefore hardly speak of an alternative development model. 22
• Exploitative behavior towards nature, it is argued, is a typical patriarchal attitude, in which both women and nature are given a subordinate role. Women’s emancipation would, therefore, also lead to less exploitative relations with nature. In addition, attention to ethnic minorities in the Third World – who generally are considered to treat nature in a less damaging manner—can give further shape to sustainable development. 22
• Bill Adams (in this volume) finds sustainable development to be a flag for many ships, and because of this concept does not enjoy an accepted theoretical foundation. Yet, the power of the concept lies in the insights derived from micro-level praxis. Thus, Adams favors a theory formation of sustainable development which includes the macro as well as the micro: the transnational corporation and the peasant, the biosphere and the field. The fragmented praxis of ecological research, planning and policy, in developed as well as in underdeveloped countries, indicate the necessity of theory formation for sustainable development. 22
• Post-modernism is a reaction to the Enlightenment narrative of the development of scientific knowledge, along lines laid out by Galileo and Newton, which could lead to a rational control by man over his natural and social surroundings. 23
• …development theories address situations where large parts of the human population suffer from substantial inequalities in emancipation. 31
• The point is not to strive for one grand and glorious development metatheory per se but rather to stress that a lot of new ground has already been covered, but that the plots still remain rather isolated.

Seddon, W., J., and D. (1994) Free Markets and Food Riots, Cambridge: Blackwell, pp. 5-134.

• Most orthodox economists (including those in the World Bank, at least until very recently) have seen the changes in this period simply as aspects of a process of “transition” as the emergence of new development (industrializing) countries (NICs) challenges the old international economic order and the global economy “adjusts” to these new circumstances. 4
• For the economists more influences by the theories of Keynes, the evident changes of the period under consideration are in part at least associated with a deepening crisis in international economic and public relations associated with a lack of effective international management of increasingly interdependent global economy and giving rise to conflict between and within states, growing inequality (both international and national) and mass poverty. 4
• …writing from a more radical perspective (and often referred to as “neo-Marxist”) the crisis is a classical crisis of over accumulation and is thus intrinsic to the international capitalist economy and its associated political regime. 5
• Mediation is this struggle (class struggle within states, and international competition and conflict at the global level) is likely to be ineffective and based on wishful thinking. 5
• In fact, in many developing countries today the combination of the recession and specific adjustment and austerity measures has been devastating. Rapis social change has been a feature of the past half-century to be sure, and the process of class formation and transformation, the rural exodus and the growth of urban areas, has generated enormous social changes, But social change in times of prosperity generates less effective tension than change under duress in conditions of economic stringency and austerity. 20
• For the contemporary global crisis in capitalism is not only a financial-economic, but also a political-economic crisis; it is also (although this is less considered to be the economists who dominate the debates on “the world in transition”) a social and cultural crisis. In the last 20 years, the world has been turned “upside down” and a process of fundamental restructuring of social relations, ideas, and values has taken place. 21
• Rapid changes in the structure of social relations, taking place particularly at a time when the relationship between the state and civil society is undergoing fundamental restructuring and reconsideration, has given rise to new social divisions and solidarities and to new forms of identity and morality. New certainties (fundamentalisms of various kinds) have merged just as old certainties or faiths have crumbled. 21
• Food riots took several forms: (a) the blockage or entrave that prevented the export of gran from an area in which shortages existed; (b) the price riot or taxation populaire in which food was seized by protestors, a just price set, and the lot sold; (c) the agrarian demonstration in which farmers destroyed their own produce as a dramatic protest; and (d) the market riot in which the crowd took retributive action against commercial agents (e.g., bankers, millers) or local magistrates in the form of looting or “tumultuous assembly to force dealers or local authorities to reduce prices. 25-6
• Food riots were most common in towns, particularly in industrial localities specializing in textiles and mining, as well as in distributional centers such as ports and market towns. Location reflected function: “riots resulted in market expansion and…erupted in productive areas in which the grain was drained by metropolitan, military, or oversea demand, and in large cities” (L. Tilly 1971:26).
• The most clearly established proposition about food riots is that they were not chaotic or violent spasms of irrational crows, but organized and purposeful political actions. Nowhere is this interpretation better illustrated but in the selectivity of riot targets. Protestors did not rampage indiscriminately, but focused their wrath on particular individuals and institutions whom the crowd held responsible for unjust actions. Typically, it was not the producers or retailers of food but the middlemen who were seen as responsible for shortages and price rises; the grain dealers, wholesalers, speculators, and mills. 29
• The aims of food riots were modest: to solve short-run problems on supply and price, restore normality to markets, activate relief measures by local officials, or remind merchants of their obligations to consumers. 29
• Harvest failures, trade slumps, industrial depressions, unemployment, military exactions, and related events that produce either rapid price rises or distributional imbalances predict the occurrence of popular protest without the necessity of positing intervening mechanisms. 31
• The community theory of food riots is persuasive for its attention to political detail and fine-grained explanation of variation in the location, timing, and mobilization of protest support. 33
• Any general explanation of food riots must be consistent with the collective results of studies at the local level and important mechanisms of protest mobilization may be revealed only to the close observer of community action. Yet it is also true that a full explanation of food riots must look beyond local actions to discover their causes in the economy and state organization which appear in community theory simple as “external threats.” 33
• Food riots are generated at the intersection of local grievances and national or even international forces of economy and politics. A complete explanation must address both community and societal conditions as well as the form of their interaction. 33
• On behalf of community theory, Bohstedt (1983; 223) suggests two related reasons for the decline of food riots: expanding markets led to reduced prices and fewer shortages while the efficacy of community politics was eroded by new “vertical” relations. 36
• In summary, the classical food riot disappeared from the European scene for three closely related reasons. Improvements in production and distribution simultaneously lowered prices and reduced the likelihood of famine. State expansion shifted the terrain of politics away from local village and paternalistic arrangements as it simultaneously introduced more effective forms of repression in the anti-Jacobin spirit of the early nineteenth century. And industrialization, coupled with state centralization, realigned politics by shifting its axis to national class struggles over wages and working conditions. 37
• …food riots should not reappear in the late twentieth century, at least not in countries that have undergone industrialization, unionization, creation of political parties, and modern state formation. Yet from the mid 1970s onward, austerity protests in the form of price riots and popular uprisings have swept across the developing countries, including many of those in Latin America (e.g. Argentina Brazil, Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland), and Africa (e.g. Zambia) that rank among the world’s most industrial economies, possess vigorous traditions of labor organization, and provide prototypical forms of centralized, “bureaucratic-authoritarian” states. 37
• …riots and demonstrations over the cost of living are common occurrences in market societies; forms of popular protests that change in interaction with state and economic organization, but also persevere as a result of recurring moral and material forces. In both the classical and contemporary periods, riot politics are introduced by far-reaching policy changes that promote free-market economies at the national and international levels respectively. Riots respond to the elimination, in different ways, of “paternalistic” consumer protections understood by the populace as legitimate rights. 50
• It is not the availability of good that is at issue, but their price—a fact that accounts for the characteristically modern way of looting. Austerity protests, moreover, respond to a variety of price increases (food, petroleum, transportation, and school fees) that stem directly from government policy changes rather than from the actions of a number of private sellers. 51
• Riot and street demonstrations are the natural means of redress for popular assemblies mobilized by a sense of immediacy, betrayal, and the need for autonomous action. Popular protests understandably distrust conventional forms of political participation, the failure of which typically defines the immediate crisis, and therefore resort to means at their own disposal. 53
• The key links between international demands, state action, and protest include: an “overurbanzied” or large urban population not absorbed in formal sector and industrial employment and so more likely to experience the pains of austerity; cities that are socially and politically organized in a strong civil society (e.g. in unions, political groups, community associations, churches); and a moral economy that provides ideological legitimation for popular protest based on the social pact previously negotiated by developmental regimes. 54
• The food riot as a means of popular protest is a common, perhaps even universal, feature of market societies—less a vestige of political-industrial evolution than a strategy of empowerment in which poor and dispossessed groups assert their claims to social justice. In the modern system of states and international economic integration, the explosive point of popular protest has moved, with most of the world’s population, to the cities where the process of global accumulation, national development, and popular justice intersect. 54
• …it is undeniable that a number of protests have no appreciable effect—at least no effect on ameliorating hardship. 129
• …a number of insurgencies successful blocked price hikes, at least for a time, and reduced the overall scope of the austerity package. Governments frequently retained the basic structural adjustment program, but attempted to compensate for cost-of-living increases with higher wages (e.g. Jamaica. Ecuador), public works and employment situation (Chile, Brazil), and price freezes (Guatemala). Although these concessions were palliative and usually temporary, they lent efficacy to the protest movement and put governments on the defensive. 129
• …austerity protests contributed directly and indirectly to regime shifts… 130
• …regime changes are paralleled, and sometimes produced, by a changing structure of popular mobilization. The venerable pattern of patron-client urban politics is on the decline, not least because states no longer command the financial resources to provide cheap food and transportation, public employment, lo-cost housing options, easy access to imported consumer goods, and all the mobility opportunities that go with influence-trading in a patronage system. 130
• …the debt crisis in all of its antecedents and complexity has introduced a national political transformation in which global policy issues increasingly intrude on the state in Latin America. The consequences of this intrusion move in two directions. On one hand, as grudgingly implemented structural adjustment programs demonstrate, states have sacrificed political sovereignty to foreign banks, agencies, and governments in the interests of economic assistance. No doubt the pattern has historical precedent, but the scale has never been as great. On the other hand, states have been subject to forceful and contradictory pressures from below. The demands of their own urban poor have never been so outraged and violent. 131
• …developing societies around the world have experienced two fundamental transformations in the last decade. The first is a global trend towards neo-liberal economic reorganization—the shift from centrally planned to market-oriented economies in Eastern Europe and the more general adoption of liberalization policies throughout the Third World. … Second, and clearly related, is a global trend towards the democratization of authoritarian and one-party regimes in the wake of popular protest movements. 333
• Neo-liberal reforms…foster the opportunity for popular participation in the process of building a consensus and sharing the burden of change. International agencies want democratic reform and those who are asked to sacrifice for their own good demand a voice in public policy. 334
• Democratization is no panacea. It does not necessarily solve the old problems of underdevelopment and surely brings some new ones in train. 338
• The fitful social movement for democratization in authoritarian countries by means of multiparty systems, free elections, and human rights is not the same as functioning egalitarian democracy. Yet history suggests that democracy is reached through democratic struggle. 338

Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Fervent calls for the dismantling of the state by late twentieth-century capitalist free marketers served to derail the state's ability to act as an instrument of distributive justice, but not to reduce its overall importance. 4
• The modern nation-state is first and foremost a war-making machine that is the product of the exigencies of group survival in the condition of international anarchy. 5
• When the state exercises its monopoly on violence internally, its identification with the interests of the nation is no longer automatic. 5
• Making war and enforcing internal order are classic roles, shared by ancient and modern states. In modern times, a third role has increasingly stolen the limelight. As political survival and internal peace are more often defined in economic terms, states have become responsible for economic transformation. 5
• Eliciting entrepreneurship and facilitating the creation of new productive capacities require a more complicated involvement in the affairs of the citizenry than simply eliciting loyalty and enforcing good behavior. The capacity required for what I would call the state's "transformative role" is correspondingly greater. 6
• Countries that attempt activities other than those compatible with their productive endowments simply saddle themselves with wasteful output and lose potential gains from trade. 8
• A simple assessment of natural resource endowments or the relative scarcity of different factors of production cannot tell us who will have a comparative advantage in chemicals or designer jeans. Social and political institutions must be analyzed as well. 9
• Different kinds of state structures create different capacities for action. Structures define the range of roles that the state is capable of playing. Outcomes depend both on whether the roles fit the context and how well they are executed. 11
• A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private implementation. Dense connecting networks without a robust internal structure would leave the state incapable of resolving "collective action" problems, of transcending the individual interests of its private counterparts. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state be called developmental. 12
• Neo-utilitarian political economy is both cynical and utopian: cynical in denying the practical importance of "public spirit" and utopian in assuming that the "invisible hand" offers an easy substitute. 25
• Neo-utilitarian conceptions of the market…tend to slip from the assertion of neo-classical economics that competitive markets will result in short run allocative efficiency to the much stronger assertion that competitive markets are sufficient to produce the kind of structural transformation that lies at the heart of development. Neoclassical economic theory is much more agnostic on the likelihood that marginal maximization will move inexorably in the direction needed to achieve long-run optimization. 25
• Neo-utilitarians often go well beyond the assertions of classical political economy in denying the importance of cultural norms and other kinds of social relations in sustaining exchange. Adam Smith, after all, considered The Theory of Moral Sentiments a natural complement to The Wealth of Nations. 26
• Looking at established market societies, Weber argued that the operation of large-scale capitalist enterprise depended on the availability of the kind of order that only a modern bureaucratic state could provide. 29
• If Weber is right, imposing different policies on a state apparatus without changing the structure of the state itself will not work. Real changes in policies and behavior depend on the possibility of erecting new state structures. 30
• Bureaucracies and organizations do not necessarily stand in opposition to markets. Rather they are often put in place in an effort to underpin and to unleash market forces. 35
• This "embedded autonomy," which is precisely the mirror image of the incoherent despotism of the predatory state, is the key to the developmental state's effectiveness. "Embedded autonomy" combines Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense connection to the surrounding social structure. 50
• Only a state that is capable of acting autonomously can provide this essential "collective good." Embeddedness is necessary for information and implementation, but without autonomy, embeddedness will degenerate into a super-cartel, aimed, like all cartels, at protecting members from changes in the status quo.
• It is an autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and regeneration of goals and policies. 59
• Embeddedness…implies a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation. 59
• Either autonomy or embeddedness may produce perverse results without the other. Without autonomy, the distinction between embeddedness and capture disappears. Autonomy by itself does not necessarily predict an interest in development, either in the narrow sense of economic growth or in the broader sense of improved welfare. The secret of the developmental state lies in the amalgam. 59
• The kind of embeddedness that might allow state managers to provide information dissemination, consensus building, tutelage, and cajoling to potential entrepreneurs seems almost entirely absent from the Indian scene.
• Less internal capacity, more difficult environments, and less carefully defined agendas of involvement combined to put embedded autonomy of the sort that characterizes the developmental state out of reach. 70
• Simplistic notions of the virtues of insulating state from society must be rejected. Some degree of "insulation" is inherent in creating a cohesive collectivity, but real effectiveness requires combining internal loyalties with external ties. 72
• Zero-sum visions in which the state's ability to behave as a coherent corporate sector varies inversely with its connectedness to civil society set us on the wrong track. Internal cohesiveness and dense external ties should be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Efficacious states combine well-developed, bureaucratic internal organization with dense public-private ties. 72
• One thing remains clear: variations in internal state organization and state-society relations create differential degrees of developmental capacity. 73
• A dynamic, carefully and rationally planned, state enterprise sector could, as far-sighted helmsman of the economy, mobilize scarce resources, stimulate markets, adopt new technologies, and rapidly lift the entire economy to a level of self-sustaining industrial growth. 79
• The global context creates a changing array of opportunities, but taking advantage of them requires institutional capacity effectively implemented through a variety of roles. 93
• State involvement varies systematically across sectors. What roles states try to play depends of the technological and organizational characteristics of the sector. How well the roles are played and with what consequences depend on each state's institutional characteristics. 93
• Countries with local producers, who understood local cultural and organizational patterns and had a strong incentive to make the technology fit, would have a big advantage in becoming good users. 96
• The best explanation for indigenization in computers is the need for self-reliance in defense. 106
• The relatively weak contribution of transnational capital to the development of local information technology made self-reliance more attractive. 106
• The ability to control and assimilate borrowed innovations, not "technological autonomy", was the name of the game. Constructing local technological capacity remained the primary goal but the relation between local technological development and foreign ties was seen as complementary. Instead of trying to restrict and discipline technological connections between local and international firms, the aim of policy was to proliferate international ties while mediating them in order to increase their positive impact on local capabilities. 111
• Policing and promotion do not connect "the state" with "economic elites"; they connect specific state agencies and the people that run them with specific firms and their owners. Sectoral relations reflect larger structural patterns, but it is at the level of firm and agencies that roles really play themselves out. 127
• Using state firms as substitutes for private production in the manufacture of commodity products is a mistake. It channels scarce state capacity into activities where the state has no comparative institutional advantage, generates relations of conflict rather than complementarity with local entrepreneurs, and complicates state firms' ability to serve as a front of indigenous technological capacity. 139
• In the cases of Brazil and India, government research institutes appear to have operated with a minimum of collaboration with those firms which would ultimately manufacture the switches. Technology development and diffusion were treated as distinct activities, whereas in Korea they were closely inter-related. 143
• The embedded autonomy that characterized state-society relations in general created a matrix for public-private collaboration adapted to the special circumstances of building high-technology industry. 146
• Private entrepreneurs hoping to carve out a market niches based on indigenous product innovation were often frustrated by other contradictions between the state's support in principle for indigenous development and the weakness of institutionalized efforts on behalf of would-be local innovators. 151
• It makes sense that these countries might have had a comparative advantage in tasks that required skilled professionals, like engineers and software designers, but it took on the ground experimentation to create a convincing demonstration. 178
• Some skeptics still want to argue that the rise of local firms and the state's efforts at promoting information technology production are only coincidentally connected, that the apparent relation is spurious, and that local firms would have come into being and grown just as rapidly if the state had ignored information technology. Unfortunately, disproving this counterfactual argument would take evidence from a range of countries vastly broader than the range that has been considered here. Nonetheless, believers in spuriousness have a lot to explain away. There are too many instances where the connection between the initiation of a policy and the initiation of an investment is undeniable. Some local firms have had started anyway, but to argue that the information technology industries that existed in these three countries at the end of the 1980s were only coincidentally related to patterns of state involvement over the prior twenty years strains credulity. 179
• For local firms, successfully negotiating the new internationalization meant combining a multiplicity of international linkages with indigenous innovation, increasing local value-added, offering superior solutions for local users, and exploiting niches in international markets. 188
• Since responsibility for defending technological autonomy was allocated primarily to state firms, local hardware manufacturers has always been more open to internationalized strategies. 190
• Neither new ties between transnational and local capital nor new exports were laurels on which to rest. 203
• Investment in high technology infrastructure complimented both general support for knowledge creation and specific support for new products. 213
• With the growth of local companies came more, not less, involvement with international markets, global technology, and transnational capital. 216
• Embeddedness is not necessarily restricted to connections with industrial capital. Reconstruction must involve a more encompassing definition of embeddedness. 240
• Once the state is connected to all major social actors, the image of independent bureaucrats forming their own project and imposing it on society becomes implausible. At the same time, the notion that transformative projects are forged independently of the state apparatus becomes even more implausible. Since any strategy for change must reconcile conflicting interests, the necessity of a strong mediating institution is obvious. The state's independent influence depends on a balance of forces in civil society, but the balance is actively constructed rather than the result of exogenous stalemate. 242
• If reconstruction of the development state occurs, it will undoubtedly take the form of a indigenous innovation. Implausible institutional innovation is, after all, central to the process that produced the development state to begin with. 243
• The power of embedded autonomy arises from the fusion of what seem at first to be contradictory characteristics. Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, protecting the state from the piecemeal capture, which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors. The state's corporate coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps groups that share its vision overcome their own collective action problems. Just as predatory states deliberately disorganize society, development states help organize it. 248
• The fate of civil society is inextricably bound to the robustness of the state apparatus. Deterioration of state institutions is likely to go hand in hand with the disorganization of civil society. Sustaining or regaining the institutional integrity of state bureaucracies increases the possibility of mounting projects of social transformation. 249
• Bureaucracy is not enough. Even the most bureaucratically coherent state cannot effect transformation without a network of ties to social groups and classes with which it shares a project. Connectedness is as important as coherence and cohesion. 249
• Nationalist initiatives ended up contributing to the emergence of internationalized industries that were, for at least some of the initiators, mirror images of what they had hoped for. 249
• Social structural changes, even if partially put in motion by the state itself, supersede the organizations and policies that created them, forcing changes in the state itself. 250
• Disdain is often deserved, but state bureaucracies can also be homes to creative and entrepreneurial initiatives. Used imaginatively, they can spark new sources of social energy. 250

Killick, T. (ed.) (1995) The Flexible Economy: Causes and Consequences of the Adaptability of National Economies, London: Routledge.
"Relevance, meaning and determinants of flexibility," T. Killick, pp. 1-33.

• An economy with a flexible structure, which can readily adjust with the needs of the time, will achieve faster development than an economy with rigid structure. Inflexible economies can expect retarded growth, with disjunctures between demand and supply creating bottlenecks, balance-of-payments strains, inflationary pressures and other economic dislocations. 1
• The flexibility of national economies is a distinctive concept, worthy of separate study, which is not adequately treated in the present literature on market efficiency and long-run development. 1
• Responsive flexibility refers to the reaction of economic agents to altered relative prices or other economic stimuli. By contrast, innovatory flexibility refers to changes initiated by the exercise of entrepreneurship. 8 It may involve the creation of new, or substantially altered , institutions - generally a protracted process. 9
• …institutions, and their adaptability, mattered most in explaining the differential rates of diffusion of economic growth. 10
• A flexible economy requires a population that is willing to take action to maximize whatever material benefits may be derived from changing conditions (or to minimize the costs). This points in favor of an individualistic (or family-based) welfare maximizing approach, and mobility in pursuit of this objective, since collective action is apt both to be slower and more uncertain. 10
• By reducing risks and losses of equity, and by offering a financial reward, it tends to increase total saving. It thus also promotes capital formation, by increasing the supply of investible resources. It thus also promotes capital formation, by increasing the supply of investible resources. Savings are transferred to investors with different needs, degrees of risks and prospective rates of return, thereby permitting more diversified and efficient investment. 14
• …a society with a vigorous entrepreneurial culture is likely to have a flexible economy. 16
• Product and process changes are self-evidently among the most important forms of innovatory flexibility. 16
• …we can define a flexible economy as one which individuals, organizations and institutions efficiently adjust their goals and resources to changing constraints and opportunities. 18

"Flexibility and long-term economic development", M. Syrquin, 34-63

• Flexibility and adaptability appear to be key elements in facilitating the all encompassing transformation required by modern economic growth, particularly in view of the conflictual nature of the process. 34
• The level of flexibility of an economy can be said to depend on (a) informational and incentive systems and (b) factors bearing on the responsiveness of economic agents to those systems. The first category refers to factors affecting the opportunity sets of economic agents, while the second focuses on the agents' reactions. 35
• More generally, [flexibility] is the ability to create new opportunities in addition to recognizing and exploiting available ones. 36
• To enhance flexibility, we need inducement mechanisms that can help mobilize the underutilized resources. 40
• The concept of flexibility is particularly relevant in disequilibrium situations, but mainstream economics is not as developed in dealing w/ such situations as its is for the analysis of equilibrium. 42
• A central component for the acquisition of human capital is 'the value of the ability to deal with disequilibria'. Education is shown to influence positively the ability to cope with change. 42
• As the level of income goes up we can expect flexibility to increase as a result of the following development-related changes: an improvement in the systems generating and disseminating information, a rise in the levels of education and skills in the labor force, a change in the attitudes of the population leading to a higher mobility and responsiveness in general, and a greater commitment to growth of the part of the government. 50
• The main conclusion...is that flexibility can probably be enhanced by very prosaic methods. Foremost is education and more generally, the development of human capabilities, which ultimately determine the capacity to adapt and to transform. 59

"Adapting the economies of Eastern Europe: Behavioral and institutional aspects of flexibility," A. Neuber, pp. 111-153

• "Institutions are the constraints that human beings impose upon themselves to structure human interaction. They consist of formal rules and informal standards of behavior and of their enforcement characteristics. Formal rules include political (and juridical) rules, economic rules, and contracts...Given the bargaining strength and the interests of decision making parties, the function of the rules is to facilitate exchange, political or economic. Informal constraints include conventions that evolve as solutions to coordination problems and that all parties are interested in having maintained; norms of behavior that are recognized standards of conduct; and self-imposed codes of conduct such as personal standards of honesty and integrity. Conventions are self-enforcing. Norms of behavior are enforced by the second party (the threat of retaliation for contract violation) or by a third party (societal sanctions). North D. 1992, "Privatization, incentives, and economic performance", in H. Siebert (ed.) Privatization: Symposium in Honor of H. Giersch, Tubingen: J.C. Mohr.
• …institutions also fulfill enabling functions, by stabilizing the environment for economic activity and by reducing uncertainty. 120
• …the adaptability of institutions has been identified as the major determinant of sustained economic development. 122
• …"a neoclassical vision of the world is one of flexibility". Little, I.M. 1982, p.25, Economic Development: Theory Policy and International Relations, New York: Basic Books.

So, A., Stephen, W. and Chiu, K. (1995) East Asia and the World Economy, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 3-30, 189-278.

• …exports make it possible for East Asian NIEs to overcome the limitations of their small domestic markets by ensuring economies of scale and full capacity utilization. 6
• …although import substitutions often leads to protectionism and monopolies, export-oriented industrialization provides the carrot-and-stick of competition, inducing technological change in export industries that must keep up with modern technology in order to improve their position in the world market. 6
• …four determinants of East Asian NIEs’ favorable economic performance are: stability of the incentive system, limited government intervention, well-functioning labor and capital markets, and a reliance on private capital. 6
• The neoclassical perspective contributes by pointing to the importance of export-led industrialization in East Asian development. Highlighting the factors of private enterprise, free markets, and positive but limited government intervention, this neoclassical perspective has received strong support from transnational corporations, which have sought to open markets in developing countries to allow them to move their assets worldwide in search of profit maximization. This is because neoclassical economists’ doctrines of free trade and investment, free market, and limited government intervention have enabled the transnational corporations to present their own interests as entirely consistent with the interests of developing countries. What is missing in the neoclassical perspective, then, is its critical examination of the impact of transnational corporations, an interstate system, and regional dynamics on East Asian development. 7
• …the cultural perspective allows researchers to relate development policy choices and institutions to certain cultural antecedents that make the reasons for such choices easier to understand. In other words, the cultural perspective is aimed at providing researchers with a frame of reference within which they can see how values, attitudes, and practices have influenced the developing countries. Thus, the cultural perspective complements rather than contradicts the neoclassical economic interpretation. 8
• For a society to move into modernity, the classical modernization school argues, the traditional structures and values must be totally replaced by a set of modern values. The economic backwardness of the developing countries, therefore, is explained by their inability to get rid of traditional cultural elements. For instance, the economic stagnation in Japan and South Korea in the early 1950s was routinely attributed to their Confucian heritage, because the formal Confucian tradition frowned on merchants and cast suspicion on easy money from unproductive activities. 8
• …Westerners and early Asian reformers had originally wrongly dismissed Confucian learning as a handicap to development, because they saw it merely as a process of training in textual memorization. Rather than closing people’s minds, Confucian tradition was capable of opening them, teaching individuals to “learn how to learn,” and giving them the tools to observe, interpret, and take on new knowledge. It also taught them to internalize ethical principles friendly to economic development, such as diligence, self-sacrifice, and delayed gratification. In addition, in its primary concern of improving social relations, Confucianism established a precedent of focusing on education. Individuals were urged to seek self-improvement through intense study and purification of their minds. Furthermore, education in Confucian teachings urged the most highly trained to serve their community and country and prepared the masses to view learning as a path to improving their lot in life. 9
• The path to success was not through leaving the family to find one’s fortune, but through relying on and providing family assistance. 10
• Thus small family enterprises commonly started out with family savings or credit from relatives, drew on the labor of many unpaid family members, turned sitting rooms and family bedrooms into production sites, and relied on kin to obtain contracts and markets. 10
• The history of the firm emphasizes pride in distinctive traditions over many generations, and the firm employs a set of rituals and ceremonies to smooth the way for harmonious human relations. As a result of this pattern of personalistic management, the transition from the risk-oriented founders of pioneer industries to the more cautious managers of well-established enterprises has proven relatively easy in the East Asian region. 10
• …public belief in the rhetoric of public service to the national community is far more pervasive in East Asia than in the West. 11
• The cultural perspective contributes by highlighting the crucial role of Confucianism—especially its orientation toward learning and education, familism, personalistic management, and the high prestige of government service—in East Asian industrialization. 11
• Instead of emphasizing free markets, trade liberalization, private enterprise, and the restricted role of the state, the statist perspective contend that states have a strategic role to play in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to national ends. Instead of focusing on maximum profitability on the basis of current comparative advantage, the statist perspective focuses on the phenomenon of “late industrialization.” 12
• [Statist perspective] …arguing for the importance of a strong state to overcome market imperfections and the various bottlenecks of industrialization. 12
• the latest pertinent question of the statist perspective is how to find the appropriate mixture of market orientation and government intervention in a manner consistent with rapid and efficient late industrialization. 12
• …because huge business conglomerates (like the chaebols of South Korea) owed their phenomenal growth to special incentives provided by the state, and they remained dependent on the state for their survival. As a result, the private sector cooperated highly with the state policy of subsidies and discipline. …this unusual mixture of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private sector cooperation caused the emergence of a strong autonomous state that was not only able to formulate strategic developmental goals but was also able to translate these broad national goals into effective policy action to promote late industrialization in East Asia. 15
• If the neoclassical economic perspective is used by the transnational corporations to justify their claims to opening national markets for free trade and investment, then the statist perspective is a defense used by the East Asian state managers and planners to justify protectionism and intervention in their economy. 15
• What is missing in the statist perspective, then, are studies of labor repression, violation of human rights, environmental degradation, conflict with foreign corporations, and economic crises. 16
• Instead of predicting that the developing countries will eventually catch up with the West and modernize themselves, the dependency perspective foresees further economic backwardness, and even bankruptcy of the developing countries, if their present exploitative links with the West remain unchallenged. 16
• Instead of trying to gain the support of transnational capitalists and domestic state managers, the dependency perspective wants to appeal to those forces that have the greatest stake in a new strategy of democratic development—namely, farmers, workers, environmentalists, and small businessmen. 20
• …the dependency perspective holds a deterministic outlook that East Asian states, except Japan, are unable to solve their deep-rooted developmental problems. Thus it fails to address the issue that many East Asian states in the 1990s are not only experiencing upward mobility into advanced industrial countries but are also starting to diversify their investment in many Southeast Asian countries. 20
• What is missing in the literature…is a comprehensive meta-perspective that examines the complex interactions among economic, political, and cultural forces in shaping East Asian development. 21
• To conclude, world-system analysis, in its mature version, has gone beyond the problems of the dependency perspective to provide a methodological break with 19^th century social scientific inquiry. It offers a new mode of thinking that stresses large-scale, long-term, and holistic methodology. In addition, it has formulated many innovative concepts—such as incorporation, semiperiphery, regionalization, hegemony, rivalry, and anti-systemic movements—to examine the changing development in the world economy. 26
• Instead of focusing on what happened within any given nation-state boundary, the large scale orientation of world-systems analysis will call upon researchers to extend their unit of analysis to the entire East Asian region.
• Instead of confining itself to the study of capitalist states in East Asia, the world- systems analysis concept of antisystemic movements will call upon researchers to examine the origins, development, and transformation of Communist regimes in the East Asian region. 29
• In the aftermath of World War II, there were serious economic and political problems in South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Yet, in a short span pf about 3 decades, these three states quickly transformed themselves into newly industrializing economies. This chapter shows that the favorable postwar capitalist world economy, huge amounts of U.S. aid, and influxes of refugee capital in the 1950s laid the groundwork for the industrial takeoff of the East Asian NIEs. Then, the Vietnam War provided a further influx of U.S. money, and the U.S. market and U.S. planners induced the East Asian NIEs to pursue the strategy of export-led industrialization in the 1960s. Finally, cheap credit in the 1970s, the arrival of Japanese capital in East Asia, and the relative decline of U.S. hegemony in the region provided more space for the NIEs states to intervene actively in the industrialization process. 211
• The 1945-1967 period saw an incredible expansion of U.S. cultural influence worldwide, which can be observed through such phenomena as the universal of the ideology of developmentalism, the U.S. leadership in the contemporary social sciences and the arts, and the successful imposition of English as the sole lingua franca of the world system. Therefore, such American cultural constructs as free trade, democracy, individualism, and consumerism spread around the world. 231
• …the erosion of U.S. economic hegemony also began to weaken the foundations of U.S. cultural hegemony. By the late 1980s there were several signs to suggest that Japan and East Asia were having more cultural influence in the capitalist world economy. 231
• Where American developmentalism stresses the role of the individual, Confucianism emphasizes the subordination of the individual to group harmony. Where American developmentalism endorses liberty and democracy, Confucianism supports enlightened authoritarian rule by a centralized bureaucracy. Where American developmentalism promotes consumerism, Confucianism values frugality, saving, discipline, and hard work. 231-2

Chew, S., and Denemark, R. (1996) The Underdevelopment of Development: Essays in Honor of Andre Gunder Frank, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

"On Development: For Gunder Frank", 61-86, Samir Amin

• [Conclusions of dependency school] a) that polarization (seen from the periphery, it manifests itself as dependency) is a fact (no one denies this); b) that polarization is inherent in capitalism (this viewpoint is not that of the bourgeois ideologists), although the analysis of the mechanism of polarization opens the field to fertile debates; c) that the polarization inherent in capitalism gained momentum during the mercantilist epoch, deployed itself with the industrial revolution, took it present form with imperialism in the sense of Lenin, and perhaps has embarked on a new stage of intensification (my argument); d) that consequently the peoples of the periphery can only liberate themselves from the disastrous effects by breaking with the world capitalist system (by delinking) and in doing so with the social logic of capitalism tout court by building socialism; and e) that delinking and building socialism constitute projects that develop in revolutionary states. 63
• For those of us who see development as a shorthand term for progressive social design, the democratization of society is, by definition, an integral part of the development process. Without it, the liberation and empowerment of the people are only empty words. 80
• …at the level of the world system, the struggle should aim at the reconstruction based on the negotiated creation of major regional blocs strong enough to meet current challenges. 84
• The task ahead is first and foremost the reconstruction of the social power of the popular classes that has been eroded by the ongoing crisis. (Last sentence in essay) 85

"World Systems: Similarities and Differences," pp. 246-258, Christopher Chase-Dunn

• Modern hegemons do not conquer adjacent core states to extract taxes and tribute. Rather, they sought to control international trade, especially oceanic trade, that linked cores with peripheries. This is why the modern world system is resistant to empire formation. The most powerful state in the system acts to block empire-formation and to preserve the interstate system.

"The Art of Hegemony," Albert Bergesen, pp. 259-278

• …the evolution of sequential stages within a social formation is interrupted in some parts of the world (the South) when other sectors reach certain levels of development (the predatory North). The development of one part of the world now inhibits the development of other areas. 261

"Frank justice rather than frankenstein injustice: Homogenous development as deviance in the diverse world," Pat Lauderdale, pp. 314-343

• [A.G.F.] I reject as contrary to fact the more commonly held supposition that underdevelopment is somehow original or traditional, or that developed countries were once underdeveloped as the underdeveloped ones are now; and I try to suggest how internationally, nationally, and regionally that underdevelopment development no less than "development," each in a close causative relation with the other, as a result of capitalism development itself. (Quoted on page 318)
• Dependency works against community determination and autonomy. 326
• [The sources of injustice] a) the continued exposure of exploitation in labor relations, b) the exclusion of participants in decision-making and policy agendas, c) the erosion of community solidarity and identity and the right to sovereignty, and d) the long-term cost to nature when it is defined in indigenous terms - that is, both humans and the environment as nature, rather the modern notion of nature as separate and subservient to humans.

"Underdevelopment and Its Remedies," Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. 355-361

• Because we are still living in this system and because any transition is still a matter of fifty years or more, we need a strategy for change that can rally support, combined with clarifying alternatives. We thus need a strategy with three time components: immediate, middle run, and long-run. The immediate involves the struggles that go on now at the local level (and, of course, local involves state level) that impinge on how lives are led immediately. It is not that any changes achieved at this level are wide-ranging. It is rather that people want and need the immediate ameliorations now at that the struggle to achieve them is not only mobilizing but also disconcerting for the forces of the status quo. 359
• …two lessons we can draw from the long history of such immediate struggles. First, they are useful insofar as they improve lives immediately, but they can never be allowed to become ends in themselves because, as soon as they do, they become instruments of our co-optation. Second, because al such struggles are local and therefore reflect the hurts of some particular group, it is important to remember that there are many hurts of many groups and that, therefore, alliances are essential if these struggles are not to become modes of division.
• [long-run] we have to engage seriously in the project of inventing the future system - not by a philosopher-king, but collectively.

Kempe, R. (1996) Development in the Third World: From Policy Failure to Policy Reform, New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk.

• The development-growth distinction is essential in economic thinking. Growth and development are different processes that are considered complementary in the long run but competitive in the short run. Economic growth is regarded as a process of simple increase, implying more of the same, while economic development is a process of structural change, implying something different is not something more. 4
• In the mid-1960s, rapid industrialization was regarded as an illusion and rapid agricultural growth became the only road to development. It was felt that, in the debate over industrialization, the relative importance of the agricultural sector still loomed large in the Third World since it was the sector that provided employment for the bulk of the labor force, contained the majority of poor people, and was the birthplace of many of the urban poor. Furthermore, it was generally the foreign exchange earnings from the agricultural sector that tended to permit or constrain the expansion of industrial output and employment. 6
• Development and underdevelopment were considered characteristics of the global system and were linked functionally, and, therefore, interacted and conditioned each other mutually. 7
• …the periphery was seen as having a reflex type of development that was constrained by its incorporation into the global system and that resulted from its adaptation to the requirements of the expansion of the center. Dependency theory, however, tended to overstate the role of external influences, and consequently minimized the internal factors affecting the development of more equitable domestic economic, social, and political systems. A reduction of dependence on the industrialized nations would have required better management of local resources and significant social and economic changes within the Third World. 7
• …that the policy framework to be considered and adapted by the Third World should, of necessity, have been more introspective in nature. The exclusive focus on "dependency" to explain underdevelopment encouraged the evolution of a paralyzing and self-defeating mythology. 7
• The basic-needs approach differed conceptually from other poverty-oriented development strategies. In defining the objectives and distinguishing features of the basic-needs policy approach, recognition was given to the fact that countries would have different requirements as a result of their varying economic, political, social, cultural, and technological characteristics. As a result there was no objective criteria for defining the contents of a basic-needs bundle. 9
• During the 1980s to the present period, the focus shifted to private-sector-led development. This not only was the policy thrust emanating from the international development agencies, but also represented an important policy shift for many Third World nations that implemented and are implementing such a policy. After decades of growing state involvement in development, many Third World nations found themselves in the throes of a serious fiscal crisis that necessitated their policy shift from the public to the private provision of goods and services. 9
• Without a viable private sector, Third World governments would not be able to stimulate or sustain economic growth, and their economies would remain in crisis indefinitely, thereby contributing to all sorts of negative externalities. It is worth repeating here that public enterprises in the world should be privatized, and further private sector initiatives need to be put in place not only to benefit from the subterranean economy but also to encourage additional domestic and foreign private investment in general. It is essential to stress here, however, that privatization does not necessarily imply termination of government responsibility for any essential services or for the general welfare of the citizenry. 156
• …by the early 1980s, the countries with the highest rates of economic growth and prosperity were those that emphasized market-oriented policies, while those with serious economic problems were those that had emphasized state intervention and regulation of their economies. 172

Levy, M. (1996) Modernization and the Structure of Societies, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

• There are two situations in which any conceivable structure might be fast-changing. One is a situation in which for whatever reason there develops a charismatic leader. The other is a situation in which the reinforcement of previously existing social structures is destroyed. 798
• One of the problems always connected with social change - quite apart from the substantive nature of the change itself - is the rate at which the change takes place. There are upper limits on the rate of social change to which human beings can adjust. Save the short run periods in social history this has probably never been an endemic problem until the development of highly modernized societies. Nevertheless, apart from this extreme case, societies vary radically as to the rates of change to which their members can adjust readily. There is no reason to believe that the greater the rate of change to which people have previously been accustomed, the greater is the ease of adjustment to increased rates of change. The substantive nature of the changes may be more relevant than the previous rate of change to which the members of a given society were accustomed. In the case of the members of highly modernized societies, within certain limits, a decrease in the rate of change may be as difficult to adjust to as an increase would be for persons accustomed to a different situation. 798-9
• In general, until the development of relatively modernized societies, the term old-fashioned has never been a general term of derogation, but even some of the members of the most highly modernized of societies conceive of a return to the old-fashioned as a solution to current problems. The more highly modernized a given society the more radical are the implications of fundamentalistic reactions. In this sense the development of high levels of modernization makes radicals of conservatives and vice versa. 799
• Despite all the so-called differences amongst cultures (or people) with regard to the emphasis placed on spiritual rather than material factors, and there never have been; there are none who do not distinguish between being relatively better off and being relatively worse off materially, and there never have been; there are none who do not prefer to some extent to be relatively better off materially, and there never have been; and there are none who will make no effort whatsoever to improve their material positions if the possibility of doing so is made clear to them, and there never have been. People do defer in the prices they are prepared to pay to be relatively better off materially, and that is what most of the sanctimony has been about, but the biggest difference amongst peoples in the past has probably been that their general conception of possibilities of material improvement have only been those of scarce episodic movement. 815
• The problem that requires explanation is not why people have trouble with modernization. The patterns that characterize modernization are so queer - so at adds at what has been par for the course for human - so different from the commonalities that enable Shakespeare to communicate across the most difficult language barriers. The problem that requires explanation - as Einstein once observed of modern science - is how it ever arose at all - why some people seem - at least for a time - to have accommodated themselves to those patterns relatively quickly and easily. It is the "successes" of England as a first comer and of Japan as a late-comer that require explanations, that are mysterious - not the problems of a China or of a Uganda or of an India even. The patterns to which adjustment must be made, if "success" is to be achieved, are, by all past human experience, inhuman. Basically, one of the most fundamental problems facing new-comers under the impact of subversive contacts with modernization is a formulate a new basis for coordination and control, usually incompatible with and alternative to be previously accepted bases of political allocation. This has sometimes been hampered by colonial status, no doubt, but it has also been furthered in some cases by colonial status, regardless of the intentions of the colonial rulers. 817

Coughlin, R. (1997) How Different is the United States, Journal of Policy History, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 490-494.

• …the first and arguably most important point of difference between the United States and nonimmigrant nations such as those of Western Europe or Japan: that anybody willing to embrace the American creed can, at least in theory, join up and (eventually) gain acceptance as an "American." 491
• …the nation's openness to accepting new members in its ranks and the unparalleled individual freedom it has offered its citizens are mirrored by a set of chronic problematic conditions that stem directly or indirectly from the American creed: the nation's tendency towards contentiousness and sectarianism; the fierce moralistic fervor the surrounds the discussion of many issues; the lack of respect for the rule of law; and the abiding tolerance for the levels of economic inequality found nowhere else among the ranks of modern industrial societies. 491

Greider, W. (1997) One World, Ready or Not, New York: Touchstone.

• The present economic revolution, like revolutions of the past, is fueled by invention and human ingenuity and a universal aspiration to build and accumulate. But it is also driven by a palpable sense of insecurity. No one can be said to control the energies of unfettered capital, not important governments or financiers, not dictators or democrats. 12
• McDonald's measures its market potential with numbers like these: In the United States, there is a McDonald's restaurant for every 29,000 Americans. In China, despite rapid expansion, there is one McDonald's for every 40 million Chinese. 14
• "Universal means taking a risk in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, language, nationality, which so often shield us from the reality of others. It also means looking for a trying to uphold a single standard for human behavior when it comes to such matters as foreign and social policy" (Said, E. (1994) Representations of Intellectuals, New York: Pantheon). 17
• The global economy divides every society into new camps of conflicting economic interests. It undermines every nation's ability to maintain social cohesion. It mocks the assumption of shared political values that supposedly unite people in the nation-state. 18
• Asian markets now count 33 million incomes of $30,000 or more place them above the American family median. By 2000, these Asian affluents are expected to number 50 million, a market still less rich than the United States but coming up smartly. 19
• During the last generation the world's 500 largest multinational corporations have grown sevenfold in sales. Yet the worldwide unemployment of these global firms has remained virtually flat since the early 1970s, hovering around 26 million people. The major multinationals grew in sales from $721 billion in 1971 to $5.2 trillion in 1991, claiming a steadily growing share of commerce (one third of all manufacturing exports, three fourths of commodity trade, four fifths of the trade in technology and management services). Yet the human labor required for each unit of their output is diminished dramatically. 21
• In 1971, 280 of the largest 500 multinationals were American-based. By 1991, the United States had only 157 on the list. Europe's largest companies surpassed America's in number and sales volume during the last half of the 1980s. By 1991, Europe had 168 of the largest 500. Japan, meanwhile, had risen in twenty years from 53 to 119. A few important multinational corporations have even emerged in countries that were once very poor - Korea, Taiwan, even Thailand. The corporate girth of nations is gradually dispersing, leveling out. 22
• International bank loans more than quadrupled from 1980 to 1991, reaching $3.6 trillion. Global bond financing expanded likewise. Cross-border stockholders in the so-called Triad - Europe, Japan, and the United States - nearly doubled during a few years in the late 1980s. 23
• The entire global volume of publicly traded financial assets (about $24 trillion) turns over every twenty-four days. 23
• The entire traded volume of U.S. Treasury debts ($2.6 trillion) turns over every eight days. 23
• Marxism is utterly vanquished, if not yet entirely extinct, as an alternative economic system. Capitalism is triumphant. The ideological argument first joined in the mid-nineteenth century in response to the rise of industrial capitalism, the deep argument that has pre-occupied political imagination for 150 years, is ended. 36
• "The extreme social transformations of this century have caused hardly any stir. They have proceeded with a minimum of friction, a minimum of upheavals….Indeed, if this century proves one thing, it is the futility of politics….[T]hese enormous transformations in all developed free-market countries were accomplished without civil war and, in fact, in almost total silence" (Ducker, P. (November 1994) "The Age of Social Transformation," Atlantic Monthly). 41
• The dirt little secret about technological revolution is that it typically depresses a firm's rate of return per unit, whether the form is making cars or computers. Falling prices, as always, threaten profit margins. Production costs may fall dramatically, sales volumes may expand robustly. Yet the rate of return remains in jeopardy. 46
• The process of global economic integration is broadly driven by market forces, in particular the competitive price pressures to reduce costs, but the actual events of industrial movement depend crucially upon political transactions - irregular deals that often offend the reigning principles of free-market enterprise. When a multinational corporation seeks to shift production to low-wage labor markets, a process of political bargaining ensues with the governments competing for the new factories. Concessions are offered, deals are made, investments follow. 81
• A corporation's power is naturally strongest if it is dealing with a small, very poor country desperate for industrial development. The terms typically involve special political favors not available to others in commerce: state subsidies, exemption from taxation, government suppression of workers, special status as export enclaves free of import duties. With these protective benefits, commerce is a able to leap across the deepest economic and social divisions, bringing advanced productive systems to primitive economies, disturbing ancient cultures with startling elements of modernity. 81
• Multinationals are, in effect, conducting a peripatetic global jobs competition, awarding shares of production to those who make the highest bids - that is, the greatest concessions by the public domain. If a poor country like Malaysia grants public favors to capital in exchange for scarce jobs, then so will Ohio or Alabama. 82
• To soften social conflict and compensate for the low industrial wages, Asian governments also typically constructed elaborate-social-subsidy systems, public housing and income supports that both ameliorated and controlled. 87
• …the United States and some other advanced nations were now mimicking the Third World - bidding for jobs with public money, offering irregular favors to migrating capital. The dispersal of manufacturing might be driven by other imperatives, but companies naturally collected whatever was available from the process. In Britain, Ford threatened to locate production of a new Jaguar model and a thousand jobs in the United States if the United Kingdom did not provide an additional $150 million in state aid for the plant. 93
• The global economy was a feminist issue. Across Asia and other developing regions, foreign-owned factories, from electronics to textiles, were typically "manned" by workforces that were 80 to 90 percent female. This was not an accident of the marketplace. The companies deliberately recruited younger women…for "the sense of discipline that women have acquired through subjection to patriarchal domination in the household" (Henderson). As new industrial workers, not unlike the new auto-workers in the American South, the women would not bring "bad work habits," including familiarity with trade unions. 98
• The same technological imperative that continuously reduces costs and improves quality has also generated a seemingly permanent and expanding surplus in the productive capacity of the world. Crudely stated, the technology competition leads companies to invest in more output of goods than the global marketplace of consumers can possibly absorb. New Factories, designed to produce more from less, naturally increase the capacity for production, but the output potential expands faster than older, less efficient factories are being closed. This underlying imbalance is compounded by the accelerating drive for globalization, as firms both modernize and rush to build new production in the developing markets. 103
• "Inevitably, as the number of producers grows, the tendencies towards global oversupplies will be enhanced, competition will get tougher, rates of return may decline and U.S. based production and the production of other major developed-country producers will become an even smaller portion of total world production…. [T]he tendency toward a diminished role for U.S.-based production in total global production seems quite inevitable.…" (Lenz, A. (November 1994) "The U.S. Chemical Industry: Performance in 1994 and Outlook," Chemical Manufacturers Association). 116
• The United States was, by far, the most open marketplace in the world and the leading advocate for opening other markets. Nevertheless, when influential sectors demanded it, the U.S. government also managed trade in behalf of domestic interests. During the Reagan presidency the free-market conservatives promoting economic deregulation also worked out important limiting agreements covering autos, steel, textiles, semiconductors, machine tools and others. These were usually said to be "voluntary," a convenient hypocrisy that may have misled some Americans but not the foreign producers. 137
• …despite the reigning pieties, the global system could not properly be called a free-trade regime. When all the contradictions exceptions and purposeful evasions were taken into account, most of the world's trade was not a free exchange based on market prices. One way or another, trade was massaged and regulated, managed explicitly by governments or internally by the multinational corporations or often by both in discreet collaboration. Lawrence B. Kraus…aggregated all of the different ways in which trade was managed - openly and covertly - and concluded that only about 15 percent of global trade was genuinely conducted in free-market circumstances Other scholars have calculated that governments directly managed 25-30 percent of trade through their various nontariff barriers. Multinational corporations themselves managed about 40 percent of global trade through the intrafirm among their own subsidiaries. 137
• Kraus noted that the top ten sectors, from aircraft to petroleum, were managed by governments or concerned firms, with the single exception of paper. These accounted for 22 percent of world trade. 138
• The globalization of industry - creating regionalized structures of production around the world - was intended to maximize these profit opportunities when they appear. It would simultaneously insulate firms from the fluctuating business cycles in different economies and regions. If demand was slowing in Europe or in the United States, shift output to booming China. If China crashed, shift it elsewhere. "If you diversify your sources of supply, you're insulated against these conditions," Van Bussman said. "Do you design smaller plants with lower cost curves. The world is moving toward that because it allows the flexibility to be very efficient." 158
• [Shamada] "China is a horror story for the rest of the world if it simply grows as an exporting nation. Overcapacity will have to be squeezed down. It will be increasingly unprofitable for companies to build new capacity in advanced nations. If the Chinese develop the technology and become productive without wages rising, then they will be a tremendous competitive ménage against the rest of the world. If you bring in 1.2 billion workers at those wages, that can destroy the global trading system."
• The history of capitalism suggested that this was an inevitable stage of industrial revolution - an explosive run-up of new technology and production, then intense competition and the emergence of vibrant new enterprises, followed by their collective struggle to establish order and more settled business environment. 184
• "Increasing output and overcapacity intensified competition and drove down prices. Indeed, the result decline in prices in manufactured goods characterized the economies of the United States and the nations of western Europe from the mid 1870s to the end of the century. On both continents the standard response by manufacturers to intensified competition and the resulting price decline was, first, to reach informal agreements as to price and output, and then to make more formal agreements (enforced by trade associations) to reduce output, set prices and allocate regional markets….The incentive to form such associations was particularly strong in the new capital-and-energy-intensive industries where several entrepreneurs had simultaneously adopted innovative technologies of production" (Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 185
• For roughly fifty years, the U.S. government has served as the tolerant and broad-shouldered leader that articulates the global system's putative rules and values and scolds (or sometimes punishes) those nations that fail to observe them. American policy permits the liberal dispersal of its own advanced technologies. It encourages and subsidizes U.S. multinationals globalizing their production. It provides financial support for foreign development and for the global institutions that supervise international finance and developing economies. It generously guarantees the military security of its economic competitors. It educates engineers and scientists for the world. But the U.S. economy provides support for the global system of a more crucial nature: the American market serves as buyer of last resort for the world, the only major economy that is willing year after year to absorb gross surpluses of production from other nations. 192
• As America's economic dominance has steadily weakened, the nation takes on an increasing volume of foreign indebtedness through its large and persistent trade deficits - the loss sustained every year by buying more goods from other economies than they are willing to buy from the United States. At the same time, the nation's broad capacity for mass consumption is being slowly eroded by declining wages and the loss of high-income employment, whether from technological reform or the migration of manufacturing sectors. Thus, the nation's economic resilience is weakening as its debt obligations accumulate. A very rich nation can manage to do this for quite a long time. But not forever. Sooner or later, like any other kind of debtor, the United States will be tapped out - no longer able to afford its role as buyer of last resort. As the enormous U.S. trade debts accumulate, the dollar declines steadily in foreign-exchange value, reflecting the country's diminishing strength. At some point, the nation's devalued purchasing power in global markets will, literally, price it out of buying so much from others. Like Britain's before it, and for roughly the same reasons, American hegemony will be ended. This reality may surface as a dramatic thunderclap or simply emerge from the slow, bleeding process that is already in progress. Either way, the moment of recognition promises crisis, not only for the United States, but also for the global economy at large. For Americans, the meaning is already being felt: a lower standard of living for most people, perhaps abruptly lowered if a sudden financial markdown of America's economic worth occurs. That by itself does not constitute a global crisis, given the luxurious and often wasteful nature of American consumption, and might even be therapeutic for Americans themselves in the long run. But it is sure to trigger a grace moment in U.S. politics and a deep psychic wound to the national self-confidence. 192-3
• The solemn, unexpressed hope of statesmen in that these great shifts of power will evolve gradually, without provoking a bloody breakdown. In the worst case, if many nations are abruptly unable to sell all their output and compelled to produce much less, it will trigger a world-wide implosion of commerce, that is, global depression. This is more or less how the last industrial revolution ended in the 1930s - in an abyss of mass suffering and conflict. It happened because neither governments nor enterprise was willing to pull back from the same economic imperatives that were driving them toward a disastrous climax. The standard response to this line of analysis is that, one way or another, things will work out - nations will adjust and the American imbalances will dissipate. 193-4
• The concrete evidence from the last two decades points in the opposite direction: the U.S. trade debt worsens steadily despite the American government's supposed success at fashioning liberalized trade agreements and more open markets, despite a much- celebrated revival of American competitiveness, despite the emergence of hot new markets with rising consumer demand, despite the declining dollar that has made U.S. goods cheaper in overseas markets. Given these facts, one would think it is time to reconsider the prevailing theory. Instead, American elites have become even more dogmatic in their attachment to it. 194
• Conceivably, this event could also renew American society if it prompts citizens to reevaluate their own social arrangements, to confront the harsh inequalities generated by the U.S. economic system and the gross wastefulness embedded in American material life. America's dilemma, however, is really a principal symptom of the global system's much larger disorder: the imperatives of industrial revolution create more supply faster than new demand and the expanding productive capacity overruns the available market consumers. 194
• NAFTA, he [Clinton] declared in late 1993, would generate 200,000 good, new jobs for Americans by boosting U.S. exports to the vibrant Mexican economy. Two years later Mexico was mired in depression, and just as NAFTA's critics had predicted, it was being used by U.S. and foreign multinationals as a convenient low-wage export platform into the rich American market. America's merchandise trade deficit with Mexico soared, reaching $15 billion in 1995, a major new source of U.S. trade debt. If one relied on the Clinton administration's own dubious formula for trade's relation to employment, the negative flow with Mexico translated immediately into 200,00 lost jobs for Americans. 195-6
• …the theoretical assumption supporting Clinton's claim - that greater global trade leads automatically to greater U.S. economic growth - is itself highly suspect. During the previous twenty years, when global trade and investment entered into dramatic expansion, the United States experienced the opposite: much slower economic growth. 196
• General Electric tripled its revenues and profits during the last fifteen years, while it shrank its world-wide workforce from 435,000 to 220,000. In the last decade, its employment feel from 243,000 to 150,000, while offshore it expanded modestly. 216
• In the global system, the United States faces two essential tasks: First, it must bring a halt to the unbalanced trade that is draining national wealth. Second, the government must shift its primary focus to defending the U.S. industrial structure and employment, not the U.S. multinationals themselves. On both fronts, the status quo is not sustainable. Yet both of these goals can be mutually reinforcing: confronting the persistent trade imbalances would enhance domestic employment as well as U.S. producers, and at the same time it could turn the global system in positive directions - away from the approaching cliff. U.S. multinationals may appear powerful and arrogant…but they are merely responding to the real imperatives of the present system, doing what they think is necessary to survive. Thus, their behavior is not likely to change unless the risks and incentives are altered for them in the system itself. 218
• [Godley] "It is a well kept secret that the theory of international trade - the entire story about the benefits every country can gain by exchanging its goods with other countries - depends upon the assumptions a) that trade between countries is balanced and b) that trade does not alter the level of employment or unemployment….International trade, if it is endemically unbalanced, threatens to impart a disinflationary shock to the U.S. economy which would cause severe unemployment and the shock would then be transmitted to the rest of the world." 222

Cardoso, F. “Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications,” pp. 142-176.

· …it does not matter greatly whether the industrial firms are owned outright by foreigners or are owned by Brazilians associated with foreign corporations, for in either case they are linked to market, investment, and decision-making structures located outside the dependent country. 146

· …to some extent, the interests of the foreign corporations become compatible with the internal prosperity of the dependent countries. In this sense, they help promote development. Because of this factor, the growth of multinational corporations necessitates a reformulation of the traditional view of economic imperialism which holds that the basic relationship between a developed capitalist country and an underdeveloped country is one of extractive exploitation that perpetuates stagnation. 149

· …the distinguishing feature of the new type of dependency that is evolving in countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico is that it is based on a new international division of labor. Part of the industrial system of the hegemonic countries is now being transferred, under the control of international corporations, to countries that have been already able to reach a relatively advanced level of industrial development. 156

· [Brazil] They did…share the goal of a strong executive, but they placed it under their direct control. This was accomplished, for example, by changing the organization and role of the military and civil offices of the presidency; broadening the scope of the National Security Council and particularly the latter's General Secretariat; creating a national intelligence service; and establishing security departments in all the ministries and state enterprises. In short, the aim was to establish even tighter linkages between the planning and control agencies of the executive and their counterparts in the armed forces, especially the chiefs of staff. Through these coordination devices, they sought to achieve even greater control over all the key economic sectors and to accelerate economic growth. Thus the military came to accept as their own the goals of centralization of the administration and the repression of all forms of social protest. Making the state apparatus more efficient and increasing repression developed side by side. Both were justified by the doctrine of national security. 158

· Dependent capitalism must…bear all the consequences of absorbing capital-intensive, labor saving technology, but that is not the main problem. It is crippled because it lacks a fully developed capital-goods sector. The accumulation, expansion, and self-realization of local capital requires and depends on a dynamic compliment outside itself: it must insert itself into the circuit of international capitalism. 163

· Any view that rationalizes de facto political processes, picturing them as the unfolding of an elite's conscious will, bears the burden of subjectivity. A more objective approach stresses the conflicts among groups within the arena of organized power as well as the conflicts between these groups and those located outside the arena who attempt to make their views felt and to change prevailing orientations. 168

· The possibility the coercion increases at the expense of information, to put it euphemistically, does exist. The possibility of keeping that tendency within limits will depend of the ability of some groups within the government, or of outside groups like the church, to neutralize the spiral of political violence. 174

· Without this participation [of the popular classes in politics], any "technical" formula for mass mobilization will lad to mass manipulation, and perhaps to an increase in the accumulation of wealth, but will not bring about political development favoring the majority and increasing the quality of life. 176

Hunt, L. “Charles Tilly’s Collective Action,” pp. 244-275.

• Tilly defines collective action very broadly as “people acting together in pursuit of common interests.” There is no necessary reference here to mode of production or social pathology. Tilly chooses collective action over collective behavior to emphasize the importance of agency: Acting together is not simply a response to changing conditions, for it can entail a purposeful shaping of conditions (e.g., the proactive type). (From Mobilization to Revolution, 1978, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, p. 7) 248
• People act collectively to maximize their collective gains, and they do so within the constraints set by the costs of such collective action. 251
• Tilly starts with a problem—collective action—that can be addressed from various vantage points, and he does not identify himself as the representative of any one theoretical affiliation. His most prominent procedure is to derive hypotheses from different theoretical positions (or from the literature inspired by those positions) and to test them, before drawing theoretical conclusions. Tilly’s agenda consequently emphasizes research and methodology, the “how to” of answering theoretical questions. The answers provided by research lead in turn to reformulation of theories of collective action. Thus Tilly’s own theoretical position is always necessarily in the process of development and unusually concerned with the problems of research strategy. 253
• Tilly explicitly aims to satisfy the cardinal criterion of scientific method; by making plain his assumptions and procedures, he makes possible the replication, validation, and falsifications of his conclusions. 258
• Two kinds of explanations emerge from Tilly’s research: (1) hypotheses that explain why changes in collective action took place in the way they did and what their specific, historical consequences were; and (2) general models of collective action. The two types represent different levels of generality, and the second depends on the first. 260
• The competitive-reactive-proactive classification rests on the claims being asserted: Competitive actions lay claim to resources also claimed by rival or competing groups; with reactive forms people act in the name of threatened rights; with proactive forms they assert group claims that have not previously been exercised. 261
• The conclusions that Tilly has drawn in recent years from his analysis of long-term changes are summarized most conveniently in The Rebellious Century: (1) the changes labeled modernization has no uniform effects on the level, focus, form, or timing of political conflict; (2) in the short run, rapid urbanization and industrialization generally depressed the level of conflict; (3) urbanization and industrialization could nevertheless stimulate conflict when they diverted resources from established groups (urban craftsmen, for instance) that retained their internal organization; (4) the emergence of industrial capitalism transformed the identities and the interests of the major contenders for power, as well as the form of their collective action; (5) the frequency and outcome of collective conflict depends on the operation of the state. 262-3
• Through organization, then (rather than social disorganization), modernization has transformed collective action. Urbanization channeled protest into the cities; the centralization and nationalization of politics shifted violent conflict to the national arena; and proletarianization created a new contender with new claims to press and encouraged the formation of centralized, bureaucratically integrated political and trade organizations. 263-4
• …the state was not just the object of struggle, but itself one of the chief parties to it. Coupled with this observation is the recognition that repression often works—periods of strong repression and central control such as the early years of the Second Empire and the two world wars produced little or no collective violence in France. 264
• According to Tilly, revolutionary situations occur when (1) contenders advance exclusive alternative exclusive alternative claims to control; (2) a significant segment of the subject population commits itself to these claims; (3) the agents of the government prove incapable or unwilling to suppress the alternative coalition. Since revolution is one kind of collective action, it is composed of similar elements, e.g., interests, organization, mobilization, and opportunity. It follows from this similarity that in Tilly’s view revolution is not an abnormal or pathological phenomenon; it is one of the possible outcomes of the struggle for power. 264

Ragin, C. and Chirit, D. “The World System of Immanuel Wallerstein: Sociology and Politics as History,” pp. 276-312.

• The basis of Wallerstein’s synthesis was the idea that whatever small technological and organizational advantage Western, particularly northwestern, Europe may have possessed at the end of the fifteenth century, it was turned into a much greater superiority by the West’s exploitation of non-Western peripheries. 276
• Drawing off the periphery’s resources enriched the capitalist core and allowed it to increase its sphere of control throughout the world. 276
• To Proudhon’s “Property is Theft,” Wallerstein added, in effect, that capitalist progress is theft on a global scale. 276-7
• It is a somewhat modified version of Marxism in which classes are viewed as transnational actors. The upper classes are situated primarily but not exclusively in the core, and peripheral societies contain the most exploited and the majority of the world’s proletariat. The upper classes maintain their power by manipulating the core states to defend their control over the periphery. Social change, in this view, is conditioned by changes in the world system as a whole, not by events in this or that country. Socialism can come only through a revolution in the entire system, not simply in one or several countries (much as this might help to create the conditions for an eventual world revolution). Perhaps most important in this world-system view is the notion that capitalism’s wealth is critically dependent on its exploitation of the periphery, not simply the domestic proletariat of the major core states (which can be bought off with the surplus product taken from the periphery). As the most exploited part of the system, the periphery will be the locus of the future world socialist revolution. 277
• World economies, by contrast, are integrated economically, not politically. While they lack political integration, the political entities embraced by a world economy constitute a single division of labor. This lack of political unity is one of the strengths of a world economy as a dynamic social system. Because of the absence of centralized control, economic actors have greater freedom of movement, which enhances their opportunities to amass wealth and promote accumulation of a global scale. These features of world economies also exacerbate the unequal distribution of wealth. 286
• The economic stagnation of noncore areas and the growing gap between core and noncore areas are due ultimately to the political and economic advantages bestowed on core nations by virtue of their historical priority in the world economy. 288-9
• Even though the capitalist world system has many different parts, an understanding of the whole provide a basis for interpreting the fate of each part. 296
• The modern world system was “born” in the sixteenth century. It matured and went through stages of growth. Its aging and ultimate “demise” are predictable, and it will then turn into a new organism, the socialist world system. 301-2
• …by making the world system almost the most meaningful source of change, except for the occasional “strong personality,” Wallerstein is able to make a series of important historical evasions. 303
• For Wallerstein no cultural differences between various peoples need be taken into account to explain different rates of development. 303

Samuelson, P. Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 7th ed., New York: McGraw Hill.

• Perfect competition is defined by the economist as a technical term: "perfect competition" exists only in the case where no farmer, businessman, or laborer is a big enough part of the total market to have any personal influence on market price; on the other hand, when his grain, merchandise or labor, is large enough in size to produce depressing or elevating effects on market prices, some degree of monopolistic imperfection has set in, and the virtues of the Invisible Hand must be that much discounted. 41
• Capital goods, then, represent produced goods that can be used as factor inputs for further production, whereas labor and land are primary factor inputs not usefully thought of as being themselves produced by the economic system. 48

Sunkel, O. "National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin America," The Journal of Development Studies.

• In an adequate historical perspective, development appears as a process of transformation of economic, social, political, and cultural structures and institutions. National development policy, to be effective, must therefore stimulate and promote the institutional and structural changes essential for the achievement of desired social goals. 23
• The formulation of a strategy of national development requires, therefore, a precise diagnosis of the mechanisms of dependence in all its forms: economic, political, military, and cultural. 28
• …the traditional agrarian structure has largely been preserved, seriously limiting modernization and technological improvement of rural production. Agriculture has been unable to respond efficiently to the demand for farm produce which has been strongly stimulated both by the growth of population and of urban incomes and by the development of industry itself, which, at least in its initial stages, is based largely on primary agricultural materials. Among other serious consequences this situation has contributed to the worsening of the balance of payments deficit, either because exports have been reduced or because agricultural imports have increased considerably. 28
• …one of the essential tasks of agrarian policy must be to speed up the growth of rural production available for the cities, at constant or decreasing relative prices for the urban consumer. As this must be compatible with an income rise for the peasants - the rural and urban poor being the political base of this strategy of development - it will be necessary to emphasize: (a) a substantial increase in yields per hectare; (b) the maximum efficiency and reduction of costs in the process of marketing; ( c) a lowering of the costs of agricultural inputs; and (d) a redistribution of income within the rural sector itself. 36
• From a strategy based unilaterally on import substitution, we must move in a decisive way to another which rests on three principle supports: (a) the expansion and diversification of exports, (b) internal structural changes in the agricultural sector and in manufacturing activity, and ( c) basic changes in the nature of foreign financial ties. 37
• …to the extent that technological progress is the fundamental determining factor of dynamic comparative advantage, it is absolutely essential to stimulate it, not just to make our own natural resources more valuable, but also to assure their optimum utilization. 39
• …to what extent will the limitations imposed by the web of international relations within which our countries exist, permit us to adopt policies and strategies of national development such as those suggested? 43
• It has become evident...that the revolutionary dangers and tensions in Latin America have their fundamental origin in the economic and social structure of these countries. 45
• …the fulfillment of the objective of reducing external dependence requires very important re-orientations in traditional development strategy, particularly relating to agrarian policy, integration, foreign relations, and industrial policy. 46

Viner, J. International Trade and Economic Development: Lectures Delivered at the National University of Brazil, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

• As long as a country has a comparative advantage in the expansion of agriculture over the expansion of manufacturing in the investment in their own estates of their savings by rural landowners may be the most productive and the most efficient investment under way in the national economy. 135
• If a government draws off from its citizens in taxes a part of what they otherwise would have spent for current consumption, and uses the proceeds in useful public works, the government is performing the saving function for the community. 137
• …foreign capital, in the absence of major changes in the international scene, will make but a marginal contribution to the capital needs of most underdeveloped countries. This renders all the more urgent the fostering of such internal conditions by these countries as will encourage domestic saving and the prudent use of the proceeds in the development of productive facilities, material and human. 140
• The greater the increase in a country's population, other things equal, the greater will tend to be the volume of its staple export products which it will attempt to market abroad, provided these are not also staple articles of domestic consumption, and therefore the worse will its terms of trade be. 142
• Primary commodities generally have a wider amplitude of fluctuation in their prices during the business cycle than do manufactured commodities. Countries exporting primary commodities are consequently squeezed during a depression by a greater drop in their export than in their import prices. ... During booms, primary products rise more in price than do manufactures. 142
• …for a country dependent to an important extent on exports of manufactures to finance its essential imports, any lag in technological progress can be fatal, this not true to anything like the same degree, if true at all, for a country which exports mainly primary products. 145
• …as per capita income rises the proportion of the income spent on primary products shrinks, so that there results, with rising per incomes, a relative trend of demand unfavorable to agriculture. ... But the relative decline in demand for agricultural products will not be a positive decline. It therefore will not prevent but will only lessen the rate of progress in per capita agricultural incomes if agriculture does not increase disproportionately... 145

Wilkie, M. Colonials, Marginals and Immigrants: Contributions to a Theory of Ethnic Stratefication.

• …ethnic groups are regarded as those socially differentiated by race, nationality, language, religion or by some recognizable cultural distinction. 73
• Assimilation s best regarded, not as a process of becoming socially indistinguishable from the mainstream groups in urban industrial society, but as accepting that society as the home base, the prime focus of allegiance and the place where personal ambitions are formed, achieved and enjoyed. 88